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ABSTRACT 
 
 How do shifts in the distribution of power effect the foreign policy decisions of states? In 
this dissertation, I argue that shifts in the distribution of power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power 
parity work together to significantly impact these decisions. Until this time, the conditional effect of 
these three variables has only been included in studies of major- or regional-power war, within the 
theoretical framework of power transition theory. To what extent do these correlates of war apply to 
foreign policy in general? Borrowing the insights of foreign policy substitution and the logic of the 
bargaining theory of war, I theorize that rapid shifts in relative state power increase the likelihood 
that states will engage in economic foreign policy that is aimed at either preserving or altering the 
status quo distribution of benefits, whether the policy in question is used as a tool of coercion or 
one of enticement. A key motivating factor for this study is to test the argument, put forward by 
foreign policy substitution, that similar factors can lead to different policy outcomes. In the 
empirical analyses, I find general support for this claim. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The motivation for this project came as a result of my exposure and subsequent interest in 
hegemonic theories of international relations, early in my graduate school career. Of these theories, 
power transition theory has especially captured my interest. The idea that global and regional 
hierarchies provide a loose form of governance in the international system is one that refutes both 
realist and liberal arguments concerning the anarchic international system. The argument that there 
are benefits to being the top dog, so-to-speak, and that states aspire and compete economically and 
politically to claim or maintain this position, provides a convincing account of how the international 
system operates. This is especially true in context of great power war, the phenomenon to which 
power transition theory owes its existence. It was the great power struggles of WWI and WWII that 
inspired Organski to formulate and publish the theory in 1958.1 Since its birth, the theory has 
enjoyed enduring validation.  
 Despite its impressive track record, in context of great power war, none have thought to 
determine whether its key tenets apply to manifestations of international conflict that fall short of 
war. This is surprising, especially when viewed in light of the observation that interstate war rare, 
and increasingly so, while other forms of conflictual foreign policy are much more common and 
becoming more so. For example, the provision of foreign aid increased from 1785 instances in 1962 
 
1 Granted, Thucydides argued over 2000 years ago that Athens growth in relative power with Sparta led to the 
Peloponnesian War. He did not formulate a comprehensive theory, however.  
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to 4315 in 2007, a 141 percent increase.2 That the key tenets of power transition theory have not 
been applied to the analysis of foreign policy outcomes that fall short of war becomes even more 
surprising if viewed in context of foreign policy substitution, which argues that similar stimuli can 
lead to different policy outcomes. It is logical that when factors that enhance the probability of war 
are present but do not result in war, that these same factors are likely leading the states in question 
to use alternative foreign policy tools that fall short of military force; states are not constrained to 
the binary policy decision of war or nothing. This logic leads to the main argument of this 
dissertation—namely, that shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity work together 
to significantly affect the probability of foreign policy options that fall short of war. This dissertation 
specifically analyzes how the interaction of these factors affects the probability that states will use 
economic sanctions, bilateral trade relations, and foreign aid in response to the unacceptable 
demands of their dyadic counterparts. 
Empirical Chapter Summaries 
Economic Sanctions 
 The first empirical chapter of this dissertation is a study of the effect of shifting relative 
power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity on the probability of economic sanctions 
imposition. In this chapter, it is theorized that the effect of shifting power on sanctions imposition is 
conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity existent in a 
state dyad. It is the expectation that, in conditions of uncertainty over capabilities and resolve, 
shifting power and greater status quo dissatisfaction increase the probability of sanctions, while a 
greater degree of power parity makes sanctions less likely. The rapid growth of a dissatisfied state 
makes it more likely that either the increasing state or the declining state will impose sanctions on 
the other, as a result of over-demanding or under-conceding. However, because senders want 
 
2 These figures were obtained using data from Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Roberts, Findley, and Popwers (2011). 
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sanctions to be costless to themselves, a greater degree of power parity in the dyad is expected to 
decrease the probability of sanctions, as it is costlier to sanction a state that is nearly equivalent in 
relative power than it is to sanction a state that is much weaker. The empirical results provide 
support for the theoretical expectations concerning sanctions imposition—namely, that shifting 
power’s effect on the probability of economic sanctions is conditional on the level of status quo 
dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity in the dyad. The change from a small to large shift in 
relative power is significant in both averagely dissatisfied and the most dissatisfied state dyads. The 
implication of these findings is that sanctions imposition is most likely in dyads characterized by a 
rapid shift in relative power, in favor of the weaker state, and by a high level of status quo 
satisfaction. Additionally, this is only the case in dyads that are near power parity.  
Bilateral Trade 
 The second empirical chapter analyzes the effect of shifting power, status quo 
dissatisfaction, and power parity on bilateral trade flows. In this chapter, it is theorized that a 
dissatisfied state’s uneven gains from bilateral trade provide the status quo state with the incentive to 
reduce its bilateral trade with an increasing, dissatisfied state, the goal being to slow the rate of the 
latter state’s relative increase in power. This is especially true in dyads that are near power parity. A 
growing, dissatisfied state is likely to use its improved position in the distribution of power to 
demand a greater share in the distribution of benefits. When this demand exceeds the cost for the 
status quo state to enact policies that restrict bilateral trade, the incentive to do so is present. 
Likewise, a dissatisfied, increasing state will have the incentive to enact policies that restrict bilateral 
trade when the latter’s demand to maintain the status quo exceeds the cost for the growing state to 
enact policies that restrict bilateral trade. Concerns over the gains from trade, and the associated 
demands to maintain or alter the status quo distribution of benefits are the motivating factors in 
both state’s decision to enact trade-restricting foreign policies against the other. 
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 In addition to the gains from trade arguments, trade may also decline because of the 
expectation of economic or political conflict. When the expectation of either type of conflict is high, 
the incentive exists to divert trade with one another to other states. In this vein, I argue that because 
a rapid increase in relative power by a dissatisfied state increases the probability of economic or 
political conflict in the dyad, these conditions can signal that the risk of conflict is high. In turn, this 
signal leads states restrict its trade with each other, leading to a decline in bilateral trade.  
 Finally, the occurrence of economic or political conflict directly impacts bilateral trade. 
Because I argue that a rapid increase in relative power by a dissatisfied state increases the likelihood 
of economic and political conflict, it is more likely that they will occur in dyads composed of an 
increasing, dissatisfied state and a more powerful, but declining status quo state. This is especially 
true in dyads characterized by a high degree of power parity. The expectation that economic and 
political conflict are higher in these dyads, leads to the expectation that these conditions lead to a 
decline in bilateral trade. The empirical results support the theoretical expectations—namely that 
rapidly shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity work together to exert negative 
pressure on bilateral trade. 
Foreign Aid 
 In this chapter, I ask how shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity work 
together to affect the use of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy. Evidence has recently been 
provided to support the argument that donor states do not only give foreign aid based on whether 
they enjoy congenial relations with the recipient state (Uzonyi and Rider 2017; Savun and Tirone 
2018). Additionally, more recent work by Early and Jadoon (2019) finds support for the argument 
that donor states use foreign aid to get recipients to act according to their wills. This is accomplished 
through fear, on the part of the recipient state, of having the aid they are receiving taken away. 
Following this line of research, I argue that a rapid increase in relative power by a dissatisfied, 
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weaker state, can incentivize a more powerful status quo power to provide its increasing dyadic 
counterpart with non-military foreign aid. Unlike the chapters on sanctions and trade, however, I 
argue that power parity works as a countervailing force on this likelihood.3In addition, I argue that 
these same conditions incentivize the donor to provide larger amounts of aid, when aid is provided.  
 The motivation for both the provision of aid and providing it in greater amounts, is to foster 
greater dependence by the increasing, dissatisfied recipient on the more powerful, but declining, 
status quo state. It has long been argued that asymmetric dependence provides states leverage, with 
which to impose their wills on dependent states in the international system (Hirschman 1980 [1945]; 
Pollins 1989). A declining status quo state will be incentivized to provided aid to a growing adversary 
when the latter’s growth, and associated demand to alter the status quo distribution of benefits, 
outweigh the cost for the status quo state to provide aid—in other words, when the increasing 
state’s growth in relative power will lead a demand to alter the status quo distribution of benefits 
that is unacceptable to the status quo state. The goal of providing aid, in these conditions, is to 
disincentivize the recipient from making such a demand—the disincentive being the prospect of 
losing said provision. The same logic explains why a donor will increase the amount of aid it 
provides to a growing, dissatisfied, recipient state.  
 The empirical results provide partial support of the theoretical excitations. First, a rapid 
increase in relative power significantly increases the probability of the status quo state’s provision of 
non-military foreign aid and this relationship is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction 
and the degree of power parity existent in the dyad. Contrary to expectations, these same dyadic 
conditions are found to exert a significant negative effect on the amount of aid donors provide to a 
recipient.  
 
3 It is assumed that power-equivalent states will be less likely to provide each other with aid. 
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Conclusion 
 The rest of this dissertation is laid out as follows. Chapter II provides a review of the 
literature that is relevant to the general theory of this dissertation. The bulk of this review covers 
studies from foreign policy substitution, bargaining and war, and power transition theory. These 
theories provide the foundation for the theory offered in the following chapter. Chapter III 
explicates the general theory. The general theory lays the foundational expectations and mechanisms 
underlying each empirical chapter. Chapters IV, V, and VI provide the specific arguments and 
empirical results for the outcomes of interest—namely, economic sanctions, bilateral trade, and 
foreign aid. Chapter VII concludes this dissertation with a discussion concerning the implications of 
the results of this study.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The literature review is laid out as follows. First, studies of foreign policy substitution are 
discussed. Of specific importance, from these studies, is the argument that the same or similar 
stimuli can lead to different foreign policy outcomes. Next, studies of power transition theory are 
discussed. From these studies, I draw out the key tenets of power transition theory, as well as 
highlight some of its progression over the last six decades. power transition theory provides the key 
independent variables (stimuli) of interest of this dissertation. Next, studies based in the bargaining 
theory of war are reviewed. The bargaining theory of war provides the underlying mechanisms that 
drive the relationship between the key independent variables (stimuli) of interest and the foreign 
policies of interest. Bargaining theory also explains how states decide which foreign policy response 
is appropriate, given the circumstances at the time. A shortcoming of power transition theory is its 
inability to account for these mechanisms, as a result of its strict focus on system-level variables. 
Importantly, the bargaining theory of war provides a bridge that facilitates the connection of a 
system-level theory of major-power war and a dyadic, state-level study of economic coercion. In 
addition, it answers the question of why and when similar stimuli can lead to the use of different 
foreign policies. 
Foreign Policy Substitution 
Foreign policy substitution argues that similar stimuli can lead states to adopt different 
foreign policy responses (Most and Starr 1984, 1989) and that these decisions may be based on the 
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same underlying mechanisms (Clark and Reed 2005; McGinnis 1991). Instead of making foreign 
policy decisions in isolation, states choose from a range of policies, based on domestic and external 
conditions and the information available to them at the time (Clark 2001; McGinnis and Williams 
1989; Palmer and Bhandari 2000). Ignoring the substitutability of foreign policy paints an 
incomplete picture of how policymakers actually see the world and make their policy decisions and 
limits our understanding of policymaker behavior (Clark 2001; Most and Starr 1984, 1989; Palmer 
and Bhandari 2000). 
Foreign policy substitution immerged theoretically and empirically in response to the 
propensity of extant studies of foreign policy to focus on a single policy outcome, as if states only 
had on possible response to any given external or internal stimuli. In their foundational study on 
foreign policy substitution, Most and Starr (1984, 1989) argue that these islands of theory and a strict 
focus on generalizability are only valid approaches to the study of foreign policy if states do not 
practice policy substitution. Focusing empirically on one policy response can mislead researchers 
and increase the likelihood of type two errors. In addition, this single outcome focus only makes 
sense if all policymakers enact the exact same foreign policy in response to the exact same stimuli, 
with no possibility of substituting one policy for another (389). In line with reality, policy makers 
have many ways to respond to the same stimuli. Importantly, policymakers choose the policy 
response that they are both willing and able to use. In other words, they have the means and 
incentive to enact a particular policy or set of policies.  
In addition to laying out the foundational logic of foreign policy substitution, Most and Starr 
(1984, 1989) speak directly to how changes in relative national capabilities, in context of increasing 
defensive capacity, can lead states to enact different foreign policies. In formulating their model of 
foreign policy substitution, they argue that states will increase their defense capacities when they 
perceive that national risk is greater than their national defensive capacity. However, doing so is only 
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one possible policy response to the increasing offensive capabilities of adversary. In context of the 
security dilemma, if State B increases its capabilities and State A views this increase as threatening, 
State A may either increase its defensive capabilities, or enact some other foreign policy. Most and 
Starr argue that existing studies of arms races only consider whether State A increases its defensive 
capabilities or not, ignoring the possibility that they may enact alternative foreign policies in 
response to State B’s increase in national capabilities. Most and Starr point out one problem with 
their formal model, namely, that states increase their defense capabilities even when they are greater 
than the risk posed by an adversary’s offensive capabilities. Therefore, instead of simply being 
concerned with whether the nations’ defense capacity is greater than the security risk posed by an 
adversary, it may be that states increase their defense capabilities to simply to maintain the status 
quo. Ultimately, their particular policy response de jure is dependent on which policies they are able 
and willing to enact.  
In his study of diversionary force, Clark (2001) argues that interstate armed conflict is not 
always a possible or desirable policy response to domestic political challenges. Extant studies of 
diversionary force ignore the possibility that leaders have other policy tools at their disposal and that 
these other tools may be more plausible and desirable than engaging in interstate conflict, in 
response to the prospect of losing power. The best policy response to the declining popularity of the 
executive depends on the circumstances at the time (also see Bennett and Nordstrom 2000; 
Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; Regan 2000). Importantly, leader’s policy decisions are restrained by 
domestic institutional restraints and by whether the policy is the response most likely to succeed 
(642). In context of democratic states, the degree to which the executive has the freedom to choose 
between policies is affected by how congruent their preferences are with the preferences of 
legislature. Institutional incongruency, in which the executive and legislature have disparate foreign 
policy preferences, can render the use of military force both implausible and undesirable, making 
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other foreign policy responses to domestic political challenges more likely. In this empirical analysis 
Clark finds institutional congruency to be positively related to the likelihood that the United States 
will use force rather than resort to trade action. He also finds support for the argument that the best 
foreign policy responses to domestic private-goods issues, such as rising unemployment, are private-
good responses. Specifically, Clark finds rising unemployment to be negatively related to military 
action and positively related to trade action via the GATT (656-657).  Overall, his findings support 
the policy substitution argument as well as the argument that the best policy response to domestic 
political challenges depends on the circumstances at the time.  
Another important insight provided by studies of policy substitution is the assertion that the 
same underlying mechanisms may be at work behind the policy making decisions of states. 
McGinnis (1990) argues that rational choice provides these mechanisms. Specifically, he formulates a 
rational choice model of arms transfers and super power alignment, arguing that extant studies 
suffer because of their singular focus on a single foreign policy option. In other words, in their 
analyses, arms transfers is a binary dependent variable, excluding the possibility that states have 
alternative policy options to aid them in their quest for greater security and strategic positioning. 
Noting that regional powers need weapons and superpowers need strategic bases within the former’s 
borders, McGinnis argues that regional powers either purchase arms from superpowers or seek 
greater superpower alignment and that this decision is based on the calculations of rational states. 
Because states face constraints on which policies they enact, as a result of economic and political 
opportunity costs, they choose the least costly policy that still enables them to achieve their foreign 
policy goals. 
To Clark and Reed (2005), strategic interaction provides the underlying mechanisms that 
drive the foreign policy decisions of states. Their theory combines strategic interaction and foreign 
policy substitution, arguing that the strategic considerations of states influence their foreign policy 
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decisions. Strategic interaction implies that states have the ability to influence the set of policy 
options that another state can use against them, as well as strategically choose their responses to the 
actions of other states. Empirically, the authors utilize a simultaneous multivariate probit model to 
analyze the conditions that increase the likelihood that the United States will be targeted by a foreign 
state, when they will respond by imposing sanctions, and when they will respond by using force. In 
their empirical analysis, they find support for the argument that states’ foreign policy decisions are 
strategic. Although they fail to find support for the expectation that the U.S. more likely be targeted 
when the president is politically healthy, they do find that the U.S. is more likely to use force or 
sanctions when targeted by states that are nearer to power parity with the U.S., and that the U.S. is 
less likely to impose sanctions when targeted by more democratic states. 
Generally, the substitution literature informs us that the foreign policy choices of states are 
not binary; it is not a simple choice between war or no war, or sanctions or no sanctions. Rather it is 
a choice of war or sanctions, alignment or arms transfers, and many other substitution scenarios that 
are too numerous to mention (Most and Starr 1984, 1989). Additionally, which foreign policy 
options are viable, in any given situation, is conditional on both domestic and external restraints. 
Important, for the purposes of this dissertation, is foreign policy substitution’s insight that similar 
stimuli, whether domestic or external, can lead states to make different policy decisions. 
Additionally, and equally important, the foreign policy decisions of states may be driven by the same 
underlying mechanisms. In the studies above, these underlying mechanisms are explained in terms 
of rational choice and strategic interaction. In this dissertation, they are explained in terms of 
bargaining theory.  
The insight that similar stimuli can lead states to enact different policy options implies that 
theories primarily concerned with one type of policy outcome, for example war, can be applied, at 
least in part, to the study of other policy outcomes. For example, the stimuli of interest to this 
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dissertation are those proffered by power transition theory, which argues that shifts in the 
distribution of power, in which a weaker, dissatisfied state overtakes the system leader, are necessary 
but insufficient causes of major power war (Organski and Kugler 1980). By placing power transition 
theory in the context of policy substitution, it becomes apparent that when these conditions are 
present but do not lead to armed conflict, the states in question may be, instead, relying on non-
violent, or less costly, forms of coercion to reach their policy goals. In other words, it is not simply a 
choice between great power war or no great power war. Rather, shifting power, status quo 
dissatisfaction, and power parity may lead to war or it may lead to a host of other policy options 
instead.  
Power Transition Theory 
The following works are foundational to power transition theory and lay out its key tenets 
and theoretical expectations. Because of its centrality to the current study, power transition theory is 
given an extensive review. Numerous studies analyze the effect of relative state power on the 
probability of interstate armed conflict and can be grouped into two competing paradigms. The first 
argues that power parity leads to peace while the second argues that peace is most likely in 
conditions of power preponderance. Realism’s Balance of Power falls into the former and power 
transition theory into the latter. This dissertation is interested in the preponderance paradigm. 
Studies based in power preponderance argue that the probability of interstate conflict increases 
when two states are nearly equivalent in military or economic power (Bennett 2006; Bennett and 
Stam 2009; Bremer 1992; Fearon 1995; Gochman 1990; Kugler and Lemke 1996; Lemke 2002; 
McCormick and Pascoe 2017; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Powell 1996, 1999, 2006; 
Weede 1976; Werner 1999; Wittman 2001). Power Transition Theory is the dominant theory in the 
power preponderance paradigm. 
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Organski (1958) introduced power transition theory to the field of International Relations, 
arguing that power parity, not preponderance, increases the likelihood of great-power war. This is in 
direct opposition to the Realist Balance of Power which argues that power parity increases systemic 
stability and peace (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1978). Importantly, Organski formulated Power 
Transition as a strictly system-level theory of armed conflict, with the goal of explaining how the 
changing distribution of power in the international system affects the probability of major-power 
war and peace.  
 Conditions leading to war. 
Per Organski, two conditions increase instability in the international system and enhance the 
probability of major-power war. First, a shift in the distribution of power in which a growing state is 
near to overtaking, or has surpassed, the declining system leader in relative power.4 When two states 
are at or near power parity both are more likely to believe that they will be victorious in war, 
increasing the probability that they will engage in armed conflict. In contrast, in conditions of power 
preponderance, it is clear which side will win, making the decision to go to war less attractive, as the 
dominant state sees no need to attack a much weaker power and the latter state has no incentive to 
challenge the dominant power. The significance of the transition highlights the importance of shifts 
in the distribution of power in the Power Transition story. Second, the growing state is dissatisfied 
with the status quo that is established and maintained by the declining system leader. Therefore, 
major-power war is especially likely when a dissatisfied, rising challenger is close to surpassing, or 
has surpassed, the system’s dominant state in relative power.  
 
4 There is no consensus on whether this occurs before or after a power transition. Also, see Lemke (2004, 55-56). In my 
analysis, I define a transition as a state moving into a position of relative power that is greater or equal than 80 percent of 
the dominant state’s power. This is the percentage used in most studies based in power transition theory. 
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A hierarchy of states. 
Another key tenet of power transition theory is how it defines the structure of the 
international system. In direct opposition to the Realist concept of the anarchic international system, 
Organski argues that the system is arranged hierarchically, with the most powerful state sitting atop 
the relative power hierarchy. In Organski’s formulation, the most powerful state in the system, 
referred to as the system’s dominant power, leads the international system in economic and political 
might. The rest of the states in the international system either benefit from the status quo, 
established and maintained by the dominant state, or they are dissatisfied and will seek to revise the 
status quo once their own capabilities rival or surpass that of the dominant power. While Organski 
agrees that some aspects of the international system are characterized by anarchy, it is usually only 
manifest in cases of international conflict, not in times of peace. This is a direct result of the 
system’s hierarchical structure. 
The concept of power. 
Important to any power-centered theory of international relations is how power itself is 
conceptualized. Power transition theory argues that state power and growth is primarily driven by 
internal economic expansion.5 Organski’s original conception of state power was in purely economic 
terms, in the form of GDP per capita. As the study of power transition theory progressed, the 
conceptualization of state power remained economically based in GDP but became conditional on 
the level state capacity to extract economic resources from its citizens (Organski and Kugler 1980). 
The logic behind this conditional relationship is that governments that are unable to effectively 
extract income from their citizens cannot use it to increase their power, regardless of the amount of 
internal wealth being generated. The idea that state power is linked to state wealth assumes that 
 
5 Unlike Realism, power transition theory argues that alliances are sticky and not easily manipulated to augment national 
capabilities. 
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income is fungible and can be used to expand military capabilities when needed. Lemke (2001) relies 
on the basic GDP-based measure of state power in his main analysis but finds similar results when 
performing the analysis with the more complex Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) 
from the Correlates of War Project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).  GDP per capita and CINC 
remain the two most common proxies for state power in studies of power transition theory. 
Status quo evaluations. 
Another key tenet of power transition theory is its argument concerning status quo 
evaluations, which are defined in either global or regional terms (Kugler and Organski 1980; Lemke 
2002). Generally, satisfied states are defined as those having more shared preferences with either the 
global or reginal dominant power, while dissatisfied states hold more disparate preferences from the 
dominant status quo state (Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008; Gartzke 2006; Kim 1992; Signorino 
and Ritter 1999; Souva 2004). Important as status quo evaluations are to power transition theory, to 
date, there is no consensus on the best way to measure this important concept. As a result, multiple 
proxies have been used to this end. 
To illustrate this point, Kim (1992) relies on Bueno de Mesquita’s (1983) alliance portfolio 
similarities to measure status quo satisfaction. Other measures are Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) S-
Scores, and Gartzke’s (2006) Affinity of Nations Index, the former relying on alliance portfolio 
similarities and the latter on voting similarity among states in the United Nations General Assembly. 
Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed, (2008) define status quo dissatisfaction as a function of a relative 
power and benefit disparity. They also construct their measure using UN roll-call data. Using UN 
roll-call data to measure differences in policy preferences can prove problematic, however, as LDC’s 
almost always vote as a block, resulting in very little variation in roll-call voting behavior among 
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minor-powers.6 This observation is what motivated Lemke (2002) to, instead, use military expansion 
as a proxy for status quo dissatisfaction in his study of relative power’s effect on the probability of 
war between states in regional hierarchies. Souva (2004) also deviates away from using UN voting 
data or alliance portfolios, basing his measure of status quo satisfaction, instead, on institutional 
similarity. 
Progression of power transition theory. 
Since its conception, power transition theory has remained close to its theoretical roots, laid 
out by Organski. In addition, most studies are still concerned primarily with relative power’s effect 
on the probability of great-power war, with a few deviations. There is much room for further 
generalization, however, such as how the tenets of the theory can be applied to the analysis of 
international conflict that falls short of war, the main task undertaken in this dissertation. 
Since Organski’s (1958) introduction of power transition theory, it has progressed to 
incorporate additional key variables, operationalizations, and methodological approaches. For 
example, Kugler and Organski (1980) extended power transition theory beyond Organski’s original 
conception by testing its claims empirically, providing evidence that the shift in relative power, 
leading to a power transition, is a necessary but insufficient condition for major-power war. As 
mentioned, Organski and Kugler also argue that state power is conditional on their capacity to exact 
resources from their populace. Additionally, they argue that states seek to maximize their net gains, 
not power, implying that peace is possible when it is more profitable than going to war.7 This last 
point moves away from the Realist focus on power maximization and tacitly implies for the need to 
incorporate a unitary-actor approach into the Power Transition argument. In addition, it implies that 
 
6 A separate analysis was performed using UN roll-call data and the results remain constant with those in the main 
analysis using democracy scores. I also tested the correlation between the UN measure and the Polity IV measure and 
found that they are roughly 28 percent correlated. 
7 This sets the stage for analyzing shifting power and conflict in context of rationalist bargaining, something Power 
Transition does not attempt. Hsiao-Chuan’s (2016) study is based on this premise and the current study follows suit. 
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the underlying mechanisms of power transition theory are based in rational choice and foreign policy 
substitution, something the theory does not lay out explicitly. 
The goal of each of the studies reviewed thus far is to explain the effect of changes in the 
distribution of power in the international system on the probability of major-power war. Lemke 
(1996, 2002), on the other hand, expands power transition theory’s explanatory power by illustrating 
its applicability at the regional level of analysis and among minor-powers. Specifically, Lemke argues 
that regional hierarchies of states operate according to the same mechanics as the global hierarchy 
laid out by Organski (1958). One caveat to this parallel, however, is when the intervention of global 
powers in regional politics does not allow the regional leader to act according to the expectations of 
power transition theory.8 Overall, Lemke’s work represents an important progression in power 
transition theory, and one that paves the way for further generalization.9 
Criticisms of power transition theory. 
While power transition theory enjoys robust empirical validation of its main tenets, its 
system-level application prevents it from adequately identifying the mechanisms that drive the 
relationship between its key independent variables and armed conflict. To remedy this, the theory 
needs to incorporate the logic of rational choice and interstate bargaining.  Some have taken up this 
task. 
Picking up on Organski and Kugler’s (1980) assertion that states seek to maximize their net 
gains, instead of power, Hsiao-Chuan (2016) constructs a rational choice model to explain why 
shifting power and dissatisfaction may not always lead to major power war. She argues that because 
power transition theory focuses on system-level variables, it ignores state-level factors that affect the 
decision to engage in war, echoing the arguments of Wayman (1996). Hsiao-Chuan contends that 
 
8 This is an important point, as the current study seeks to apply power transition theory to the use of economic coercion 
between both major and minor powers. 
9 i.e., to the dyadic level of analysis and to economic coercion. 
 18 
not all power transitions involving a dissatisfied challenger lead to war because of the dynamics of 
strategic interaction and variation in the ordered preferences of states (24). In other words, the costs 
and payoffs of war are not constant across all states and issues. If peace leads to larger net gains than 
war, a power transition may not lead to conflict, a point that Organski and Kugler (1980) made but 
did not formulate. Overall, Hsiao-Chuan provides a convincing argument for the need to modify 
power transition theory to include the strategic decision-making calculus of states, in order to 
provide the theory with greater explanatory power. She does not address, however, the possibility of 
foreign policy substation. While she explains why shifts in power and dissatisfaction may or may not 
lead to war, she makes no attempt to explain what policies they are choosing to use in its place. In 
other words, the only two possibilities are war or no war. This dichotomous treatment of 
international conflict ignores the realities of how policymakers actually see the world and make 
decisions.   
Another criticism of power transition theory is that researchers have failed to adequately 
operationalize and incorporate shifting power into their empirical analyses. For example, Wayman 
(1996) argues that existing studies of power transition theory do not do enough in the way of testing 
the dynamics of relative power’s effect on the probability of major-power war. Although the theory 
is about shifting power, extant studies have relied primarily on static measures of power in their 
empirical analyses. As a result, the operationalization of relative power in their analyses is the static 
distribution of power between states. This operationalization fails to capture the shift altogether. 
Because of this mis-operationalization of shifting power, existing studies misunderstand when 
changes in the distribution of power increase the probability of war. Correcting this 
operationalization error, Wayman argues that rapid shifts in power can lead to major-power war in 
the absence of a power transition, a vast departure from the main body of power transition theory 
studies.  
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Wayman offers five reasons for why transitions are not necessary for major-power war, 
however, the second is especially relevant to the current study. Namely, a shift in power can increase 
the probability of major-power war because it fosters an appetite for a greater share of competitive 
goods on the part of the growing state, and one of apprehension on the part of the declining status 
quo power. The latter’s fear is that the rising power will develop greater capacity to challenge its 
dominance in the future (147). Both arguments echo those put forward by the bargaining theory of 
war concerning the incongruency between the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits, 
an argument that is discussed in detail in the next section of this literature review. Wayman’s 
departure from most power transition theory studies, concerning the necessity of a power transition 
for the occurrence of major-power war, is worth noting and implies the need to incorporate rational 
choice and bargaining into the arguments of power transition theory. 
While power transition theory provides a resilient explanation for the occurrence of major-
power war, it does not answer three important questions. First, it does not address the question of 
why all power transitions consisting of a dissatisfied challenger do not lead to major power war, a 
point that Hsiao-Chuan (2016) addresses. Secondly, and related, it does not answer the question of 
why a declining system leader and a rising dissatisfied challenger cannot come to an agreement that 
both prefer to armed conflict, avoiding war’s ex-post inefficiency. This is Fearon’s (1995) insight and 
is discussed in detail below. Finally, power transition theory does not answer the question of how 
shifting power, power parity, and status quo evaluations, apply to interstate conflict that falls short 
of war. To answer these questions, I turn to the insights offered by the bargaining theory of war. 
Bargaining and War 
Studies of power and conflict, based in the bargaining theory of war, argue that armed 
conflict is more likely when the distribution of benefits between two states does not match the 
dyadic distribution of power (Fearon 1995; Powell 1996, 1999; Reed, Clark, Nordstrom, and Hwang 
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2008; Werner 1999).10 Importantly the bargaining theory of war is a theory of interstate conflict, 
applying to armed conflict between all state dyads; therefore, it is not restricted to explaining conflict 
between major-powers. In addition, it is easily adapted to explain other manifestations of 
international conflict that do not involve military force. In other words, it is ideal for explaining why 
states choose different policies in response the same stimuli. This is key as it is the goal of the 
current study to determine whether the key tenets of power transition theory can be applied to, not 
only a wider swath of states in the international system, but also conflictual foreign policy options 
that fall short of war. The insights of the bargaining theory of war, coupled with the arguments of 
foreign policy substitution, facilitate the application of power transition theory to economic 
coercion. 
Reed, Nordstrom, and Hwang, (2008) succinctly lay out the logic of the bargaining theory of 
war. Following the arguments of other studies that incorporate bargaining into the study of power 
parity and war, they explain that “. . . disparity between the distribution of power and the 
distribution of benefits increases the chances of war” (1205). Using the example of the distribution 
of territory, they argue that a revisionist state will demand a reallocation of the territory, in its favor, 
when the current allocation is not commensurate with its position in the dyadic distribution of 
power. As the challenger rises in power, its appetite for benefits will increase their willingness to go 
to war with the major power to obtain those benefits. The defender will acquiesce to the revisionist’s 
demand if the distribution of power favors the latter. This assumes that the distribution of power 
represents the probability of victory by the revisionist if the states should fight over the issue. Both 
the calculation of the revisionist, concerning the demand for more territory, and the calculation of 
the defender, concerning whether to reject or accept the demand, is based on their evaluations of 
 
10 This is similar to Wayman’s (1996) argument that an increase in relative power can lead to an increased appetite for 
benefits on the part of the growing state. 
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the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits, ex-ante. Importantly, Clark, Nordstrom, 
and Reed, argue that an incongruency between the distribution of benefits and the distribution of 
power increases the probability of war, regardless of where the dyad falls on the distribution of 
power continuum.11 In this formulation, neither power parity nor a power transition are necessary 
conditions for war. A key contribution of Reed, Nordstrom, and Hwang’s (2008) study is their 
construction of a proxy measure for the dyadic distribution of benefits, measured by calculating 
disparities in UN roll-call votes. They argue that larger disparities in voting behavior translate to 
larger disparities in state preferences. Larger disparities in preferences, in turn, translate to greater 
disagreement over the status quo distribution of benefits (1207, 1209). 12 In their empirical analysis 
they find support for their theoretical expectations. 
The bargaining model of war. 
Fearon’s (1995) work on bargaining is foundational to the bargaining and war literature. He 
argues that existing theories of armed conflict do not answer the question of why states fail to come 
to ex-ante agreements that avoid the ex-post inefficiency of war. War is inefficient because both 
states engaged in armed conflict incur costs by fighting. As a result, both states will receive more of 
the disputed good via a negotiated settlement than they can obtain through war. Fearon argues that 
existing studies based in Neorealism as well as those based in rational choice fail to address this 
question adequately. To remedy this shortcoming, Fearon provides three main mechanisms that 
prevent rational states from settling on such an agreement.  
 
11 This similar to Wayman’s argument and evidence suggesting that a power transition is not necessary for shifting power 
to lead to war. 
12 The measure I use for status quo satisfaction is absolute differences in regime-type. The logic behind my measure is 
the same as Reed, Nordstrom, and Hwang’s (2008) logic behind their measure for the distribution of benefits. My 
measure of status quo satisfaction can also be considered a proxy for benefit distribution; likewise, their measure can be 
considered a proxy for status quo satisfaction. 
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First, state leaders hold private information concerning their own capabilities or resolve to 
use force and have the incentive to misrepresent this information to obtain greater concessions 
when bargaining. Private information concerning one’s own capabilities or resolve, and the incentive 
to represent this information to an adversary, can result in war when it causes one state to demand 
too much or give too little when bargaining, making war less costly than acquiescing to the demand. 
Key here is the incentive to misrepresent this information. Relying only on the explanation of 
private information is not sufficient to answer why states go to war. The question of why states do 
not share this information, ex-ante, must also be answered. Secondly, states may not be able to 
credibly commit to keep the terms of agreements they have made with other states. Bargaining 
failure in this case is a result of a commitment problem. Commitment problems can lead to war 
between states when one of them cannot credibly commit to honoring the terms of a negotiated 
settlement. Fearon explains that commitment problems can lead to two types of war: preemptive 
and preventive. A preemptive war occurs when states cannot credibly commit to an honor terms of 
an agreement because of a strong first strike advantage. Preventive wars occur when an expected 
increase in relative capabilities prevents the increasing state from credibly committing to not using 
the increase to seek greater concessions in the future. In this case, the declining state has the 
incentive to attack immediately to lock in the current distribution of benefits, so long as the costs of 
war are outweighed by the cost of its relative decline. Third, issue indivisibilities can lead to 
bargaining failure and war. This refers to instances in which the benefits in question cannot be 
divided in such a way that is preferred by either side to war.  
Fearon believes the first two explanations carry the most validity, acknowledging that most 
issues are not truly indivisible. Similar to power transition theory, Fearon illustrates that shifting 
power can lead to armed conflict between states; however, like Wayman (1996) and Clark, 
Nordstrom, and Reed (2008) Fearon does not argue the necessity of a power transition. Nor does he 
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argue the necessity of power parity.13 Fearon’s goal is simply to establish a theory of armed conflict 
that takes into account factors that existing studies of armed conflict have neglected to consider 
adequately.14 
Bargaining and economic coercion. 
 
The studies based in bargaining discussed, thus far, address the question of how relative 
power and the satisfaction with the status quo affect the occurrence of armed conflict; however, 
they make no attempt to answer questions in this question in context of foreign policy options that 
fall short of war. In contrast, the studies that follow base their arguments concerning economic 
coercion within the bargaining framework. Doing so is not new, as notable studies span at least the 
last thirty years (Tsebelis 1990; Eaton and Engers 1992; Smith 1996; Drezner 1999, 2003; Morgan 
and Miers 1999; Dorussen and Mo  2001; Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009; 
Krustev 2010; Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014; Hull 2015; McCormack and Pascoe 2017), with 
some of these arguing from the foreign policy substitution perspective (Drezner 1999, 2003; 
Morgan, Palmer, and Miers 2000; Selden 1999). Most of these studies borrow their theoretical 
insights from the bargaining theory of war and, with minor modifications, apply those insights to the 
analysis of economic coercion. For example, Krustev (2010) argues for the need to incorporate 
endogenous demands into the theory and analysis of economic sanctions, specifically stating that 
this is an adoption from the crisis bargaining literature. He states “. . . in accord with the crisis 
 
13 It is not Fearon’s intent to formulate a theory of systemic major power war, as was the intent of Organski and other 
Power Transition scholars. 
14 Powell (2006), agrees that shifts in the distribution of power can lead to a commitment problem, resulting in 
preventive war; however, he also argues that shifting power can lead to preventive war in conditions of perfect 
information. This is possible when large-rapid shifts in relative power occur (181). Powell’s key point is well summarized 
when he explains that because of the anarchical nature of the international system, in which there is no governing body 
to enforce agreements between them, states are tempted to renege on agreements they make. This can lead to conflict 
when either state prefers fighting over acquiescing to the other’s demands, even when each knows the capabilities and 
resolve of the other. This happens when the cost of acquiescing outweighs the cost of armed conflict. 
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bargaining literature and contrary to sanctions research, I endogenize the status quo change 
demanded by the sender and the sender’s decision to challenge the status quo” (148).   
McCormick and Pascoe (2017) argue that sanctions can reduce the likelihood of preventive 
war between states in the international system. This is possible when sanctions are used by states to 
preserve the status quo distribution of power by slowing or stopping the rise of an adversary that is 
expected to experience an increase in relative power. This “smoothing” is accomplished by 
employing “moderately destructive” sanctions that degrade the military capabilities of the adversarial 
state, making an advantageous shift in relative power less likely, thus reducing the likelihood of a 
commitment problem-driven preventive war. In other words, instead of preventive war states can 
engage in preventive sanctions to inhibit? the growth of an adversary thus negating the need for 
armed conflict. Through a game theoretic model, the authors provide evidence suggesting that states 
may use sanctions to preserve the status quo distribution of power and in so doing the status quo 
distribution of benefits. The key implication is that when sanctions are effective at “smoothing” a 
shift in power the type of commitment problem-driven war Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006) write 
about can be avoided through the use of a foreign policy option that falls short of armed conflict. 
Another implication of McCormack and Pascoe’s study is that economic coercion, in this case 
sanctions in addition to armed conflict, represent an outside option available to states when 
bargaining fails, and that sanctions are used in response to expected shifts in relative power.15  
Two important assumptions underlie McCormack and Pascoe’s (2017) arguments. First, all 
international relations can be analyzed within a bargaining framework whether analyzing armed 
conflict or economic coercion. In their study states decide which foreign policy option to employ 
 
15 This is not the main point of their study but an important implication, none the less, that provides a foundation and 
starting place for the current study. The main argument of my dissertation is that shifts in relative power can increase the 
probability of economic sanctions imposition. McCormick et al.  did not test this implication and only mentions it 
briefly.  
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depending on the magnitude of an adversary’s shift compared to their own cost to initiate armed 
conflict or impose economic sanctions. The decision to use sanctions or armed conflict are both 
based on the strategic calculations of policy makers. Second, shifts in relative power can increase the 
likelihood of the imposition of economic sanctions. The authors argument is that when an expected 
shift in power will be more costly than the status quo state’s cost to engage in armed conflict, 
preemptive sanctions are imposed to destroy military capabilities and prevent the shift from ever 
occurring, negating the need for preventive war.16 
Power parity and economic coercion. 
As power parity is one of the key variables of power transition theory, it is important to 
know how extant studies of economic coercion treat this important factor. Hull (2015) analyzes the 
relationship between the static distribution of power and the imposition of economic sanctions; 
however, he does not attempt to analyze the effects of shifting power. He argues that power parity, 
coupled with state rivalry increase the probability of and the imposition of economic sanctions.17 
From a foreign policy substitution perspective, he contends that power parity makes war an 
especially costly foreign policy option, making the less costly economic sanctions more likely.18 As 
with other studies based in policy substitution, he argues that states choose either war, economic 
coercion, or diplomatic sanctions when making foreign policy decisions. Economic coercion falls 
between least costly diplomacy and most costly armed conflict (13). The costs of each policy option 
relative to the others are key to this calculation.  If a state can get what it wants from another state 
by using sanctions rather than engaging in a costlier war it will do so.19  
 
16 My argument is similar but not identical. Their argument is that sanctions can be imposed in the shadow of preventive 
war. My theory does not require preventive war to be looming on the horizon. In addition, my theory is concerned with 
shifts in relative power that have occurred, not in those that are expected to occur. 
17 State rivalry is simply another way to capture status quo evaluations of the states in question.  
18 This study adopts the same view. 
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In his empirical analysis Hull finds partial support for his expectations. Namely, that power 
parity’s effect on the imposition of sanctions is conditional on state rivalry. Contrary to expectations 
however, he finds that power parity is negatively related to the imposition of economic sanctions 
while rivalry’s effect is positive. In other words, sanctions are more likely between rivals that are 
further from parity. This finding reinforces the findings of Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) that state 
leaders seek to impose sanctions that are costless to themselves, especially the leaders of democratic 
states. Imposing sanctions on a nearly equipowerful adversary is more costly than imposing 
sanctions on an adversary that is far more inferior in relative power.  
Drury, James, and Peksen (2014) also find a negative relationship between power parity and 
the imposition of economic sanctions, offering two theoretical reasons for why this is the case. First, 
weaker states may be more vulnerable to sanctions. Second, powerful states are better able to afford 
the cost associated with imposing sanctions (35). The latter explanation is the same offered by Reed, 
Nordstrom, and Hwang, (2008). Together, the findings of Hull (2015), Drury, James, and Peksen 
(2014), and Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) effectively establish that power parity, a key variable in 
studies based in power transition theory, is negatively related to and the imposition of sanctions. 
This runs counter to Power Transition’s expectations concerning its effect on armed conflict.20  
It is important to mention that Drury, James, and Peksen (2014), Hull (2015), and 
McCormick and Pascoe (2017), represent the few studies that directly address the effect of relative 
state power on the likelihood of economic coercion. The findings of Hull and Drury et al., provide 
evidence that, unlike armed conflict, power parity decreases the probability of economic sanctions. 
In addition, they support the findings of past studies of power parity and armed conflict which find 
that the relationship between power and war is conditional on status quo evaluations. McCormick 
 
20 As the current study borrows heavily from power transition theory, it is important to point out that expectations 
concerning the static measure of relative power are in line with the findings and theoretical explanations of the three 
studies mentioned. They effectively establish that power parity is negatively related to sanctions imposition. 
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and Pascoe provide formal evidence for a relationship between economic sanctions and shifting 
relative power.  They argue that moderately destructive sanctions can be used by states to smooth or 
prevent an adversary from increasing in relative power thus negating the need for preventive war. 
Importantly, both studies provide evidence that the relationship between relative power and 
conflictual interstate relations extends to foreign policy options other than armed conflict, 
specifically to economic coercion. 
Conclusion 
Power Transition Theory and the bargaining theory of war provide strong arguments and 
robust empirical evidence concerning the relationship between relative power and international 
conflict at the systemic and regional levels, as well among state dyads. However, neither addresses 
the effect that changes in the distribution of power and status quo evaluations have on the 
probability of interstate conflict that falls short of military action. A few studies of economic 
sanctions have analyzed the effect of static relative power in this respect but fail to mention shifting 
power altogether. Only McCormack and Pascoe (2017) offer any insight concerning shifting power 
and economic coercion; however, they do not put their formal model to quantitative analysis. It is 
the goal of this dissertation to remedy these shortcomings and provide insight into how the key 
tenets of power transition theory apply to economic coercion between states in the international 
system. 
In the theory section that follows, I apply the insights of power transition theory, foreign 
policy substitution, and the bargaining model of war to answer the question of how relative power 
and status quo evaluations effect the use of economic coercion. Power Transition Theory provides a 
recipe for interstate armed conflict and peace but does not answer questions that are not posed at 
the system or regional level of analysis. In contrast, the bargaining theory of war enables us to 
explain the mechanisms that are blurred by the purely system-level focus of power transition theory. 
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Foreign policy substitution informs us that similar stimuli can lead to different foreign policies. The 
synthesis of these three theories not only provides a clearer understanding of why and when relative 
power and status quo evaluations increase the probability economic coercion, but of interstate 
conflict in general, addressing some of the shortcomings of power transition theory and expanding 
its explanatory power
 29 
CHAPTER III 
GENERAL THEORY 
 
 How do shifts in the distribution of power effect the foreign policy decisions of states? In 
this dissertation, I argue that shifts in the distribution of power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power 
parity work together to significantly impact these decisions. Until this time, the conditional effect of 
these three variables has only been included in studies of major- or regional-power war, within the 
theoretical framework of power transition theory (Lemke 2002; Organski and Kugler 1980). To what 
extent do these correlates of war apply to foreign policy in general? By posing this question another 
naturally arises of how to best justify applying a theory of war to the study of the other foreign 
policy tools available to states. I contend that foreign policy substitution best facilitates this 
endeavor.  
It is legitimate to ask whether applying a theory of international conflict to the analysis of 
economic sanctions, foreign aid, and bilateral trade presents an apple to oranges dilemma.21 I argue 
that this is simply not the case. This is not the first study to apply the theoretical expectations of a 
theory of armed conflict to the study of conflictual interstate interactions that fall short of war, even 
outside the theoretical framework of foreign policy substitution—for example, Lektzian and Souva 
(2003) provide validation for the argument that factors associated with an increased probability of 
 
21 See Singer (1961). 
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armed conflict can also be associated with a greater probability of economic sanctions. 22 They do so 
by extending the argument of the democratic peace to the imposition of sanctions by arguing that 
democracies are less likely to sanction each other than they are to sanction non-democracies. Of 
course, this is the key tenet of foreign policy substitution as well.  
 At its core, foreign policy substitution argues that similar stimuli, whether domestic or 
external, can lead states to make different foreign policy decisions at different times (Morgan and 
Palmer 2006; Most and Starr 1984, 1989).23 In line with this reasoning I argue that when shifting 
power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity do not lead to war, they may lead states to enact 
other foreign policies that fall short of war. Specifically, I argue that when these conditions do not 
lead to war, they can lead to the imposition or easing of economic sanctions, the provision or 
recension of foreign aid, or to less or more favorable bilateral trade relations.24 It simply ignores 
reason to argue that states simply take no action when they are either unable or unwilling to use 
armed conflict as a tool of foreign policy, regardless of the stimuli under consideration.  
 Importantly, foreign policy substitution informs the current study’s expectations concerning 
the policies that are available to states as well the policies they choose to enact. In line with the 
arguments that national resources (capabilities), and domestic political institutions largely determine 
the foreign policy options that states have at their disposal, this study espouses the argument that 
more powerful, resource-rich states have a greater variety of foreign policy tools at their disposal 
than less powerful, resource-poor states; however, this is likely conditional on domestic political 
institutions. In line with Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed (2008), I also agree that powerful, resource-
 
22 See Clark (2001) and Clark and Reed (2005) for examples of studies analyzing the substitution of economic sanctions 
for military force. 
23 The theory offered in this dissertation focuses on external stimuli, --namely, the rapid increase in relative power by an 
adversarial state.  
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rich states are the most likely to engage in costlier forms of foreign policy—for example, war and 
economic sanctions. Both arguments are based on the observation that states with greater resources 
have larger budgets with which to fund a greater variety of policy options, as well as to fund more 
costly policy options, than do their resource-poor counterparts.  
 In context of power transition theory, Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed’s (2008) second 
argument may, at least in large part, explain why the theory was formulated and has been largely 
reserved for the study of major-power war; major powers simply have larger budgets with which to 
utilize war as a foreign policy tool than do minor powers. They are observed fighting major-power 
wars because, A, they are major powers, and B, they have the resources necessary to fund them.25 
The second argument may also shed partial light onto one of power transition theory’s key tenets—
namely, that major-power war is most likely to occur when a rising, dissatisfied state is close to, or 
has surpassed, the system leader in relative capabilities. Per the logic of foreign policy substitution, it 
is at this point that both the status quo and revisionist state are most likely to possess the resources 
necessary to wage major-power war. This is also the point at which the demand of either side, to 
alter or maintain the status quo, is more likely to exceed the cost of war. 
 Foreign policy substitution also has important implications for dyadic configurations other 
than those consisting of two major power. For example, what is the implication for dyads 
characterized by power preponderance, in which the state dyad consists of a major-power and a 
much weaker, but rapidly increasing, adversarial minor-power?26 It follows logically, in these cases, 
the major-power will have the resources to wage war, while the same will not likely be true for its 
less powerful dyadic counterpart. Therefore, per the logic of substitution, we should expect war to 
 
25 Another reason for power transition theory’s singular focus on war is that when Organski (1958) first introduced the 
theory, the field of international relations was mostly concerned with the “high politics” of war. This is not surprising as 
World War II had ended just over a decade before its publication. 
26 This is another question left unaddressed by power transition theory. 
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be less likely, and other less costly policies to be more likely in conditions of dyadic power 
preponderance. Even if the much weaker state in the dyad experiences a rapid increase in relative 
power, it will be relatively less costly than an increase of similar magnitude by an adversarial major-
power that is closer to power parity with the status quo state. Moving to dyads consisting of two 
minor powers, it is more probable that neither state has the resources to use armed conflict as a tool 
of foreign policy. They simply do not have large enough budgets, on average. In minor-power dyads, 
the rapid rise of an adversarial state will more likely result in foreign policy responses that are less 
costly than armed conflict. This does not mean that minor powers do not fight, however, as a look 
at the empirical record will quickly prove otherwise.  
 In summary, it is the general expectation that rapid increases in relative power, by a 
dissatisfied state that is near parity with its more powerful dyadic counterpart, increases the 
probability that either state will enact foreign policies that are aimed at disincentivizing the other 
from making demands to maintain or alter the status quo. However, this relationship is conditional 
on the degree of power parity existent in the dyad and whether the dyad consists of at least one 
major power or contiguous states. This leads to the general proposition of this dissertation: 
P1: Among relevant dyads, a rapid increase in power by a dissatisfied state increases the probability that either the 
declining or increasing state will enact foreign policies aimed at disincentivizing demands to alter or maintain the status 
quo distribution of benefits, respectively, but this relationship is conditional on the degree of power parity existent in the 
dyad. 
 The remainder of this chapter turns to the task of delineating the theory and causal 
mechanisms in greater detail and culminates with three testable hypotheses concerning the effect of 
shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity on the use of economic sanctions, 
bilateral trade, and foreign aid as tools of foreign policy. The first task is to discuss the cases to 
which the theory is applicable. 
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Scope Conditions 
The valid question has been raised of whether it is appropriate to apply power transition 
theory to state configurations outside of the usual system- or regional-hierarchical structures. In light 
of this question, I argue that the international system consists of at least three types of hierarchical 
structures. The first is the hierarchy of the international system. The second is the hierarchical 
structure of each region in within the international system. The third is dyadic hierarchy. Holding the 
top position in each hierarchic structure is a dominant state that fashions the respective status quo 
of the hierarchy under consideration. The most powerful state in the international system holds the 
top position in the system hierarchy, the most powerful state in each region holds the top position 
its respective regional hierarchy, while the most powerful state in a dyad holds the top position in 
the dyadic hierarchy. If it is valid to argue system and regional hierarchies exists, then logic demands 
that hierarchy exists at the state dyad level as well. Arguing otherwise would not qualify as being 
logically consistent.  
 Does this view of the international system justify applying the theory or power transition to 
state dyads? I argue yes, but with conditions. As stated, I believe that doing so is not only 
appropriate but logical. Even as hierarchy exists at the international system and the regional level, 
hierarchy must also exist at the dyadic level. Even as relative power and the status quo matter at the 
system level, it matters at the regional and dyadic levels. At the system level, the United States is 
necessarily concerned with a rising China. Changes in the distribution of power, coupled with 
China’s desire to refashion the status quo according to its own preferences, means that changes in 
the distribution of power matter. Likewise, at the regional level, an increasingly capable Iran is of 
great concern to Saudi Arabia. Shifting power and status quo evaluations are of extreme salience, 
without question. Finally, at the dyadic level, North Korea’s advancing missile technology is of great 
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concern to South Korea. It represents a positive gain in relative power on the part of Pyongyang and 
increases their ability to upset the dyadic status quo.  
I argue that relative power and status quo evaluations do not only matter in context of 
system or regional hierarchies, but also to dyadic hierarchies. Additionally, dyadic hierarchical 
concerns are inherent to system and regional hierarchies. While China is rising, threatening the 
United States’ position at the top of the system hierarchy, doubtless the United States is concerned 
with China’s rise for other, non-system related concerns. An example of this is China’s ability to use 
economic statecraft to demand better terms-of-trade. Case-in-point, as I write this China has banned 
all agricultural imports from the United States as retaliation for a ten percent tariff on all Chinese 
goods. I would argue that China’s increasing bargaining leverage is not only a concern to the United 
States because it means that China may replace the United States as the world’s top superpower, but 
because it means that the United States will get less from its bargaining with China in the future, 
which is a purely dyadic concern.   
The same logic can be applied to regional hierarchies. Iran’s rise is not only of concern to 
Saudi Arabia because of the latter’s prospect of losing its title of most powerful country in the 
region. This surely is a genuine concern; however, of equal concern is the prospect that Iran’s rise 
will make it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to defend against it in a future military conflict. The 
status quo, in this case, is Saudi Arabia’s ability to thwart an offensive by Iran or carry out a 
successful offensive against them. This scenario is related to relative positions of power within a 
dyadic hierarchy. It does not necessarily have anything to do with Saudi Arabia’s fear of losing the 
spot as top dog in the region, so-to-speak. 
So, what are the aforementioned conditions for applying power transition theory to the 
dyadic level of analysis? I argue that for power transition theory to be relevant to pairs of countries, 
relative power and status quo evaluations must be salient within those state dyads. I define relevant 
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dyads, generally, as those that consist of at least on major power or contiguous states. I believe that 
in these conditions the relative gains in national power and status quo evaluations become salient. 
Thus, these are the conditions in which power transition theory can be applied to the dyadic level.  
 As mentioned above, relevant dyads are defined as those that consist of at least one major-
power or those that include contiguous states. This is the generally accepted definition of politically 
relevant dyads. These political relevant dyads are the most prone to experience armed conflict. Thus, 
considering the insights of foreign policy substitution, they should also be the most likely to engage 
in other foreign policies. While these are the general scope conditions, further alteration must be 
made depending on the foreign policy response under consideration.  
 The scope conditions for the analyses of economic sanctions and bilateral trade incorporate 
the additional requirement that the dyad must also engage in some level of bilateral trade, greater 
than zero. The reasoning behind this added condition is that only states that trade can use the 
imposition or easing of sanctions, or less favorable or improved trade relations, to influence each 
other’s behavior. Foreign aid builds on the general scope conditions by adding the stipulation that at 
least one state in the dyad must have acted as an aid donor to any other state in the past. The logic 
here is that a state that possessed the resources to use foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy in the 
past will most likely have the resources to do so in the future.  
 Do these scope conditions make sense? Are they realistic? I argue in the affirmative. The 
valid criticism has been raised that power transition theory does not apply to all state dyads. I agree 
with this criticism and have adjusted the scope conditions, accordingly. In addition, a specific 
concern has been raised with regards to power transition theory’s applicability to dyads consisting of 
the major powers and much weaker or distant states, neither which seem to pose a threat and 
conflict seems unlikely. For instance, is power transition theory applicable to the United States and 
Burkina Faso? Admittedly, Burkina Faso (or any other relatively weak and distant state) does not 
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pose a direct threat to the security of the United States. It is relatively weak and far away. Both facts 
would remain even if the small west African state is highly dissatisfied and experiences a rapid 
increase in relative power with the United States; a rapid increase, in favor of Burkina Faso, would 
be miniscule and inconsequential. That point aside, I believe that this criticism overlooks the indirect 
threat that Burkina Faso’s rapid increase in relative power could pose to the United States. The 
United States, or any other major power, will be concerned with a rapid increase in relative power, 
by a dissatisfied state, even when that state does not pose a direct threat to their security. Why? 
Because the dissatisfied state’s rapid shift in power can threaten allies of the United States, as well as 
regional stability. It is most likely the case that if a dissatisfied state is increasing in relative power 
with the United States, or any other major power for that matter, it is also increasing in relative 
power with other states in the international system and with states in its own geographic region. This 
is the case for any rapidly growing state, regardless of how powerful its dyadic counterpart is. In the 
hypothetical scenario of Burkina Faso and the United States, the former’s rapid increase in power 
heightens the probability that it will come into conflict with U.S. allies or with its own regional 
neighbors. Therefore, alliance commitments and the desire for regional stability, can incentivize the 
United States to enact policies that counter Burkina Faso’s rapid growth and discourage aggressive 
demands and behavior, even when the revisionist’s increase in relative power does not pose a direct 
threat to the security of the United States.  
 Implication of scope conditions. 
 These scope conditions have important implications for foreign policy. The composition of 
the state dyad in question will necessarily affect both the policies that are available and the policies 
that states choose to enact. The scope conditions lead to the following expectations. First, because 
major-powers have greater resources to fund a greater variety of foreign policies, as well as to fund 
more costly policy options, major-power dyads, consisting of two major powers, are expected to be 
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the most active in their use of foreign policy and will be the most likely to engage in its costlier 
manifestations, on average. Second, mixed-dyads, consisting of one major and one minor power, will 
experience less variation in their use of different foreign policies and will use less costly options than 
major-power dyads, on average. Third, minor-power dyads, consisting of two minor powers, will 
have the least amount of variation in their foreign policy responses and will use less costly options 
than either major-power or mixed-dyads, on average. In context of all three dyadic configurations, it 
is the expectation that contiguity increases the probability of all types of foreign policy.27 
Foreign Policy Carrots and Sticks 
As has already been alluded to above, states use foreign policy to either coerce or entice 
other states into altering their behavior. In other words, most foreign policy tools, if not all, can be 
used as both stick and a carrot. It is my general expectation that the use of a particular foreign policy 
as a tool of enticement is less costly, on average, than the cost to use the same policy as a tool of 
coercion. For example, it is my assumption that the easing of sanctions is less costly than their 
imposition or intensification, and that removing restrictions to bilateral trade is less costly than 
increasing restrictions. Perhaps, however, foreign aid is an exception to this very general rule, as the 
cost to provide foreign aid (inducement) is costlier than its redaction. Going back to Clark, 
Nordstrom, and Reed’s (2008) finding that states with more resources can more readily afford the 
use of more costly forms of foreign policy, than states with fewer resources, it is logical to expect, 
then, that major-power dyads are more likely to engage in coercive foreign policies than are mixed- 
or contiguous, minor-power dyads. This is because major-powers have larger budgets with which 
they can more easily fund coercive policy responses. In summary, major-power dyads will use a 
greater variety of policies, use more expensive policies, and are more likely to use coercive foreign 
 
27 In the empirical chapters, the aforementioned and established scope conditions are applied as sample restrictions. This 
means that each analysis is restricted to dyads that either consist of at least one major power or to those that are 
contiguous. Because of the former restriction, I do not control for dyad-type in the empirical analyses. 
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policies, than mixed or minor-power dyads, on average. That said, in conditions of shifting power, 
status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity, it is my assumption that states use economic sanctions 
and bilateral trade relations coercively more often than they do as inducements. 
The Nested Bargaining Model 
I now delineate the mechanisms that drive foreign policy decisions, in response to demands 
to alter or to maintain the status quo distribution of benefits. To do so, I turn to the logic of 
bargaining theory. Borrowing the insights of Fearon (1995), I argue that the bargaining model of war 
can be modified to incorporate foreign policies that fall short of armed conflict. In this modified, 
nested bargaining model, the issue (stimuli) being bargained over is the status quo distribution of 
benefits. Whereas, Fearon’s model includes the bargaining range of war, in my model each foreign 
policy option possesses its own distinct bargaining range, based on the cost that it imposes on the 
sender and target when used as an outside option to a negotiated settlement. Just as each state 
assigns a value to war, I argue that each also assigns a value to the other foreign policy options 
available to them.  
 It is helpful to think of this modified bargaining model as a continuum, augmented by 
multiple bargaining ranges, with a bargaining range for each available foreign policy existing on the 
same continuum. Because the use of most foreign policies imposes some cost on the originator and 
the recipient state, settlements exist to which both states prefer to their use, whether economic or 
military in nature. 28 This area of mutually agreeable settlements constitutes the respective bargaining 
range for each policy.29 It is important to point out that the cost to enact a certain foreign policy tool 
 
28 In context of economic sanctions, there is evidence that the cost to the sender is conditional on regime type (Lektzian 
and Sprecher, 2007). They argue that democratic leaders tie their hands by making public statements, condemning the 
actions of other states, but are pressured by domestic audiences to keep the sanctions they impose on those states 
costless to themselves. The implication is that democracies will be more likely to sanction than nondemocratic states, but 
their sanctions will impose little or no cost on themselves. I would argue that all cases of sanctions exact some cost on 
both sender and recipient, even though these costs may be very low for the former. 
29 This logic is adopted from, and is an adaptation of, Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model of war. 
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is not constant across states. For example, it may be more costly for a democratic state to enact 
sanctions than an autocratic state. While the absolute cost to use a particular policy varies from state 
to state, it is my assumption that the cost to enact a certain policy, relative to the cost of other 
policies, remains constant on average. For example, on average, economic sanctions are a less costly 
policy option than armed conflict. 
In addition, these distinct bargaining ranges determine whether one or many policies are 
used in lieu of a negotiated settlement. In other words, they determine whether policies are used as 
substitutions or compliments. For example, when a state demands too much or gives too little, in 
which the cost of their demand, or insufficient concession, exceeds its dyadic counterpart’s cost to 
initiate armed conflict, the latter state has the inventive to do so. If these same costs exceed the cost 
to impose economic sanctions, provide foreign aid, or implement restrictions on bilateral trade, the 
incentive to do so is present. Additionally, if cost of the demand exceeds the cost to enact multiple 
foreign policies, the incentive to enact a portfolio of policies is present. This logic can explain why 
war is often accompanied by other foreign policies.30 The same is logic applies to the use of all other 
foreign policy tools that are available to a state at any particular time.  
It is clearly the case that all states do not have the ability to enact all forms of coercive 
foreign policy. While the tools available varies from state to state, the decision-making process 
remains constant. For example, if a state does not have the capability to sanction, sanctioning simply 
never enters the decision-making calculus of that particular state. In that case, the state weighs the 
costs of using the foreign policy tools that it does have available; however, the decision-making 
process is not altered. Concerning more powerful states, they will have more policy tools at their 
disposal than less powerful states. This means that their foreign policy calculations will be more 
 
30 Clark and Reed (2005) also argue that states do not only substitute one policy for another but often enact multiple 
foreign policies simultaneously. Their dependent variables and empirical model are constructed specifically to allow for 
this possibility. 
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complex, simply due to their having more policy responses to consider. While a powerful state like 
the United States will consider the use of sanctions, their use will never come into the calculations of 
many less powerful states. Speaking analogously, if a burglar breaks into your home and you own a 
baseball bat and a crowbar, but no gun, your decision will be between using the bat, the crowbar (or 
maybe both if you’re talented) or doing nothing. Whether or not you will use a gun is not relevant 
because you simply do not own one. However, you still have to make a decision concerning your 
other available responses. This decision process itself is the same regardless of the options you have 
available to you. The tools vary, not the decision-making process. 
Power-to-Benefit Disparities and Bargaining Failure 
Why does shifting power, among adversaries, incentivize them to engage in either coercive 
or inducive foreign policy? I argue that the answer to this question lies in relative power-to-benefit 
disparities, as laid out by the bargaining theory of war. This is true for both economic sanctions, 
foreign aid, and bilateral trade relations. Again, I turn to foreign policy substitution and the 
bargaining theory of war to provide the theoretical foundation and mechanisms for this argument, 
respectively.  
The bargaining theory of war argues that distribution of power roughly determines how 
benefits are expected to be distributed among states in the international system. Thus, relatively 
more powerful states demand a relatively greater share of these benefits, while relatively less 
powerful states demand a relatively smaller share than their more powerful counterparts. When a 
state’s share in the distribution of power is incongruent with its share of benefits, the benefit-
deprived state has the incentive to demand an alteration to the distribution of benefits that is 
commensurate with its current position of relative power.31 This is in line with the arguments of 
 
31 Werner (1999) sheds additional light on this expectation. She explains that even though not all power-to-benefit 
disparities of this type lead to the threat of violence, ". . . such attempts do clearly provide the occasion for a dispute . . . 
since leaders may frequently resort to the threat or the use of force to back up their claim to a larger share of the 
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Morgan and Palmer (2006) who posit that an increase in national capabilities is associated with 
greater capacity and incentive to seek alterations to the status quo (29). When a shift in relative 
power is not accompanied by a commensurate shift in the distribution of benefits, one or many 
foreign policy responses become more likely. This can be caused by the status quo state’s refusal to 
alter the status quo (giving too little) or by the growing challenger’s costly demand to alter it (asking 
too much).  Thus, the probability of that states will use foreign policy, either coercively or as a 
positive inducement, is higher when a dissatisfied state experiences a rapid increase in relative power. 
Status Quo Satisfaction 
 I argue that the use of foreign policy to both coerce and entice is less likely to be observed 
between satisfied states, even when the weaker of the two experiences a rapid increase in relative 
power. This is based on the arguments of power transition theory. It is assumed that two states with 
similar foreign policy preferences are more satisfied with the dyadic status quo, while those with 
disparate foreign policy preferences are less satisfied. I espouse the argument that political 
institutional similarity approximately equates to greater similarity in foreign policy preferences, and 
that greater similarity in foreign policy preferences reduces the likelihood of interstate conflict. The 
key underlying argument is that domestic political institutions largely determine the foreign policy 
preferences of states. Theoretically, this conceptualization of status quo evaluations is the best fit, 
even over other more commonly used conceptualizations.32 
The argument is based in the preferences explanation for the democratic peace, which argues 
that states of similar regime type have similar preferences and are therefore more satisfied with the 
 
available benefits . . . " (716). Importantly, Werner also explains that when a shift in relative power occurs, it is likely that 
the distribution of benefits does not automatically adjust in-kind. This is because a shift in relative power can take place 
within the confines of a single state but a revision to the distribution of benefits requires that two states come to a 
negotiated settlement concerning the new allocation of the benefits in question. Werner names a new division of 
territory or revised terms of trade between two states as examples of the types of benefits that are distributed among 
states in the international system (717). 
32 I address these other measures, and why I do not use them, in the chapter on economic sanctions. 
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status quo, while those with dissimilar regime types have disparate preferences and are more 
dissatisfied. In turn, greater satisfaction provides states with less incentive to engage in conflict. 
There is evidence to support that this argument is not only true of democratic states but any pair of 
states that are similar in regime type (Peceny et al. 2002; Souva 2003; Werner 2000).  
Souva (2004) explains that institutional similarity reduces the probability of dyadic conflict 
via three avenues: ideological similarity, reduction of in-group out-group conflict, and by reducing 
the benefits of conquest (264-266). The underlying claim of each of these avenues is, respectively, 
that states similar in political and economic ideology have less issues to come into conflict over. 
Next, similar states are less likely to see each other as members of the out-group, reducing the 
likelihood that they will come into conflict. In-group members are viewed as less of a threat than 
members of an out-group. Finally, when two state’s foreign policy preferences are similar, they have 
more incentive to cooperate and less incentive to engage in conflictual behavior.  
I argue that, for either the status quo or revisionist states, the costliness of their demands is 
conditional on the degree of dyadic status quo satisfaction existing between them. Shifts in relative 
power, and the respective demand from either the status quo or revisionist state, are costlier when 
dyadic status quo dissatisfaction is high. On the other hand, when satisfaction is high it is less likely 
that a state, increasing in relative power, will make a demand that is costlier to the status quo power 
than the latter’s own cost to enact one or multiple foreign policies. Relatedly, it will be less likely that 
the status quo state will make a demand to maintain the status quo distribution of benefits that is 
unacceptable to the revisionist state. There are a few reasons for this.  
A growing but satisfied state will be less likely to be in a situation of power-benefit disparity 
and, thus, less likely to demand too much in the way of revising the status quo. There are two 
reasons for this. First, a satisfied state will already be enjoying a greater share of benefits due to the 
similarity between its own preferences and the foreign policy preferences of the status quo power, 
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and their greater propensity to cooperate to achieve a pareto-optimal division of benefits between 
them.33 Additionally, if a demand is made to adjust the status quo, the adjustment will be less likely 
to meet resistance from the status quo power, as cooperation rather than coercion, will be the norm 
between them. For example, if Canada experiences a rapid shift in relative power with the United 
Kingdom it is highly unlikely that the former will make a demand that triggers the latter to engage in 
military, economic, or any other form of coercion. First, it is more likely that the two countries will, 
through cooperation and coordination, work diplomatically to facilitate any demand that Canada 
issues for a greater share in the distribution of benefits. Secondly, because of the symbiotic 
relationship that already exists between the two allies, because of similar preferences, it is unlikely 
that Canada would have the need to demand a revision to the status quo large enough to warrant a 
coercive response by the United Kingdom. Because of its similarity in preferences with the United 
Kingdom, and resulting cooperative diplomatic relations, Canada enjoys, and will continue to enjoy, 
a share in the dyadic distribution of benefits that is commensurate with its position of relative power 
with the United Kingdom. 
With regards to the outcomes of interests to this dissertation, I expect greater status quo 
dissatisfaction to be associated with in increased likelihood that sanctions, foreign aid, and bilateral 
will be used as tools of foreign policy, either to coerce or to entice. The probability that sanctions 
will be used as a tool foreign policy increases when status quo dissatisfaction is high, as it is more 
likely that a growing revisionist or the status quo state will demand too much or give too little when 
bargaining over the status quo distribution of benefits. Greater status quo dissatisfaction increases 
the probability that foreign aid and bilateral trade will be used as tools of foreign policy for the same 
 
33 Tammen, Kugler, and Lemke (2017) support this argument when they state “. . .  when nations share the same 
evaluations of the status quo, they willingly coordinate efforts and cooperate to achieve joint, Pareto optimal goals. The 
level of cooperation among nations does vary in direct proportion to the proximity to the status quo among competing 
parties” (5). 
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reason; a dissatisfied revisionist state is more likely to make a demand to which the status quo state 
is not willing to acquiesce, and vice-versa. As a result, the status quo state has the incentive to use 
foreign aid or bilateral trade to coerce, or entice, a dissatisfied revisionist into abandoning or 
tempering its demand to alter the status quo. In the case of foreign aid, greater dependence on the 
aid of the status quo state foreign increases the cost associated with its loss. Therefore, greater 
dependence on this aid makes it less likely that a revisionist state will make a demand to alter the 
status quo that is unacceptable to the donor.34  
Power Parity 
 
As with shifting relative power and status quo satisfaction, I argue that the static distribution 
of power effects the foreign policy decisions of states. Power parity increases the cost to engage in 
military and economic foreign policy and decreases the probability that either type of policy will be 
successful. In context of armed conflict, power parity introduces greater uncertainty concerning 
which side will be victorious. Thus, uncertainty increases the likelihood that either side will demand 
too much or give too little, leading to armed conflict. There is ample empirical evidence that power 
parity increases the likelihood of war (Fearon 1995; Lemke 1996, 2002; Organski and Kugler 1980). 
In context of economic sanctions, power parity also decreases the likelihood of success, while 
simultaneously increasing the cost associated with their imposition. In contrast to armed conflict, I 
expect a countervailing force to be at work in dyads that are near parity, decreasing the likelihood 
that they will engage in sanctions.35 This expectation is based on the observation that senders seek to 
impose sanctions that are costless to themselves.36 Evidence of this argument is provided by the 
 
34 A more thorough explication of the theory for each outcome of interest, as well as a more specific literature review, is 
provided in each empirical chapter. 
35 This same logic implies that power parity should be associated with shorter sanctions episodes. 
36 See Lektzian and Sprecher (2007). 
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observation that states usually impose sanctions on less powerful targets (Farmer 2000). The 
implication is that sanctions are most likely to be observed in mixed dyads.   
It is my expectation that power parity exerts negative pressure on bilateral trade, in dyads in 
which a dissatisfied state experiences a rapid increase in relative power. Because states are concerned 
with the relative gains of other states, a rapid increase in relative power by an adversarial state can 
lead to a decline in bilateral trade relations. This can either be the result of the status quo state’s 
unacceptable demand to maintain, or the revisionist state’s unacceptable demand to alter, the status 
quo distribution of benefits. When two states are closer to power parity, the concern over relative 
gains is exacerbated, increasing to probability that the demand of the growing revisionist state will 
lead to worsening trade relations and, therefore, to reductions in bilateral trade. The implication is 
that reductions in bilateral trade, due to shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction, are likely most 
pronounced in major-power dyads, in which the states are closer to power parity.  
Although studies of the determinants of foreign aid are silent concerning the effect of 
relative power on its use as a foreign policy tool, it is my expectation that states that are nearly 
equivalent in power are less likely to provide each other with foreign aid. The ability to use foreign 
aid to coerce or entice is contingent on the donor’s ability to make the recipient dependent on its 
provision to the extent that its disruption is costly enough to deter the latter from making costly 
demands to alter the status quo. Fear of losing aid disincentives the recipient from issuing demands 
large enough to incentivize the donor to reconsider the utility of continuing its provision. 
Additionally, it is more likely that major powers will have the resources to provide foreign aid than 
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their minor power counterparts. Taken together, these two arguments imply that the use of foreign 
aid, as stick or carrot, is most likely to be observed in mixed dyads.  
Aggregated Policy Costs 
Importantly, there are costs associated with the use of any foreign policy, that apply to both 
the originator and recipient state. These costs come in the form of political repercussions, such as 
domestic or international audience costs, or economic costs, such as forfeited revenue from trade, to 
name a few. As mentioned earlier, just as the costs of war are weighed against the cost of an 
adversary’s demand, so also are the costs of the other foreign policies available to a particular state. 
In this light, the use of any type of foreign policy may present an inefficiency puzzle akin to the 
inefficiency puzzle of war. This is true when both the sender and recipient are better off coming to 
an ex-ante agreement.37 I use the word “may” intentionally, as this may not always be the case when 
a foreign policy or group of policies are used to entice, rather than coerce—for  example, easing 
sanctions may be costly to the sender but will most likely be beneficial to the target. The same is true 
of trade restrictions. Again, foreign aid is different in this respect, but the logic is the same. 
Providing aid may be costly to the donor but not necessary for the recipient state. When foreign 
policy is used in an inducive context, therefore, its use is primarily inefficient for the sender, not the 
target. That said, it could be argued that inducements are costly to the recipient state because of the 
strings to which they come attached. In this context, the target state gives up freedom over its 
domestic or foreign policy in exchange for these incentives. If this is the case, inducements can be 
inefficient and both states would be better off coming to a negotiated settlement. All things 
 
37 See Fearon (1995).  
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considered, however, it is my expectation that all foreign policies impose some cost on both the 
sender and the recipient state. 
 Cost aggregation. 
Important to the discussion of costs, is how they accrue for both the sender and recipient 
state. It is logical to argue that these costs aggregate across time and space. These aggregated costs 
are equal to the grand total of all sunk and current costs that are incurred by a state in a single 
bargaining episode. For the purposes of this dissertation, a bargaining episode is defined as a 
duration of time in which two states bargain over the same issue.38 With regards to special accrual, 
these costs are incurred by both the originator and recipient states when one or more coercive 
policies are used. Therefore, aggregate costs accrue as a result of policies being used independently, 
or concurrently. By concurrently I mean that more than one foreign policy is used in the same 
bargaining episode. The implication is that multiple policies may be enacted simultaneously (same 
period); however, this is not a requirement to be categorized as concurrent. For example, it is 
possible for the use of provision of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy to precede the use 
economic sanctions, or vice versa. The key is that both policies are used within the same bargaining 
episode. I define a bargaining period as the time between instances of bargaining failure within the 
same bargaining episode. There may be multiple bargaining periods within a single episode. 
 In addition to spatial aggregation, costs accumulate over time. This is true for both sender 
and target states. It is possible for costs to aggregate solely via the use of one foreign policy, because 
of duration; the longer a policy is in place, the larger this cost becomes. Theoretically, this can lead 
to a point at which the cost of a target state’s demand no longer exceeds the aggregate cost to 
 
38 In context of shifting power, states are bargaining over the distribution of benefits, in relation to the distribution of 
power; however, the precise nature of these benefits is inconsequential for the purposes of this study. 
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engage in a particular policy.39 In this case, the sender no longer has the incentive to continue its use. 
Combining this argument with the argument of that costs accrue spatially intuitively implies that the 
costliest bargaining episodes are those that are of an extended duration and incorporate the 
concurrent use of multiple coercive foreign policy tools. 
 There is precedent for this logic in existing research—for example, Miyagawa (1992) argues 
that economic sanctions can hardened target leaders over time. Using United States sanctions against 
Cuba to illustrate this point, Miyagawa explains that, over time, Castro was able to paint the 
sanctions regime as an attack by wealthy capitalists on the nation as a whole. This, in turn, led to a 
solidification of national sentiment in support of the communist regime, enabling Castro to take a 
harder line against the United States (84-85). 
 An example of costs aggregating both temporally and spatially, is General William 
Westmorland’s strategy of attrition during the Vietnam War. From 1964 to 1967 (temporal costs), 
Westmoreland increased the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam from sixteen thousand to over five-
hundred thousand in combination with an intensified bombing campaign (spatial costs), in hopes of 
beating the Vietcong into submission, only to end in stalemate. In 1968, the bombing campaign was 
halted by President Johnson and Westmorland was replaced as commander of the Military 
Assistance Command in Vietnam (MAVC). The specific costs associated with Westmorland’s 
strategy of attrition came in the form of blood, treasure, and time. 
The implication of aggregate costs, as laid out above, is that states’ demands are dependent 
on their assessment of the costs incurred in past bargaining periods and the costs that will be 
incurred in the current period if they fail to come to a negotiated settlement concerning the 
distribution of benefits. When a target makes a demand, the sender compares the cost of the 
 
39 For example, a war of attrition in which the costs associated with continuing an offensive campaign become too costly 
to continue. 
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potential target’s demand with how much has already been spent on the particular issue, to date, and 
how much will be spent in the current period. Depending on the size of the target’s demand, relative 
to the sender’s aggregate costs, the latter will either acquiesce, or respond by engaging one or more 
foreign policy responses. This same cost assessment determines whether the sender discontinues the 
use of one or multiple coercive policies. When the demand of the target state becomes less than or 
equal to the sender’s aggregated costs, the sender no longer has the incentive to continue using the 
policy or policies in question. At this point, the sender is better off acquiescing to the target’s 
demands than continuing to use any foreign policy tool.  
Enacting Foreign Policy 
Now that the main tenets of the theory have been laid, and the scope conditions set, I review 
how shifting power, status quo evaluations, and the static distribution of power affect the decision 
to use foreign policy, in lieu of a negotiated settlement. In conditions of imperfect information, 
concerning capabilities and resolve, shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity can 
lead states in a dyad to engage in a variation of foreign policies, with the aim of compelling or 
enticing other their dyadic counterpart into acquiescing to their demands, regarding the status quo 
distribution of benefits. This can lead either the declining status quo state or the growing revisionist 
state to use foreign policy to this end. The decision to engage in foreign policy, and which policy or 
policies are to engage in, is ultimately decided by weighing the cost of the potential target’s demand 
with the sender’s own cost to enact each policy or policies. This can lead states to use economic 
sanctions, bilateral trade, or foreign aid as tools of foreign policy, among others. As the calculations 
for the status quo and revisionist states are based on different motivations, that is maintaining and 
altering the status quo, respectively, I will now turn to a deeper explanation concerning each state’s 
calculation and decision to enact a particular foreign policy or portfolio of policies. 
 50 
 The status quo state. 
The declining status quo state’s precise foreign policy response depends on the size and 
rapidity of a challenger’s shift in power and the associated demand to revise the status quo, their 
proximity in relative power, and the degree of status quo satisfaction existing in the dyad. Rapid 
shifts in power, by a growing, dissatisfied challenger, present a greater cost to a declining state than a 
smaller, more gradual shift by a satisfied state. If the cost of the shift and associated demand are 
large enough to move beyond the range acceptable to the declining state, it has the incentive to 
enact foreign policies that pressure and incentivize the revisionist state to reduce or withdraw its 
demand to alter the distribution of benefits. For the purposes of this dissertation, I argue that this 
can lead the declining state to use economic sanctions, foreign aid, or bilateral trade to this end.40 
 The revisionist state. 
 The growing revisionist state has the incentive to enact a particular foreign policy response, 
or portfolio of responses, when the declining status quo state makes a demand to maintain the status 
quo distribution of benefits that is greater than the cost for the revisionist to enact a particular policy 
or group of policies. In other words, this is the case when the revisionist’s shift in power causes the 
declining state’s demand to maintain the status quo distribution of benefits to no longer fall into the 
range of settlements that the latter state prefers to enacting these foreign policy responses. The 
growing revisionist enacts foreign policies that pressure or entice the status quo state into 
acquiescing to its demand for a greater share in the distribution of benefits. I argue that the 
revisionist state can use economic sanctions or bilateral trade to this end. Unlike its more powerful 
counterpart, however, it is unlikely that the weaker revisionist state will be able to use foreign aid to 
 
40 Importantly, it is not being argued that the shift must result in a power transition in which the weaker state surpasses 
its dominant counterpart. The shift and associated demand to revise the status quo must simply be greater than the cost 
for the declining state to engage in one or more coercive foreign policies. 
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as a foreign policy tool, as it seems unlikely that a weaker state will provide a more powerful 
counterpart with aid. These arguments lead to the following testable hypotheses: 
H1: The probability that either the status quo or revisionist state will impose economic sanctions increases when the 
weaker, dissatisfied state experiences a rapid increase in relative power, but this relationship is conditional on the 
degree of power parity existent in the dyad. 
H2: The probability that the status quo state will provide aid or increase the amount of aid it provides increase when 
the weaker, dissatisfied state in the dyad, experiences a rapid increase in relative power, but this relationship is 
conditional on the degree of power parity existent in the dyad. 
H3: The probability that the either the status quo or revisionist state will impose trade restrictions increases when the 
weaker, dissatisfied state in the dyad, experiences a rapid increase in relative power, but this relationship is conditional 
on the degree of power parity existent in the dyad.  
Conclusion 
I have argued that the conditions posited by power transition theory to increase the 
probability of war—namely, rapid increases in relative power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power 
parity, significantly affect probability that economic sanctions, foreign aid, and bilateral trade will be 
used as tools of foreign policy. These theoretical expectations are based on foreign policy 
substitution’s insight that similar stimuli can lead states to make different foreign policy decisions at 
different time and on the bargaining theory of war’s argument that disparity between a state’s share 
in the distribution of power and its share in the distribution of benefits increases the probability of 
armed conflict. When a state increases in relative power, the distribution of benefits is not 
guaranteed to adjust in kind, incentivizing the growing state to demand that a commensurate 
adjustment be made. I have argued that this is especially true when the increasing state is dissatisfied 
with the dyadic status quo. I have argued that when this demand is too large, or is denied by the 
status quo state, either state may be incentivized to enact foreign policies that are less costly than 
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accepting that demand. Importantly, the motive driving the decision to engage in a particular policy 
or group of policies is to compel or entice the other state into acquiescing to the demand of the 
sender. I further argued that the particular policy or policies chosen depends on the policies that are 
available to the state at the time. This is determined largely by the state’s resources and its domestic 
political institutions. In addition, the choice of which available policy or group of policies to enact 
depends on the sender’s cost to engage in that particular policy, or policies, compared to the cost to 
acquiesce to the target’s demand. When the latter outweighs the former, the incentive to engage in 
coercive foreign policy is present. Taken together, these arguments lay the foundation for the 
empirical chapters ahead. Each empirical chapter builds on this chapter by going deeper into how 
the theory applies to each outcome of interest, and by testing the theoretical claims quantitatively.
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CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
 
 In this first substantive chapter, I put my theoretical expectations concerning the 
relationship between relative power and the use of economic sanctions to quantitative analysis. I 
argue that, in conditions of imperfect information concerning capabilities and resolve, a rapid 
increase in relative power by a dissatisfied state increases the likelihood of economic sanctions, while 
dyadic power parity works as a countervailing force, mitigating the probability of their use. Greater 
divergence between the foreign policy preferences of states determines the degree to which they are 
satisfied with the status quo distribution of benefits. Because politically dissimilar states often have 
conflicting foreign policy goals, regimes that are more dissimilar are assumed to be more dissatisfied 
than those that are politically similar. The positive effect of shifting power on sanctions imposition is 
a result of either the status quo or revisionist’s demand to maintain or revise the status quo 
distribution of benefits, respectively. The negative effect of power parity stems from the observation 
that it is costlier to engage in economic sanctions with a state that is nearly equivalent in relative 
power than with one that is far weaker. Importantly, I assume that these affects are only applicable 
to dyads that consists of states that are at least 80 percent of power parity. 
In line with my theoretical expectations, I find that rapid shifts in relative power have a 
positive and significant effect on sanctions imposition, and that this relationship is conditional on 
the level of status quo dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity in a state dyad. Additionally, 
among these state dyads, those that are closer to power parity are less likely to use sanctions.
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The rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. I first present a recap of the theoretical 
expectations and restate the related sanctions-specific hypothesis. Next, I discuss the research 
design, followed by the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
discussion concerning the implications of findings. As the literature review chapter includes the 
relevant scholarly work on economic sanctions, this chapter excludes a literature review to avoid 
redundancy.  
Theory 
 As the general theory for this study, as well as much of the theory of this chapter, is laid out 
in detail in the previous chapter, this section offers a brief recap of the theoretical argument and 
presents the testable hypothesis. In conditions of imperfect information, concerning capabilities and 
resolve, either the status quo or revisionist state may have the incentive to use economic sanctions as 
a result of the rapid gain in relative power by the weaker state in the dyad. The status quo state has 
the incentive to use sanctions as a tool of foreign policy when the cost of the growing revisionist 
state’s increase in relative power and resulting demand to alter the status quo distribution of benefits, 
is costlier to the status quo state than the cost to impose sanctions. In other words, when the status 
quo state can get more by imposing sanctions than it can by acquiescing to the revisionist’s demands 
for a greater share of the benefits in question, the incentive to impose sanctions is present. Likewise, 
the incentive for the revisionist to impose sanctions on the status quo state is present when the 
latter’s demand to maintain the current distribution of benefits is costlier to the revisionist state than 
imposing sanctions. In other words, when the revisionist can get more by imposing sanctions than it 
can by acquiescing to the status quo state’s demand to maintain the status quo distribution of 
benefits, the incentive to impose sanctions is present.  
I argue that the relationship between shifting relative power and economic sanctions is 
conditional on two factors. First, the state increasing in relative power is dissatisfied with the status 
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quo. A state that is satisfied with the status quo, meaning that it shares more foreign policy 
preferences with the status quo state, will be less likely to suffer from a power-to-benefit disparity 
than a state that shares little or no preferences with the status quo state. In addition, a satisfied 
state’s relative gains in power will be less of a concern (Lemke and Reed 1996; Peceny et al. 2002; 
Souva 2003; Werner 2000). The demands of a dissatisfied, growing state to alter the status quo 
distribution of benefits will likely be larger, on average, than the demands of a growing but satisfied 
state. This is because dissatisfied states are more likely to be suffering from a power-to-benefit 
deficit, ex-ante. In addition, the demand of a dissatisfied state to alter the status quo distribution of 
benefits is costlier to the status quo state than a demand of the same magnitude made by a satisfied 
state. This is because of the disparity between its preferences and those of the status quo state. As a 
result, dissatisfied states will be more likely to have their demands for a greater share of benefits 
rejected, providing them with the incentive to impose economic sanctions. In addition, dissatisfied, 
growing states will be more likely to make a demand that is costlier to the status quo state then its 
cost to impose sanctions, providing the latter state with the incentive to impose sanctions. 
The second conditional factor is how close the revisionist and the status quo states are in 
relative power. In line with power transition theory, which argues that interstate conflict is most 
likely in dyads that are near power parity, it is the expectation of this study that the effects of shifting 
power, status quo dissatisfaction, and relative power are conditional on how close two states are to 
power parity. Departing somewhat from the expectations of power transition theory, however, it is 
my expectation that being closer to power parity is negatively associated with the imposition of 
economic sanctions.  Imposing sanctions on a state that is nearly equivalent in power is more costly 
than imposing sanctions on a state that is weaker. By increasing the cost to impose sanctions, greater 
power parity increases the size of the bargaining range, decreasing the probability of economic 
sanctions imposition by either state in the dyad. This is the case even when the weaker, dissatisfied 
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state experiences a rapid increase in relative power. This said, it is my expectation that shifting power 
and status quo dissatisfaction will have the greatest positive effect, and relative power will have the 
greatest negative effect, on the probability of economic sanctions imposition in dyads that are nearer 
to power parity. It is important to clarify that power parity plays two rolls in the theory and analysis. 
First, two states that are closer to parity will be less likely to sanction one another. Second, this will 
be the case only between states that are already nearer to power parity. This is because it is between 
near-parity states that shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction become salient. These arguments 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The probability that either the status quo or revisionist state will use economic sanctions increases when the 
weaker, dissatisfied state experiences a rapid increase in relative power, but this relationship is conditional on how close 
the states are in relative power.   
Research Design 
The data are arranged in a dyad-year format, spanning the years 1980-2000, and is arranged 
so that the more powerful state in the dyad is state A and the weaker is state B. The dataset is 
composed of sanctions-relevant dyads. For the purposes of this study, sanctions-relevant dyads are 
defined as those consisting of states that conduct some level of bilateral trade with each other and 
consist of at least one major power or contiguous states. The logic behind these scope conditions is 
twofold. First, states with no trade relations have no logical way to impose sanctions on one another. 
Second, dyads consisting of a major power, or those containing contiguous states, are more likely to 
have issues over which to engage in sanctions, in addition to other coercive foreign policies. To 
capture the effect of power parity I subset the data so that there are two separate datasets. The first 
consists only of dyads that are near power parity. The threshold used is 80 percent. The second 
dataset only includes dyads that are less than 80 percent of power parity. Sub-setting the data in this 
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way allows me to circumvent the need for a trichotomous interaction term of shifting power, status 
quo dissatisfaction, and power parity.  
Data. 
The descriptive statistics for variables included in the statistical analysis of sanctions 
imposition are found in Table 1. The dependent variable, Sanctions, is dichotomous and equals one if 
sanctions were imposed by dyad-year, and zero otherwise. There are sixty-six instances of sanctions 
imposition in the dataset. The data for this variable comes from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 
(2008). I use the Hufbauer et al. data because of its widespread use and convenience and ease of 
replicability. In an earlier draft of this chapter I did use the TIES dataset, but this became 
unnecessary after reverting to the dichotomous dependent variable. Specifically, I no longer need the 
sanctions threats variables from the TIES dataset. The dependent variable in the prior draft was a 
tetrachotomous categorical variable that included both sanctions imposition and sanctions threats. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics—Economic Sanctions Imposition 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Sanction 14,769 0.004 0.066 0 1 
1-Year Shift 14,769 0.0001 0.025 -0.174 0.197 
Dissatisfaction 14,769 8.946 7.147 0 20 
Relative Power 14,769 3.670 2.403 -5.814 11.96 
1-Year Shift*Dissat. 14,769 -0.001 0.270 -1.976 2.879 
Ln(trade) 14,769 3.177 7.073 -25.33 12.89 
Allies 14,769 0.220 0.415 0 1 
US 14,769 0.225 0.418 0 1 
Ln(distance) 14,769 6.494 3.097 0 9.377 
Major Power Dyad 14,769 0.754 0.431 0 1 
Year 14,769 1,991 6.049 1,980 2,000 
Sanction Year 14,769 9.594 6.010 0 21 
_spline1 14,769 -636.4 651.5 -2,106 0 
_spline2 14,769 -931.2 1,058 -3,430 0 
_spline3 14,769 -712.3 898.3 -3,016 0 
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All models include four key independent variables. The first, 1-Year Shift, measures one-year 
shifts in relative state power, and ranges in value from -.05 to 0.5. Empirically, 1-Year Shift ranges 
from -0.174 to 0.197. Negative values indicate that the weaker state in the dyad became relatively 
weaker over a one-year period, while positive values indicate that the weaker state increased in 
relative power.41 This variable, 1-Year Shift, is constructed using Carroll and Kenkel’s (2016) Dispute 
Outcome Expectation (DOE) scores. DOE scores are calculated using a machine learning technique 
that simulates dispute outcomes and then produces the probability that each side will be victorious 
in a hypothetical dispute, for each dyad-year.  
The creators argue that DOE scores have two advantages over ratios constructed using the 
Correlate of War’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) index (Singer et al. 1973). First, 
DOE scores are a direct measure of the probable outcomes of armed conflict between two states, 
whereas CINC scores are only a proxy. Second, DOE scores are more efficient predictors of armed 
conflict than CINC ratios. A third reason for choosing DOE scores over CINC or GDP is that the 
latter two experience very little variation over time, while the former experience greater change from 
year-to-year. As this dissertation is interested in stimuli that affect the probability of coercive foreign 
policy, I believe DOE scores to be a better fit than relatively stagnate CINC or GDP ratios. They 
are a better choice for testing the effect of rapid shifting power on the foreign policy decisions of 
states. Figure 1 illustrates the extent that each measure of relative power varies between the years 
1980 and 2000, for the United States and China. It is clearly the case that DOE ratios experience 
much greater variation than GDP or CINC ratios. Therefore, because I am primarily interested in 
the effect of rapidly shifting power, DOE scores are the best measure. 
 
41 The results for the effects of  5- 10-, 15-, and 20-year shifts in relative power are included in the appendices. Appendix 
I contains the results for economic sanctions, Appendix II contains the results for bilateral trade, and Appendix III 
contains the results for foreign aid. 
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Figure 1. Variations in Different Measures of Relative Power (U.S. and China). 
 
To construct the variable for shifting relative power, I first calculate the ratio of the weaker 
state’s DOE score over the combined DOE scores for both states for each dyad-year. This is the 
same calculation commonly used for CINC ratios and GDP ratios. Next, I created a lagged DOE 
ratio variable, capturing a one-year lag in relative state power. Finally, I subtract each lagged DOE 
ratiot-1 from the DOE ratio at timet. The resulting variable equals the value of a one-year shift in 
relative state power, by dyad-year.42 Shifts in power can be positive or negative. As mentioned above, 
if positive, the weaker state became relatively more powerful. This can either mean that the state 
increased in power, or that the more powerful state decreased. In either case, the weaker state gained 
on its more powerful counterpart over that one-year period of time. If the value of the shift is 
 
42 This is the same process used to make the 5-, 10-, 15-, and 20-Year Shift variables in the appendix. 
 60 
negative, the weaker state became relatively less powerful over the course of the designated span of 
time. This can either mean the weaker state declined in power, or that the more powerful state’s 
power increased. While not theorized, the logic of my argument leads to the expectation that 
negative shifts in power (weaker state becoming even weaker) will decrease the probability of 
sanctions. 
To illustrate the magnitude of these shifts, a 5th percentile shift is equal to -0.036, while a 
shift at the 95th percentile equals 0.038. These statistics inform us that even larger shifts in state 
power are not large in an absolute context. The implication, also supported by the empirical results, 
is that small changes in relative state power significantly impact the likelihood that sanctions are used 
as a tool of foreign policy. Importantly, this variable captures a country’s shift in power, relative to 
its dyadic counterpart. This is an essential operationalization choice, as shifting relative power is 
what is theoretically important. The idea that one state is declining relative to the other provides the 
incentive to use economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.  
Because the main effect of interest is the rapid changing of relative state power, I feel that 
the one-year shift is the best measurement choice, when considered in context of the theory. The 
rapid growth of an adversary in such a short amount of time is likely to be of greater concern to the 
declining state than a shift in power that takes place over many years or even decades. It also leaves 
open the possibility of sudden, unexpected increases in state capabilities, which are certain to be of 
greater concern to the declining adversary. This will especially the case when the shift in question is 
an increase in relative war-winning capabilities, which DOE scores directly measure. One seemingly 
logical reason for this is that the status quo state has less time to adjust to the growth of its dyadic 
counterpart when the latter experiences a relatively large increase in relative power over a one-year 
period, than it would over a ten- or twenty-year period. For example, the United States would 
understandably be more concerned if Iran produced a nuclear weapon within the next year than it 
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would if it did so in ten. In the prior scenario, the United States the much less time to adjust and 
respond to Iran’s increase in relative power. Additionally, Iran’s rapid increase in power would likely 
be perceived by the United States as a precursor to increasingly aggressive behavior by Iran. This 
logic retains its validity even when taking nuclear weapons out of the equation. If an adversary 
rapidly increases the size of its military over a relatively shorter period of time, the increase will be of 
greater concern to a declining counterpart than if the increase takes place over many years. One 
admitted shortcoming of taking a one-year change in power is that it does not allow us to see how 
longer, more gradual shifts in relative power affect the use of economic coercion.43 Because of the 
nature DOE scores, I believe they best in the analysis of shorter, more rapid changes in power. 
The second key independent variable is a proxy for status quo satisfaction. Similar to Souva 
(2004) I argue that political institutional similarity approximately equates to greater similarity in 
foreign policy preferences, and that greater similarity in foreign policy preferences reduces the 
likelihood of interstate conflict. The key underlying argument is that domestic political institutions 
largely determine the foreign policy preferences of states. Based on this assumption, the question 
arises of how to best measure states’ domestic political institutions? The answer is unarguably 
regime-type, and the most accepted and widely used measure of regime-type is the Polity Project’s 
Polity IV scores. Between Polity IV, S-Scores (Signorino and Ritter 1999), and United Nations 
General Assembly Voting ideal points (Voeten 2013), only Polity IV directly measures and quantifies 
the domestic political institutional composition of states. Based on the argument and assumptions 
above, Polity IV scores are clearly the most theoretically consistent measure for this study. 
To capture differences in regime-type and, thus, foreign policy preferences, I create a new 
variable called Dissatisfaction. This variable is constructed using the Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 
2010). Polity IV measures the degree of openness of each country by year, ranking them on a scale 
 
43 I include the regression results for 5-, 10-, 15-, and 20-year shifts in relative power in the appendix. 
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ranging from -10 to 10, with fully autocratic states equaling -10 and fully democratic state equaling 
10. To create Dissatisfaction, I calculate the absolute difference between each state’s Polity IV score, 
by dyad-year. The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 20. Dyads with the score closer to 0 are more 
similar in regime type, while those closer to 20 are the more dissimilar.  
The valid question arises of why I do not use more common measures of status quo 
satisfaction in my analysis. Empirically, the most common measures of status quo satisfaction are 
Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) S scores, which measure alliance portfolio similarity, and UN Affinity 
scores (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2009), which measure similarity between how states vote in the 
United Nations General Assembly.44 My choice to use polity differences as a proxy for status quo 
satisfaction is theory driven. Before moving on, it is important to reiterate that this study is not the 
first to do so. Recall that Souva (2004) measures status quo satisfaction in terms of regime type 
similarity, basing his justification for doing so in the preferences explanation of the democratic peace 
(Lemke and Reed 1996). The related assumption is that similar states are more satisfied with the 
dyadic status quo while states of dissimilar regime types are more dissatisfied. This implication is that 
the most dissatisfied dyads will be those consisting of one highly democratic and one highly 
autocratic state. Dissatisfaction is assumed to be high in these dyads because of greater disparity in 
the foreign policy preferences of a highly democratic and a highly autocratic state. In turn, highly 
dissatisfied states’ demands are likely to be costlier than those of satisfied states.45  
 The third key independent variable, Relative Power, measures the static distribution of power 
at timet. This variable is constructed using Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores 
 
44 S-scores and polity differences are not correlated in any substantially significant way. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is equal to -0.0892 and a covariance of -.113428. In other words, greater disparity in regime type is negatively 
related to alliance portfolio similarity. The direction of the relationship makes sense, as states on opposite sides of the 
political spectrum, in terms of regime-type, will be less likely to ally with one another. Why the correlation is so weak is 
somewhat puzzling. The most intuitive answer is that states do not primarily base their alliance decisions on domestic 
political similarities, but on other factors such as security and economic interests or a common adversary. 
45 This is discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
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from the Correlates of War Project (Singer et al. 1973) and is the ratio of the more powerful state’s 
capabilities and the combined capabilities of the weaker and more powerful state in the dyad, by 
dyad-year. CINC scores are used to avoid introducing collinearity into the model that may result by 
using DOE scores to measure shifting power as well as the static distribution of power in the same 
model. Additionally, CINC scores are the most commonly used measurement of state power so my 
decision to include them is partially due to my desire to adhere to scientific precedence and 
convention. 
The final key independent variable is an interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction. This 
variable allows us to test the key theoretical effects of interest and allows me to directly test the 
theoretical expectation that the effect that rapidly shifting power has on the probability of sanctions 
imposition is conditional on the degree of status quo satisfaction existent in a dyad. 
 The models also control for factors that have been shown to affect the probability of 
economic sanctions imposition. The first control variable Ln(trade) measures logged yearly dyadic 
trade and comes from version four of The Correlates of War’s trade dataset (Barbieri, Omar, Keshk 
2016).  It has been argued that greater trade between two states has a pacifying effect on interstate 
conflict (Oneal et al. 2003) but may also increase the probability of economic sanctions 
(Mastanduno 2003; Stein 2003; Cox and Drury 2006; Hull 2015).  
 Next, the model controls for whether two states are allies, with the expectation that allies 
should be less likely to use sanctions against each other than non-allies. Allies is coded one if the 
states are allies and zero otherwise. The model also includes a variable that indicates whether a dyad 
includes the United States, as it is responsible for a majority of the sanctions reported in the data. Of 
the sixty-six instances of sanctions imposition, the United States is the sender in fifty. US is 
dichotomous, equaling one if the dyad includes the United States and zero if otherwise.  
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 Next, a variable named Year is included for the year sanctions were imposed. It has been 
shown that sanctions use has increased over time (Haas 1998; Cox and Drury 2006). To control for 
temporal dependence, the model includes a variable named Sanction Year that measures the time 
since the last sanction. It may be that more elapsed time between sanctions episodes either makes 
sanctions more or less likely. Including a variable that counts the number of years since the last 
sanctions episode between countries in a dyad allows the model to account for any autocorrelation 
of this sort. The model also includes three cubic splines to account for duration dependence (Beck 
1998). 
Methods. 
 As the dependent variable is binary, I use a rare events logit to test H1 (King and Zeng, 
2001). The rare events logit was developed to remedy small-sample bias in cases where the rarer of 
two outcomes, in our case sanctions imposition, is rare in relation to the size of the sample. By 
default, the rare events logit command in Stata calculates robust standard errors. To provide a 
substantive interpretation of the logistic results, I calculate predictive margins using Stata’s margins 
command. 
Because it is expected that shifting power’s effect on the probability of sanctions imposition 
is conditional on status quo evaluations and the degree of power parity in the dyad, I divide the data 
into two separate datasets before performing the empirical analysis. This allows me to circumvent 
the need of a trichotomous interaction between 1-Year Shift, Dissatisfaction, and Relative Power. The 
first data subset only includes dyads that are more than or equal to eighty percent of power parity. 
This is the traditionally accepted threshold used in studies power transition theory and indicates that 
the states are near power parity (Organski and Kugler 1980). The second data subset only includes 
dyads that are less than eighty percent of power parity. After sub-setting the data, I then perform the 
identical empirical analysis on both datasets. If the interaction of shifting power and status quo 
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dissatisfaction is significant in the subset of near-parity dyads and not in the no-parity subset, this 
will provide support for the hypothesis that the effect of shifting power on the probability of 
economic sanctions is conditional on the level of dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity in 
the dyad. 
In order to capture sanctions-relevant dyads, I further restrict the analysis to dyads that 
either consist of at least one major power or those that are contiguous. Dyads that include at least 
one major power are more likely to experience conflict than those consisting of two minor powers. 
Additionally, it has been shown that contiguous states are more likely to engage in conflict than non-
contagious states (Starr 1978; Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985). The contiguity variable comes for the 
Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016 (v3.2) (Stinnett, Tir, Schafe, Diehl, 
Gochman 2002). Contiguous equals one if two states share a land border or are separated by less than 
400 miles of water. Because contiguity increases the probability of armed conflict, it is expected that 
it is also be positively correlated with the probability of other types of foreign policy responses. 
Empirical Results  
Table 2 reports the rare events regression results for four models. Model 1 and Model 2 
report the regression coefficients for the subset including only dyads that are greater or equal to 
eighty percent of power parity. The coefficients in Model 3 and Model 4 are for the subset 
consisting of dyads that are less than eighty percent of power parity. Models 1 and 3 are baseline 
models with no interactions. It is the expectation that the interaction of shifting power and status 
quo dissatisfaction will only have a significant effect on the likelihood of economic sanctions in 
dyads in the near parity subset. 
Model 2 indicates that the interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is significant at the 
ninety-five percent level. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that the interaction has no effect on 
the likelihood of economic sanctions imposition with ninety-five percent confidence. Comparing the 
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results in models 2 and 4, we can see that the interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is 
significant in Model 2 but not in Model 4, confirming H1. The effect of shifting power on the 
probability of sanctions imposition is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction and the 
degree of power parity in the dyad. The basic interpretation of the lower order terms of the 
interaction in Model 2 is that a one-unit change in 1-Year Shift leads to an expected increase in the 
log-odds of economic sanctions of 23.83, when holding Dissatisfaction and all other variables at their 
mean values. It is important, however, to point out that a one-unit shift in relative power is never 
observed in the data. The smallest shift, in favor of the weaker state in the dyad, is equal to 
0.00000173 while the largest shift is equal to .1973733. The latter value equates to approximately a 
one-fifth unit change in 1-Year Shift. To arrive at an interpretation of the coefficient for 1-Year Shift 
that makes empirical sense, I divided the coefficient by 0.2, giving a value of 4.66. Thus, a one-fifth 
unit change in 1-Year Shift leads to an expected increase in the log odds of economic sanctions 
imposition of 4.66. In terms of probability and percent, this equates to approximately a .55 increase 
in the probability, or a 55 percent increase in the probability of economic sanctions. Holding all 
variables at their means, the baseline probability of sanctions is estimated at approximately .0045 or 
.45 percent. Thus, a one-fifth unit change in 1-Year Shift increases the probability by .55 or 55 
percent, to .007 or .7 percent respectively.  
Admittedly, these values are minuscule; however, this is due to the extreme rarity of 
economic sanctions imposition in the data. For context, we can compare the effect of the United 
States being in a dyad with the effect of a one-fifth unit change in 1-Year Shift. In Model 2, the 
coefficient for US is approximately 2.85. The interpretation being that, if the United States is in a 
dyad, the log odds of economic sanctions increase by 2.85. In terms of probability and percent, this 
equates to a .95 increase and a 95 percent increase in sanctions likelihood, respectively. This 
increases the probability of sanctions from the baseline .0045 to .009, or .9 percent. Subtracting the 
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probability of sanctions when there is a one-fifth unit change in 1-Year Shift from the probability of 
sanctions when the United States is in a dyad, results in a difference of .002, or .2 percent. The 
implication is that dyads that include the United States are only .2 percent more likely to experience 
sanctions imposition than dyads that experience a one-fifth unit change in relative power. In either 
case the likelihood of sanctions remains miniscule. This fact does not diminish the importance of 
the findings. When dealing with minuscule probabilities we need to look at the relative effects of the 
variables under consideration, not only their absolute magnitude. No variable in the model will be 
impressive if we only consider the latter. 
Moving on to the effect of Dissatisfaction, when holding 1-Year Shift at its mean, a one-unit 
increase in Dissatisfaction leads to an expected increase in the log odds of economic sanctions 
imposition of .07. This is the effect expected by H1. Greater dissatisfaction with the status quo 
increases the probability of sanctions but is conditional on 1-Year Shift. 
Model 2 also indicates that a one-unit increase in Relative Power leads to an expected decrease 
in the log odds of economic sanctions imposition of 0.19. The coefficient for bilateral trade is 
negative but fails to reach significance at the .05 level. The coefficient for Allies also fails to reach 
statistical significance, leaving open the question of whether allies are more or less likely to use 
sanctions against each other than non-allies. The logged distance between capital cities fails to reach 
significance but is in the expected negative direction. The logic here is that countries that are further 
from one another are less likely to come into conflict and also less likely to engage in trade, both 
decreasing the likelihood of economic sanctions. The variable Year is in the expected positive 
direction but fails to reach significance in any model. Sanction Year is positive in the near-parity 
subset and negative in the preponderance subset but fails to reach significance in any of the four 
models. It is interesting that as more years pass since the last sanctions episode the likelihood of 
sanctions imposition increases in dyads that are near parity and decreases in those that are further 
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from parity. This finding validates the general expectation that dyads characterized by near-parity 
will act differently than those that are further from power equivalence.    
Table 2. Rare Events Logistic Regression Results for Sanctions Imposition. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
1-Year Shift 8.860 23.83*** 12.84 14.55 
 (5.576) (7.294) (8.086) (10.58) 
Dissatisfaction 0.0634*** 0.0712*** -0.0241 -0.0142 
 (0.0187) (0.0193) (0.0661) (0.0624) 
Relative Power -0.194*** -0.197*** 0.266* 0.260* 
 (0.0594) (0.0576) (0.139) (0.137) 
1-Year Shift* Dissat. . -1.401** . -0.258 
 . (0.593) . (0.624) 
Ln(trade) -0.0340** -0.0319* -0.0478 -0.0479 
 (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0374) (0.0374) 
Allies 0.258 0.273 -1.292 -1.294 
 (0.332) (0.322) (1.255) (1.264) 
Ln(distance) -0.0300 -0.0239 -0.129 -0.131 
 (0.0756) (0.0731) (0.117) (0.118) 
US 2.846*** 2.830*** 3.520** 3.573** 
 (0.387) (0.389) (1.416) (1.389) 
Year 0.0464* 0.0466* 0.0949 0.0962 
 (0.0241) (0.0245) (0.0816) (0.0840) 
Sanction Year 0.209 0.233 -0.0498 -0.0473 
 (0.270) (0.274) (0.693) (0.684) 
_spline1 0.0254 0.0266 0.0240 0.0226 
 (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0542) (0.0537) 
_spline2 -0.0243** -0.0252** -0.0221 -0.0209 
 (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0389) (0.0387) 
_spline3 0.0120*** 0.0124*** 0.00864 0.00824 
 (0.00434) (0.00440) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
Constant -98.72** -99.30** -193.6 -196.3 
 (47.86) (48.68) (161.9) (166.5) 
     
Observations 14,769 14,769 5,630 5,630 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Substantive effects.  
To provide a more intuitive interpretation of the regression results, I report the predictive 
margins for the regression results reported in Model 2. These are represented graphically in Figure 2 
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and Figure 3. There are two horizontal lines in both figures. The dashed line is equal to the baseline 
probability of economic sanctions when all variables are set to their main values. The solid line is 
equal to the value of the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval of a 1st percentile shift in 
relative power. The former allows us to see how the effect of 1-Year Shift compares to the baseline 
prediction. The latter allows us to determine whether the change in 1-Year Shift is statistically 
significant. The predictive margins in Figure 2 indicate that, ceteris paribus, shifting power 
significantly effects the probability of sanctions imposition. Additionally, moving from a 1st 
percentile shift to a 99th percentile shift is a statistically significant change. Holding status quo 
dissatisfaction at its mean value, a dyad in which the weaker state experiences a one-year shift in 
relative power at the 99th percentile is significantly more likely to experience sanctions imposition 
than a dyad in which the weaker sate experiences a one-year shift in relative power at the 1st 
percentile. A 99th percentile change in relative power equates to approximately a 2 percent 
probability of sanctions, while a 1st percentile shift equates to approximately a .09 percent 
probability. Moving from the 1st to 99th percentile leads to a predicted 2168 percent increase in the 
probability of sanctions imposition. 
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Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Changes in 1-Year Shift on the Probability of Economic 
Sanctions Imposition holding Dissatisfaction at its mean. 
 
 
Figure 3 reports the predictive margins of 1-Year Shift when Dissatisfaction is set at its 
maximum value of 20. Per my theory, this degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo should be 
associated with the greatest likelihood of economic sanctions when coupled with rapid shifts in 
relative power. We can see that the effect of 1-Year Shift at its 1st and 99th percentile values is 
significantly different from zero. Unlike Figure 2, the difference between a 1st and 99th percentile 
shift is not significant at the 95 percent level. However, the difference is significant when changing 
between the 1st percentile and about the 60th – 95th percentile values of 1-Year Shift. In the most 
dissatisfied dyads, a shift in power at the 1st percentile equates to approximately a .16 percent 
probability of economic sanctions imposition. At the 95th percentile, the probability is roughly equal 
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to 3 percent. This equals a statistically significant 1775 percent increase in the probability of 
sanctions. To provide some context, if the United States is in a dyad, the probability of sanctions 
imposition is roughly 2.1 percent, ceteris paribus. Thus, a one-year shift in power at the 95th 
percentile value in the most dissatisfied dyads is associated with a higher probability of economic 
sanctions imposition (3 percent) than the United States being in a stat dyad.  
Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Changes in 1-Year Shift at Max Value of Dissatisfaction on the 
Probability of Sanctions Imposition. 
 
The empirical results confirm H1. Rapid gains in relative power and status quo 
dissatisfaction interact to increase the probability of economic sanctions imposition in dyads that are 
near power parity. In dyads that are further from power parity (< 80%) none of the key independent 
variables exert a significant effect, including the interaction of shifting power and status quo 
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dissatisfaction. The confirms the expectation that the shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction 
are salient among states that are close to power parity.  
Conclusion 
 Drawing on the theoretical expectations of power transition theory, the bargaining theory of 
war, and insights from foreign policy substitution, I have argued that rapid increases in relative state 
power, and status quo dissatisfaction increases the probability of economic sanctions imposition in 
state dyads that are near power parity. I have also argued that this relationship is conditional on the 
degree of power parity existent in the dyad—namely, that power parity decreases the probability of 
sanctions by increasing the cost to the sender and reducing the certainty of their success. The 
demand to alter the status quo distribution of benefits and the demand to maintain the status quo 
distribution of benefits, as a result of changes in the distribution of power, impose costs on the 
declining and growing state in a dyad, respectively. Sanctions are more likely when these costs 
exceed the cost for either side to impose sanctions. If either state can get more by imposing 
sanctions than they can from a negotiated settlement, the incentive to impose sanctions is present. 
In the empirical analysis, I find support for the argument that the relationship between shifting 
power and the probability of economic sanctions is dependent o the level of dissatisfaction and the 
degree of parity in a state dyad.  
 What do these findings contribute to our understanding of economic sanctions imposition? 
Of what value are they to the scientific and policy making communities? In the scholarly sense, this 
is the first study to operationalize shifting power, and the first to analyze its effect on the use 
economic sanctions. Importantly, this study illustrates that relative power dynamics and status quo 
evaluations apply, not only to armed conflict, but to foreign policies that fall short of war. The 
insights of power transition theory and the bargaining theory of war not only apply to the “high 
politics” of war, but to the use of economic sanctions, specifically. These findings shed light on this 
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relationship and can be used to more fully explain the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy 
tool, like when the United States imposed sanctions on North Korea for their rapidly developing 
nuclear weapons program. Additionally, the insights of this study can provide us with additional 
insights and expectations concerning the effect of shifting power on future episodes of economic 
sanctions. For example, how will China’s continued rise in relative power with the United States 
affect the likelihood of economic sanctions between the two superpowers in the future? This is a 
point we will now briefly consider. 
 On the twenty-point scale of status quo satisfaction China and the United States score a 
fifteen, with twenty being the most dissatisfied. The empirical results indicate that this high level of 
status quo dissatisfaction is associated with an increased probability of economic sanctions. In 
addition to the superpowers qualifying as a highly dissatisfied dyad they are also each other’s largest 
trade partner. It is likely that the high level of trade between them presents more opportunities to 
use economic sanctions to settle disagreements over China’s increasing power and spreading 
influence. China is also growing rapidly, relative to the United States. Thus, the combination of 
status quo dissatisfaction, greater opportunity to use sanctions, and rapidly shifting power in China’s 
favor, the likelihood of more economic sanctions in the future is quite probable. This will be 
especially true if China’s rise in power continues at its current pace or accelerates.  
 Perhaps China’s shifting power is partially responsible for the recent souring in trade 
relations between the two superpowers. In March 2018, the United States announced it would 
impose stiff tariffs on Chinese steel, aluminum, and other goods to persuade Beijing to reconsider its 
approach to trade with the United States, including the $375 million trade deficit (Lawder and 
Mason 2018). In tit-for-tat retaliation, China promised to respond proportionately by imposing 
similar tariffs on goods produce in the United States (Hancock 2018). Escalatory steps by both sides 
have now escalated to a full-blown trade war. While armed hostilities between China and the United 
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States would prove prohibitively costly for both states, as both states possess large and capable 
nuclear arsenals with a global reach (Kristensen and Norris 2018), the current break down in trade 
relations illustrates that both states are more willing to engage in less costly coercive foreign policies, 
specifically in the form of economic sanction
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CHAPTER V 
 BILATERAL TRADE 
 
How do shifts in relative power, status quo evaluations, and power parity effect bilateral 
trade flows between states in the international system? In this chapter I argue that rapid shifts in the 
distribution of power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity work together to significantly 
affect bilateral trade flows. This expectation is based in two arguments.  
The first argument, and the main argument of this chapter, is that a status quo state will seek 
ways to divert trade from a growing adversary that is near power parity in order to limit the latter’s 
gains from trade. Likewise, the growing adversary that is near power parity with the status quo state, 
may divert trade from the latter state with the same goal in mind.  The key motivation of both states 
is to prevent the other from increasing in relative power and to disincentivize them from making the 
resultant demands to alter or maintain the dyadic status quo distribution of benefits. Either state 
may accomplish these goals via foreign policy tools that fall short of military action, such as 
economic sanctions, tariffs, or non-tariff barriers to trade, among others. Secondly, the expectation 
of future economic or political conflict, as well as the occurrence of economic or political conflict, 
reduce bilateral trade. In this vein, I argue that the rapid increase in relative power by an adversary 
that is near parity with the status quo state can lead to the expectation of conflict and to an increased 
likelihood of its realization. The expectation or realization of conflict, in turn, work to reduce 
bilateral trade. Both arguments should be viewed as complimentary, and lead to the general 
expectation that a rapid increase in relative power by a dissatisfied state that is nearer to power parity
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 with the status quo state exerts negative pressure on bilateral trade flows. To test this theory, I 
analyze how the interaction of shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction affect bilateral trade 
flows.46 I find that in the most dissatisfied dyads, that are also near power parity, rapid shifts in 
relative power significantly decrease bilateral trade flows.  
The chapter is laid out as follows. First, a review of the conflict and trade literature is given. 
The review places my research into the body of works that analyze the effect of conflict on trade 
flows between exporter and importer states. These studies establish three important points. First, 
concerns over the gains from trade can affect bilateral trade flows. Second, trade increases the 
probability of dyadic conflict. Finally, conflict and the expectation of conflict decreases bilateral 
trade. As this dissertation adopts a foreign policy perspective, it is important to look beyond the 
effects that armed conflict has on trade, and to look to other coercive foreign policies that may also 
affect bilateral trade flows. To date, no study has analyzed the effect of shifting power, status quo 
evaluations, and power parity on trade flows.  
Next, theoretical expectations concerning shifting power, status quo evaluations, and power 
parity are offered, followed by a testable hypothesis concerning their effects on bilateral trade flows. 
After the theory has been laid out, a description of the data and methods is given, followed by the 
empirical analysis and implications of findings. The chapter is then concluded. 
Literature Review 
 The literature review is organized into two sections. The first section reviews studies arguing 
that trade increases the probability of conflict and that conflict directly impacts bilateral trade. The 
second section reviews studies that extend this logic to foreign policies that fall short of armed 
conflict, specifically economic sanctions. In the theory section I use the insights of these studies to 
 
46 I do not attempt to determine which foreign policy tool is most likely to be employed. I do this in the sanctions and 
foreign aid chapters. This chapter is solely interested in shedding light on the effect on bilateral trade.  
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formulate a theory of shifting power and bilateral trade, arguing that conflict and the expectation of 
it, whether in the form of economic coercion or military action, has a negative effect on bilateral 
trade. 
 Armed Conflict and Trade. 
The conflict-trade literature falls under the prevue of studies arguing, generally, that political 
variables significantly affect the flow of bilateral trade. One branch of this literature argues that 
uneven gains from trade can lead states to reduce trade with adversaries (Dixon and Moon 1993; 
Gowa and Mansfied 1993; Peterson 2011). Inherent to these studies is the idea that uneven gains 
from trade lead to uneven gins in state power. This resulting differential in state power is the security 
externality being referred to. Another branch of the conflict-trade literature argues that trade 
increases the likelihood of dyadic conflict (Hirschman 1980 [1945]; Keshk et al. 2004, 2010; Kim and 
Rousseau 2005; Long 2008, 2010; Mansfield et al. 2000; Peterson 2011; Pollins 1989, 2010), while 
another branch argues that conflict, and the expectation of conflict, exert negative pressure on 
bilateral trade (Long 2010; Pollins 1989).  
Gowa and Mansfield (1993) argue that existing studies of trade that base their arguments in 
the prisoner’s dilemma fail to consider the externalities of trade, what the authors consider, “the 
most critical aspect of free-trade agreements in the anarchic international system” (408). 
Additionally, they argue that free-trade can be detrimental to the welfare of the state because gains 
from trade can be used to increase military power. Free trade leads to greater efficiency, which leads 
to higher national income. Increased income, in turn, can be used to increase a state’s military 
power. Empirically, the authors find that allies trade more than non-allies, providing support for 
their arguments concerning security externalities—allies are less concerned with each other’s relative 
gains than they are with the gains of non-allies, who are more likely to be adversaries. 
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Dixon and Moon (1993) theorize that states with similar political institutions and foreign 
policy preferences trade more than states with disparate political institutions and foreign policy 
preferences. This is because conflict is more likely between dissimilar states and the prospect of 
conflict exerts negative pressure on bilateral trade. Using Polity II data and UN voting data to 
capture political and foreign policy similarity, respectively, they find support for their arguments—
namely, that more similar states trade more than more dissimilar states. They do find, however, that 
the effect of both variables is conditional on the value of the other. Political similarity is most 
important when foreign policy similarity is low. Likewise, foreign policy similarity is important when 
political similarity is low. The implication of their study is that differences in political institutions and 
foreign policy preferences increase the likelihood of conflict and the treat of conflict exerts negative 
pressure on bilateral trade.  
Peterson (2011) also argues that gains from trade can lead to security externalities because of 
alterations in the dyadic balance of power. He argues that trade with third-party states has a 
significant effect on the likelihood of interstate conflict. In line with the bargaining theory of war, 
Peterson argues that increases in relative power, because of gains of trade with third-parties, 
incentivize the growing state to demand a greater share in the distribution of dyadic benefits. In 
addition, gains from trade provide the growing state with the capital needed to finance violent 
conflict.47 Peterson further argues that relative gains of the growing state incentivize the declining 
state to engage in conflict to preserve the status quo. Importantly, Peterson also finds that this 
relationship is conditional on the degree of political similarity in the dyad, as states are more worried 
about the relative power gains of states that hold disparate foreign policy preferences than those 
 
47 This is in line with Morgan and Palmer’s (2006) argument that the foreign policy goals of growing states are more 
likely to be oriented toward changing the status quo because of an increase in resources with which to fund change-
oriented policies. 
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holding preferences more similar to their own.48 This is because it is more likely that a politically 
dissimilar, growing state will make demands to alter the status quo in ways that are unacceptable to 
the declining state than a growing but similar state. Employing a gravity model of trade, Peterson 
finds support for his theoretical expectation that third-party trade is related to an increase in the 
probability of dyadic conflict.  
Another branch of the conflict-trade literature focuses on the effect that conflict has on 
trade. Basing his argument in public choice, which assumes that actors are rational utility 
maximizers, Pollins (1989) is one of the first to integrate political variables into the classic gravity 
model of trade. He argues that importers, regardless of the level of analysis (e.g., individuals, 
organizations, or states), make import decisions based on both economic and political factors. He 
names three political motivations that affect import decisions. First, it is the desire of the importer to 
gain leverage over the exporter through the manipulation of trade ties. Examples of this behavior are 
economic sanctions, embargos, and other forms of economic coercion. Second, similarities and 
differences in the foreign policies of the importer and exporter states influences import decisions. 
Importers will trade more with states that hold more similar foreign policy preferences.49 Finally, the 
political relationship between the importer and exporter state affects import decisions.50 Importers 
will do more business with friendly states than with rivals because doing business with an adversarial 
state is riskier than doing business with friends. In addition to the risk involved with importing from 
a rival state, importer’s decisions on where to get their imports is also based on their desire to 
reward states they view as friendly to their own and punish those who are adversarial (741). In sum, 
the actors who make import decisions, whether individuals, organizations, or governments, consider 
the foreign policy preferences and the political relationship between their state and the exporting 
 
48 see also Wolfers (1962, 31) and Dixon and Moon (1993).  
49 This is a key expectation for the theory offered in this chapter. 
50 This insight is also important for the theory that follows.  
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state and partially base their import decisions on these political concerns. Pollins tests his theory 
using a political-augmented gravity model of trade, finding support for the argument that trade is 
influenced by both economic and political factors. 
Another highly relevant study is Long’s (2010) analysis of the effects of expected and actual 
internal and external armed conflict on bilateral trade. Long asks how the expectation of armed 
conflict affects consumer demand for imports and firms’ supply of exports. He argues that both the 
expectation of future conflict and the occurrence of armed conflict reduce bilateral trade flows. 
Basing his argument in the rational expectations hypothesis, Long argues that profit-maximizing 
firms assess the likelihood of future internal or external conflict in the market state according to the 
information they have at timet, and that these assessments are correct on average. In other words, 
firms’ expectations at timet-1 concerning future conflict are distributed around the true value at timet 
(88). When future armed conflict seems likely, rational firms will reduce their commercial interaction 
with the conflict state to avoid declining profitability. The negative effect that expected conflict has 
on trade is a result of the conflict’s deleterious effects on the supply of, and demand for, exported 
goods. Long argues that armed conflict reduces the supply of goods as well as the consumer demand 
for those goods. This happens through two mechanisms, one direct and the other indirect. First, 
armed conflict directly affects trade because it destroys property and leads to a loss of human 
resources, both of which lower economic growth in the conflict state. The supply of goods by firms 
in the exporter state and the demand of consumers in the importer state are both fueled by their 
respective national incomes. National income, in turn, is fueled by economic vitality and economic 
growth. In the exporting state, decreases in economic growth, as a result of internal or external 
conflict, reduces the ability of firms to produce goods, decreasing supply for, and increasing the 
price of, their goods. Likewise, property damage and the loss of human resources, due to armed 
conflict, lowers national income in the importing state. Just as lower national income in the 
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exporting state reduces supply, lower national income in the importing state reduces the ability of 
consumers to purchase imported goods, reducing demand. Therefore, conflict in either an exporting 
or importing state results in a reduction in bilateral trade. Secondly, Long argues that armed conflict 
can indirectly affect trade, as a result of economic or political policy change. Both categories of 
policy change have the potential to reduce firms’ ability to profit from exports and consumers’ 
demand for imports. These policy changes can come in the form of economic sanctions, 
government expropriation or confiscation, or embargos, to name just a few.  
Long’s theoretical expectations lead him to formulate five testable hypotheses concerning 
the effect of expected and actual internal and external conflict and bilateral trade. He first 
hypothesizes that domestic conflict and expected domestic conflict in the exporter state are 
negatively related to exports. Second, domestic conflict and expected domestic conflict in the 
importer state are negatively related to exports. Third, expected and actual interstate conflict in the 
exporter state with any third-party state reduce exports. Fourth, expected and actual interstate 
conflict in the importer state with any third-party state reduce exports. Finally, expected and actual 
interstate conflict between the importer and exporter state is negatively associated with exports. 
Using a conflict-augmented gravity model of trade, Long finds strong support for all five 
hypotheses. Interestingly, he finds that the expectation of future conflict has a greater impact on 
bilateral trade than the actual occurrence of conflict. This finding seems to validate the argument 
that firms’ estimates of future conflict are correct, on average, leading to divert trade before conflict 
ensues. Firms are getting out ex-ante to avoid the profit-reducing effects of war.  
Taken together, studies of armed conflict and trade provide evidence in support of the 
arguments that trade increases the probability of dyadic conflict and that conflict reduces trade. 
Reductions in trade can be a result of expected losses due to expected or actual conflict. Or, they 
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may be a result of the strategic actions of rational states, aimed at preventing the relative-gains of 
their adversaries.  
 Sanctions and trade. 
Because this dissertation is based in the logic of foreign policy substitution, it is important to 
review studies that analyze the effect that foreign policy responses, short of war, have on bilateral 
trade flows. This is important as the general theory of this dissertation argues that shifting power, 
status quo evaluations, and power parity not only influence the probability of armed conflict but 
many foreign policy responses, including economic sanctions. Following this logic, sanctions and 
other economic policy tools, can directly and indirectly affect trade. 
The findings of extant studies of economic sanctions and trade are mixed, with some 
reporting a negative relationship when major powers are sanctions senders (Crozet et al. 2016; 
Evenett 2002; Hafner-Burton et al. 2008; Yang et al. 2009), others finding that this only holds in 
cases of comprehensive sanctions regimes (Caruso 2003; Yang et al. 2004), and others finding that 
the relationship between sanctions and trade is conditional on other factors, such as the degree of 
state ownership of domestic industry (Davis et al. 2014). In opposition to these studies, others 
report a positive relationship between sanction imposition and bilateral trade flows (Dutt et al. 
2010). As a result of the United States being the most prolific sender of economic sanctions, many 
studies analyzing the effect of sanctions on trade look to how economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States affect trade.  
Yang et al., (2009) adopt this latter approach, asking how unilateral and multilateral sanctions 
effect third party trade with the European Union, in which the United States is the sole, or one of 
many senders. The goal of their study is to analyze network and third-country effects of the United 
States sanctions imposed on the trading partners of the European Union. Third-party effects are 
synonymous with sanctions busting in which third party states capture lost trade between the sender 
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and target state. It is argued that sanctions effectiveness depends on the number of states involved 
in sending sanctions. With more states on-board, so to speak, the less likely it will be that one or 
many of them will attempt to sanctions bust. Network effects refer to sanctions’ disruption of trade 
between more than just the target and sender. In the case of Yang et al.’s study, this is disrupted 
trade between targets of US sanctions and the European Union.  Using a gravity model of trade, the 
authors find support for the network effects argument but none for the third-party effects (1234-
1235).  
Evenett (2002) analyzes the effect that economic sanctions had on the import of South 
African goods by eight industrialized states. The sanctions were aimed at coercing the South African 
government into ending Apartheid. They find that once they control for whether the United States 
is in a dyad, the sanctions imposed by the other seven industrialized economies had no significant 
effect on South Africa’s exports, with the United States sanctions reducing South Africa’s exports by 
one-third (572). The takeaway, however, is that sanctions reduced bilateral trade.  
 Morgan and Bapat (2004) argue that economic sanctions punish domestic firms in the sender 
state. Although sanctions are aimed at the target state, in attempt to coerce them into changing 
undesirable behavior, sanctions make trade with the target state less profitable for the sender's 
domestic firms, causing them to reduce or completely stop all economic transactions within the 
target state (65-66). The authors also point out that sanctions are often purposely aimed at the 
sender’s own domestic firms that have business dealings in the target state. The sender state’s 
interests and their firms' interests often come into conflict, presenting a problem for the sender. The 
problem being how to disincentives domestic firms from continuing illegal trade with the targeted 
state. They conclude that the sending government must make violation costly enough to deter their 
own domestic firms from illegally circumventing sanctions laws. Because of lost profits resulting 
from lost trade with the target state, the sender’s affected firms may try to circumvent sanctions by 
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moving their operations to a state that allows trade with the target state, decreasing bilateral trade 
flows between sender and target (66). 
While Bapat and Morgan focus on the strategic relationship between sender government and 
its own firms to explain when sanctions will be successful, Early (2012) looks to external actors to 
answer the question of why sanctions are often unsuccessful in achieving their stated aim. Early 
agrees with Bapat and Morgan's (2004) argument that sanctions punish the sender's domestic firms 
by increasing the cost to do business in the targeted state. In addition, however, Early argues that 
sanctions disrupt target firms' wider trading networks. As a result of increased cost, and loss of 
market access, firms in both states may be forced to seek new markets. This is an expensive 
endeavor, immediately following sanctions, and one that necessarily involves a decrease in bilateral 
trade between the sender and target. 
Taken together, the studies above provide ample evidence that political and economic 
conflict have the potential to disrupt bilateral trade flows. Many address how political and foreign 
policy preference similarity affect trade and how trade can alter the distribution of power, leading to 
negative externalities and reductions in bilateral trade. None of the studies above, however, address 
the multiplicative effect that shifting power, power parity, and political similarity have on bilateral 
trade flows. The theory offered below attempts to address this question.  
Theory 
How do shifting power, status quo evaluations, and power parity effect bilateral trade flows 
between states in the international system? To answer this question, I present a theory that borrows 
arguments from the conflict-trade and sanctions-trade literature. Overall, the expectations and 
findings of both bodies of work lead me to hypothesize a negative relationship between shifting 
power and bilateral trade flows in state dyads characterized by status quo dissatisfaction and power 
parity.  
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Because gains from trade can be used to increase state power and, therefore, its position in 
relative power, these conditions can increase the probability that states will use bilateral trade as a 
tool of foreign policy. An increase in relative power, by a dissatisfied state, is likely to lead to a 
commensurate demand to alter the status quo distribution of benefits; however, both the status quo 
and revisionist states have the incentive to limit the other’s gains from trade in these conditions. The 
status quo state is incentivized to limit or halt the growth of the revisionist state, while the revisionist 
is incentivized to increase the rate at which the status quo is declining—thus, speeding up its own 
increase in relative power. In conditions of uncertainty, the cost of these demands may exceed what 
either state is willing to accept. When the respective demand of the status quo or revisionist state to 
maintain or alter the status quo, respectively, outweighs the cost for the other to enact restrictions 
on bilateral trade, the incentive to do so is present.  
In addition to the incentive to limit an adversary’s gains from trade, the expectation or 
realization of economic or political conflict can also lead to declines in bilateral trade. The 
expectation of conflict can lead to the diversion of trade from the market where conflict is likely to 
more stable markets elsewhere. In addition, governmental restrictions on trade and armed conflict 
directly and negatively impact bilateral trade. In this vein, I argue that rapidly shifting power, status 
quo dissatisfaction, and power parity can lead to the expectation and realization of economic and 
political conflict, both of which lead to a decrease in bilateral trade.  
In sum, shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity can lead to reductions in 
bilateral trade via three avenues. First, the status quo and revisionist states may place restrictions on 
bilateral trade to limit each other’s gains from trade. The incentive to do so is present when the cost 
to restrict trade is less than acquiescing to the other’s demand to maintain or alter the status quo, 
respectively. Second, shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity can lead to the 
expectation of future economic or political conflict, leading states to divert trade to safer markets. 
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Finally, the realization of economic or political conflict can directly impact bilateral trade.  These 
arguments lead to the following testable hypothesis: 
H1: Bilateral trade will decline when a dissatisfied state experiences a rapid shift in relative power in dyads that are 
near power parity.  
Methods 
The analysis relies on a fixed-effects, augmented gravity model of trade with robust standard 
errors, clustered by dyad. The gravity model is based on the Newtonian law of gravity, which states 
that objects of greater mass and that are nearer in proximity exert a greater gravitational pull on the 
objects around them. In context of states, this translates to mean that larger states that are closer in 
proximity engage in more bilateral trade while those that are further away engage in less. In this 
regard, larger GDP in both the exporting and importing state proxies for greater supply and greater 
demand, respectively. Greater supply and demand increase trade while greater distance between 
trade partners decreases bilateral trade.  
The gravity model of trade came into common usage in the 1960s when Tinbergen (1962), 
Poyhonen (1963), and Linnemann (1966) used the gravity model to analyze international trade flows. 
Since that time, the model has lasted the test of time as a result of its accurate predictions of bilateral 
trade flows (Baier, Bergstrand, and Fung 2014; Baker, Kabir, Salim and Al-Mawlai 2017). Validation 
for the argument that trade is largely a function of the size of trade partners and distance between 
them is illustrated by the gravity model’s ability to explain a large amount of the variation in trade 
flows, as illustrated empirically by a large R-squared coefficient. 
There are possible drawbacks to using the gravity model. One possible limitation to using 
the basic gravity model with longitudinal data is the high likelihood of omitted variable bias (Baltagi, 
Egger, and Pfaffermayr 2003). To counter this possibility, I calculate a fixed effects OLS regression 
model using the “xtreg” and “fe” commands in Stata. This allows the model to control for 
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unobserved time-invariant factors that may otherwise confound the empirical results. In addition to 
the possibility of omitted variable bias, the use of OLS may introduce problems of model 
misspecification. For example, Silverstovs, and Schumacher (2006) find evidence that Poisson Quasi 
Maximum Likelihood (PQML) estimation provides a more accurate specification of the gravity 
model than OLS. This is partially a result of the latter estimation technique’s problematic handling 
of observations in which trade-flows are equal to zero. However, despite any possible drawbacks, 
the gravity model of trade, analyzed with fixed effects OLS regression, remains the preferred 
method for the analysis of bilateral trade flows. I follow this convention. 
In addition to the augmented gravity model, marginal effects are calculated using Stata’s 
margins command to provide greater insight into the validity and implications of the regression 
results, specifically the interaction of shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction. Margins calculates 
ninety-five percent confidence intervals which allow for the determination of whether changes in 
and across values of the key independent variables are statistically significant.  
As in the sanction’s analysis, the data is divided into two different subsets, based on the 
degree of parity in each dyad. The first subset includes only dyads that are greater than or equal to 80 
percent of power parity. The second subset includes only dyads that are less than 80 percent of 
parity. Sub-setting the data in this manner allows us to test the hypothesized conditional effect of 
shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity on bilateral trade without the need of a 
trichotomous interaction term. The identical analysis is then performed on each subset and reported 
in the regression table. If the interaction of shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction is 
significant in the subset of near-parity dyads and not in the no-parity subset, this will provide 
support for the hypothesis that the effect of shifting power on bilateral trade is conditional on the 
level of dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity in the dyad. 
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Data 
The study spans the years 1870-2007. The data are arranged in dyad-year format and 
organized so that the more powerful state in the dyad is State A and the weaker is State B. The 
dataset is composed of politically relevant dyads. For the purposes of this chapter, these are state 
pairs that include at least one major power or are contiguous, and that engaged in some level of 
trade. The descriptive statistics for all model variables are found in Table 3.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics—Bilateral Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
1-Year Shift 21,006 -0.001 0.0591 -0.245 0.241 
Dissatisfaction 21,006 9.090 6.840 0 20 
1-Year Shift*Dissat. 21,006 -.0375 .637 -4.352 4.424 
Ln(Relative Power) 21,006 -0.123 0.276 -5.856 -6.73e-05 
Ln(distance) 21,006 5.516 8.188 -25.33 9.377 
Ln(GDP)a 21,006 18.86 12.88 0 30.30 
Ln(GDP)b 21,006 14.01 11.26 0 28.60 
Ln(trade) 21,006 2.896 6.747 -29.93 12.13 
Ln(pop)a 21,006 10.99 1.012 4.804 14.10 
Ln(pop)b 21,006 8.650 1.204 4.804 14.02 
Year 21,006   1870 2007 
      
 
Trade data is from version 4.0 of the Correlates of War’s trade dataset (Barbieri, Omar, 
Keshk 2016). The dependent variable, Ln(Trade), is continuous and is calculated by taking the log of 
total bilateral trade by dyad-year. In gravity models, it is traditional that the dependent variable and 
the other conventional gravity model variables be included in their logarithmic forms. This makes 
interpretation easier and in terms of the percent change X and associated percent change in Y.  
The first key independent variable, 1-Year Shift, measures the one-year change in relative 
power. This variable is constructed using Carroll and Kenkel’s (2016) Dispute Outcome Expectation 
Scores (DOE), which measure the probability of each state’s probability of military victory by dyad-
year. This variable is continuous and is calculated by taking the ratio of the weaker state’s power and 
the aggregate power of both states, by dyad-year. I then subtract the value of the ratio at timet-1 from 
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the ratio at timet. The result is the value of a one-year change in relative power. Larger values 
indicate shifts of greater magnitude towards power equivalence. I expect 1-Year Shift to be negatively 
related to bilateral trade. 
The second key independent variable, Dissatisfaction, is calculated using Polity IV scores, 
which measure political openness. Higher scores mean that a state is more democratic and lower 
scores mean it is more autocratic. The variable ranges from -10 to 10.  It is assumed that greater 
divergence in domestic political institutions is indicative of greater divergence in shared foreign 
policy preferences.51 Dissatisfaction is calculated by subtracting the Polity IV scores of each state in a 
dyad and then taking the absolute value, by dyad-year. This new variable acts as a proxy for status 
quo satisfaction and ranges from 0 to 20 with larger values indicating less similarity in shared policy 
preferences and, therefore, greater status quo dissatisfaction. It is expected this variable is negatively 
related to bilateral trade. 
The interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is the primary effect of theoretical interest 
and allows the model to test whether the relationship between shifting relative power and trade is 
conditional on state status quo evaluations and relative power. It is the expectation that larger shifts 
in power by a highly dissatisfied state that is closer to power parity with its more powerful trading 
partner will have the largest negative effect on bilateral trade. Concerns over the gains from trade are 
expected to be more salient under these dyadic conditions. In addition, the expectation and 
likelihood of economic and political conflict are also greater. 
The next key independent variable, Ln(Relative Power), measures the logged dyadic 
distribution of power by dyad-year. This variable is continuous and is measured by taking the ratio 
of State A’s CINC score and the sum of both states CINC scores, by dyad-year. I take the log of this 
variable to adhere to the gravity model convention mentioned earlier. The data for this variable 
 
51 For an in-depth discussion concerning this measure and why it is used, please refer to chapter 4. 
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comes from the Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey 1972). I expect this variable to be positively related to bilateral trade, as it is similar to GDP 
in that it measures the size of each state in the dyad. The six indicators that go into calculating the 
CINC score are military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel 
production, urban population, and total population. Thus, larger CINC scores can be translated as 
larger states, in terms of both economy and population. 
In addition to the key independent variables, control variables are included that are 
fundamental to the gravity model of trade. The first two variables are the logged GDP of both states 
in the dyad. Ln(GDP)a and Ln(GDP)b come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
dataset and are measured in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Development Indicators, The World 
Bank). As mentioned, the expectation is that larger GDP is associated with greater levels of bilateral 
trade. The next two gravity variables measure the logged population of each state in the dyad. 
Ln(pop)a and Ln(pop)b also come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator dataset. The 
logic for including population variables in the gravity model is the same as for including GDP. Like 
the measures of GDP, these variables are expected to be positively related to bilateral trade. The 
final gravity variable is the logged distance between the capital of State A and State B. This variable 
comes from version 3.2 of the Correlates of War’s Direct Contiguity dataset (Correlates of War 
Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2; Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 
2002). Unlike the GDP and population measures, this variable is expected to be negatively 
associated with bilateral trade. The further two countries are apart the costlier it is to trade, leading 
to less bilateral trade.  
Empirical Results 
Table 4 reports the fixed effects OLS regression coefficients. Model 1 and 2 report the 
regression results for the subset of data that only includes dyads that are greater than or equal to 80 
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percent of power parity. Model 3 and 4 report the results for dyads that are less than 80 percent of 
power parity. Model 1 and 3 are the baseline models for each subset and do not include the 
interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction.  
In Model 1, a 1-Year Shift fails to reach statistical significance but is in the hypothesized 
negative direction. The same is true for Dissatisfaction. The coefficient for Ln(relative power) is in the 
expected positive direction but also fails to reach statistical significance. The coefficient for 
Ln(distance) is in the expected negative direction but is not statistically significant. Ln(GPD)a is in the 
opposite direction as expected but is not significant. Ln(GDP)b is in the expected positive direction 
and is significant at the 95 percent level. The coefficients for Ln(pop)a and Ln(pop)b are in the 
expected positive direction and are statistically significant at the 95 and 99 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Fixed Effects OLS Regression Results for Logged Bilateral Trade. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
1-Year Shift -1.086 1.768 3.186* 6.287*** 
 (1.038) (1.369) (1.697) (2.137) 
Dissatisfaction -0.0285 -0.0267 -0.0977*** -0.0945*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0260) (0.0255) 
Ln(Relative 
Power) 
0.360 0.422 -0.267 -0.342 
 (1.899) (1.901) (1.050) (1.067) 
1-Year 
Shift*Dissat. 
. -0.336*** . -0.444 
 . (0.125) . (0.294) 
Ln(Distance) -0.0116 -0.0117 -0.0118 -0.0120 
 (0.00983) (0.00984) (0.00982) (0.00982) 
Ln(GDP)a -0.0162 -0.0177 0.0269 0.0263 
 (0.0329) (0.0330) (0.0285) (0.0286) 
Ln(GDP)b 0.0738** 0.0732** -0.00399 -0.00405 
 (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0321) (0.0323) 
Ln(pop)a 1.727** 1.657** 2.550*** 2.564*** 
 (0.767) (0.771) (0.839) (0.839) 
Ln(pop)b 3.587*** 3.644*** 2.019*** 2.005*** 
 (0.434) (0.438) (0.772) (0.771) 
Constant -48.32*** -47.99*** -42.87*** -42.94*** 
 (6.739) (6.743) (7.139) (7.133) 
     
Observations 21,079 21,079 8,316 8,316 
R-squared 0.119 0.120 0.085 0.085 
Number of 
dyadcode 
870 870 503 503 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 2 reports the regression results of the full model, including the interaction of 1-Year 
Shift and Dissatisfaction. Please recall that the coefficients in this model are for the subset of data in 
which all dyads are greater than or equal to 80 percent of power parity. Immediately apparent is the 
fact that the coefficients and significance levels are almost identical to those reported in Model 1. 
The only substantial difference is that the sign on the coefficient for 1-Year Shift is now positive. 
This sign flip is simply due to the nature of interaction terms. In Model 2, we can see that the 
interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent 
level. Comparing the results in models 2 and 4, we can see that the interaction of 1-Year Shift and 
Dissatisfaction is significant in Model 2 but not in Model 4. This confirms H1. The relationship 
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between shifting power and bilateral trade is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction 
and the degree of parity in a dyad. 
The interpretation of the constituent terms of the interaction in Model 2 is that when 
holding Dissatisfaction at its mean value, a one-unit change in 1-Year Shift leads to approximately a 1.8 
percent increase in bilateral trade. This makes sense because the average difference in regime-type is 
roughly equal to  7. Recall that Dissatisfaction ranges from 0 to 20, with lower values being the most 
satisfied. If the mean value of Dissatisfaction was closer to 20, the sign for 1-Year Shift would likely be 
positive. Likewise, when holding 1-Year Shift at its mean, a one-unit change in Dissatisfaction is 
associated with approximately a -.03 percent drop in bilateral trade.  The negative sign on this 
constituent term also makes sense, as the mean value of 1-Year Shift falls roughly between its own 
60th and 70th percentile value and more rapid shifts are expected to exert negative pressure on 
bilateral trade. 
Model 3 simply reports the same results as Model 1, but for the less than 80 percent of parity 
subset. Model 4 reports the results of the full model for the same subset. There are some notable 
differences in these models from the greater than or equal to 80 percent of parity models. First, in 
Model 3, 1-Year Shift is now positive but still fails to reach significance at the 95 percent level. In the 
baseline model for the near parity subset, the sign was negative.  Second, the sign for Ln(relative 
power) is negative in Model 3 and 4, whereas in Model 1 and 2 the sign was positive. While the 
coefficient for this variable is not significant in any model, it is still worth noting the change in sign. 
This can be interpreted as an indication that greater degrees of power parity increase trade between 
states that are already nearly equivalent in national capabilities but decrease trade in those further 
from power equivalence. While this would be an interesting question for future analyses, I currently 
have no convincing theoretical reason for why this may be the case. Next, the sign of the coefficient 
of Ln(GDP)a also flips from being negative in Model 1 and 2 to positive in Model 3 and 4. The sign 
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for Ln(GDP)b also changes directions; however, the sign changes from being positive and highly 
significant to negative and not statistically significant. The other coefficients and signs in Model 3 
and 4 are consistent with those reported in Model 1 and 2 with one exception. The sign for 
Dissatisfaction remains negative in all models but is only statistically significant in Model 3 and 4. 
Finally, the interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is not significant in the less than 80 percent 
of parity subset.  
Because of the insignificance of the interaction term in Model 4, the model of interest for 
the less than 80 percent of parity subset is the baseline reported in Model 3. Of note in this model is 
that Dissatisfaction is negative and significant at the 99 percent level and exerts an effect on bilateral 
trade that is independent from 1-Year Shift. In the near parity subset, the effect of Dissatisfaction is 
conditional on 1-Year Shift. The coefficient for Dissatisfaction in Model 3 indicates that a one-unit 
increase in Dissatisfaction is associated with roughly a 0.1 percent decrease in bilateral trade when 
holding all other variable at their means. This can be interpreted to mean that trade partners that are 
further from parity are not as concerned with the relative growth of their trade partners but more 
with the degree of status quo satisfaction existent in the dyadic relationship.52 
The uniformly different signs for the GDP variables from State A and State B and from 
model to model may not be that surprising. It has been shown that GDP can be positively or 
negatively related bilateral trade, depending on whether trade is in capital-intensive or labor-intensive 
goods, respectively (Bergstrand 1989; Long 2008). Because I do not have data that differentiates 
between trade in capital and labor-intensive goods, I am not able to elaborate further on this finding 
 
52 It is worth noting that the differences in sample sizes between the two subsets of data. If we could increase the 
observations in the less than 80 percent of parity subset the level of significance for 1-Year Shift may increase as well. If 
this were to be the case, then the last statement concerning trade partners that are further from parity and their concern 
with shifting power would be incorrect. Of course, this is purely hypothetical and from the data available this seems to 
be the best conclusion. 
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at this time. This may be an interesting avenue for future research. Specifically, whey it appears to be 
the case that this effect is dependent on the degree of power parity existent between trade-partners. 
Substantive Results. 
To provide a more intuitive interpretation of interaction term in Model 2, marginal effects 
are reported in Figure 4 and 5. The dashed horizontal line in both figures is equal to the average 
marginal effect of Model 2 on bilateral trade flow and is included for context and interpretability. In 
Figure 4, 1-Year Shift is set to range from its minimum to maximum value while holding Dissatisfaction 
at its mean. Recall that this is for the subset of data that only includes dyads that are greater than or 
equal to 80 percent of power parity. We can see that, holding Dissatisfaction at its mean, a dyad in 
which the weaker state experiences a shift equal to the minimum value of 1-Year Shift, does not 
experience significantly more bilateral trade than a dyad in which the weaker state experiences a shift 
equal to the maximum value. However, the effects of a minimum shift and a maximum shift on 
bilateral trade are both significantly different from zero. 
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Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Shifting Power at Mean Value of Status Quo Dissatisfaction. 
 
 In Figure 5, 1-Year Shift ranges from its minimum to maximum values with Dissatisfaction hold 
constant at its maximum value of 20. This directly tests the hypothesized effect of shifting power 
and status quo dissatisfaction on bilateral trade. Among highly dissatisfied dyads that are near parity, 
the difference between a minimum one-year shift and a maximum one-year shift statistically 
significant at the 95 percent level. Additionally, 1-Year Shift exerts negative pressure on bilateral 
trade, confirming H1. According to the marginal effects reported in Figure 5, a dyad experiencing a 
maximum shift in relative power is predicted to engage in 67.5 percent less bilateral trade than a 
dyad that experiences shift at the minimum value. The results in Figure 5 provide further validation 
of H1 and the expectation that shifting power leads to a decline in bilateral trade in dyads 
characterized by a high level of status quo dissatisfaction and that are near power parity.  
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Figure 5. Marginal Effect of 1-Year Shift at Max Value of Status Quo Dissatisfaction. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has provided an important and neglected detail to the story of bilateral trade and 
conflict. It is the first study to analyze the conditional effects of shifting power, status quo 
evaluations, and power parity on bilateral trade flows. The main argument of this chapter is that 
rapid shifts in the distribution of power, coupled with status quo dissatisfaction and power parity, 
exert negative pressure on bilateral trade flows between states in the international system. Two 
theoretical explanations were offered for this relationship.  
First, I argued that because the gains of trade can be used to increase relative power, states 
will take steps to curb the growth of their adversaries, with the goal of preserving the status quo 
distribution of benefits. Second, it was argued that threat or realization of armed conflict and other 
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coercive foreign policies can have a direct impact on trade flows. Both explanations work in tandem 
to explain how shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity work together to reduce 
bilateral trade. 
The empirical results provide evidence in support of my theoretical expectations. Rapid 
shifts in relative power, by a dissatisfied state that is near power parity with its more powerful 
counterpart, lead to a significant reduction in bilateral trade. The results indicate that, compared to a 
dyad in which the weaker state experiences a minimum shift in power, a dyad in which the weaker 
state experiences a maximum shift in power engages in 67.5 percent less bilateral trade. 
Placed in context of the general theory of this dissertation, these findings support the 
argument that power transition theory is useful beyond its proven utility in explaining the 
occurrence of great power war or regional armed conflict. Specifically, this chapter validates the 
argument that power transition theory can explain the use of foreign policies that fall short of 
military action.
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CHAPTER VI 
FOREIGN AID 
 
While it is intuitive that states give foreign aid to their friends, perhaps less intuitive is the 
observation that they give aid to their adversaries. This chapter is interested in the latter 
phenomenon. Specifically, it investigates how donors use foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy to 
persuade their adversaries to fall in line with their policy preferences. Whether recipients are friend 
or foe, foreign aid can be used by donor states as a carrot and a stick. Aid can be used to entice 
foreign states to adopt policies that are conducive to the donor’s interests or can be rescinded to 
punish recipients that do not fall in line. In this chapter I ask how rapid increases in in relative 
power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity effects how states use of foreign aid as a tool of 
foreign policy. 
In the previous chapters, I provide evidence that shifts in relative power, status quo 
dissatisfaction, and power parity significantly affect the probability of economic sanctions imposition 
and the flow of bilateral trade. In this chapter, perhaps counterintuitively, I argue, and find evidence 
for the argument, that rapid increases in relative power by a weaker adversary increases the 
probability that a declining status quo state will provide a growing revisionist state with foreign aid. 
In addition, I argue that these same conditions lead to an increase the amount of aid provided. A 
declining status quo state will provide a growing revisionist state with foreign aid to foster economic 
dependence on the part of the growing revisionist state. By increasing the revisionist’s dependence 
on their provision of foreign aid, the status quo state raises the cost that the revisionist will incur if 
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that aid is reduced or rescinded completely. In the empirical analysis, I find support for my 
theoretical expectations—namely, that shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity 
work together to make the provision of foreign aid more likely.  
The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows. First, I review the foreign aid literature that 
deals specifically with the provision of aid to unstable and adversarial states. These studies are 
relatively new, as well as few in number. The first is the study by Savun and Tirone (2018), which 
provides evidence in favor of the argument that donors give aid to governments in terrorist-prone 
states in order to disincentivize their citizens from joining terrorist organizations. The second study 
is Uzonyi and Ryder’s (2017) analysis of the provision of foreign aid among rival states. After the 
literature review, I present my theoretical expectations, including three sets of testable hypotheses, 
concerning the effect of relative power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity on both the 
probability of foreign aid’s provision and the amount of aid donors provide to adversarial states. The 
theory is followed by a discussion of the data and methods used in the empirical analysis. I then 
present the empirical results, followed by a discussion concerning the implications of the findings.   
Literature Review 
 The following literature review focuses on studies dealing with the provision of foreign aid 
between rival states. These studies are the most relevant to the current study, in that rivalry and 
status quo dissatisfaction are similar concepts. Both are attempts to measure conflictual interstate 
relations and are indicators of dyadic status quo satisfaction. Rival states are, by implicit definition, 
dissatisfied with the dyadic status quo. Studies of rivalry and foreign aid generally fall into a single 
camp; however, recent work provides an emerging alternative. The main camp argues that rivalry is 
generally associated with less likelihood of aid provision and less aid when it is provided (Boschini 
and Olofsgard 2007; Colaresi 2004; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Poe 1992; Rudloff, Scott, and 
Blew 2013). The arguments and findings of these studies vary, however. For example, Colaresi 
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(2004) argues that leaders of donor states may be punished by constituents if they provide aid to 
rival and it is not reciprocated. Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) find that more intense rivalry 
decreases aid. Rudloff et al., (2013) find support for the argument that rivalry causes states to give 
aid to a rival’s enemies but to not provide the rival with foreign aid. In this vein, Meernik et al., 
(1998) and Poe (1992) analyze where the United States sent foreign aid during Cold War to combat 
the Soviet Union’s influence in other states. 
An alternative emerging body of work, that is much less voluminous and more recently 
established, argues that states sometimes have the incentive to provide foreign aid to states other 
than their friends, including rivals and states that are experiencing political instability (Uzonyi and 
Rider 2017; Savun and Tirone 2018). Savun and Tirone (2018) argue that foreign aid reduces 
terrorism in recipient states by reducing the incentive for individuals to participate in terrorist 
organizations. Donors have the incentive to provide foreign aid to states where terrorist 
organizations are likely to prevent their growth or proliferation. Specifically, the authors argue that 
the provision of governance and civil society aid dampen participation in terrorist groups and that 
organized civil society organizations are key to democracy promotion (6). In their empirical analysis, 
the authors find evidence that greater amounts of civil society and governance aid reduce terrorist 
attacks in recipient states, unless a civil war is ongoing.53 While the Savun and Tirone, study does not 
differentiate between rival and non-rival states, it does help to establish the argument that the 
incentive to provide foreign aid to other states is not only based on congenial interstate relations. In 
other words, states do not only have incentives to give aid to their friends, but also to further their 
foreign interests. 
Uzonyi and Rider (2017) also analyze the stabilizing effects of foreign aid in recipient states; 
however, theirs is the first study asking why donors provide aid to rival states. The authors argue 
 
53 Governance aid refers to foreign aid aimed at spurring or fostering greater democratization in the recipient state. 
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along the lines of the adage “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.” Their first 
hypothesis is that greater instability in a state will increase the probability of the provision of 
nonmilitary aid between it and a rival donor. Their theory is simply that “instability-induced 
turnover,” in which a leader is deposed and replaced by another leads to greater uncertainty and an 
increased probability of violent conflict (277-278). This argument is based on the logic of the 
bargaining theory of war and specifically the theory’s augments concerning uncertainty concerning 
the resolve of rival states to use force (Fearon 1995). Internal instability can increase the prospect of 
irregular leader turnover (280). In turn, irregular leader turnover brings the greatest uncertainty 
concerning the new leader’s resolve, as you may end up with a more hawkish leader in power, as a 
result. In turn, greater uncertainty over resolve increases the probability of escalation to armed 
conflict because of the incentive to misrepresent this information to adversaries. That said, the 
authors concede that the destabilization of a rival state is not a negative development in every case. 
It may be the case that reducing the resources of a rival state could turn out to be a positive tactic if 
doing so weakens them militarily while not causing the regime to collapse, resulting in irregular 
leader turnover (278). Additionally, in conditions of low uncertainty, concerning who would take the 
deposed leader’s place, a rival state may have the incentive to destabilize the current regime. This 
would be the case if the new leader in waiting was known to be less or equally hawkish as the 
incumbent. The current situation in Venezuela is a good example of this exception. The situation in 
Syria, however, is its inverse.  These exceptions aside, the authors focus on conditions of high 
uncertainty, in which a donor has the inventive to provide foreign aid to a rival regime in order to 
stabilize it enough to prevent the current leader from being deposed of power. Non-military aid can 
be used by the rival regime to bolster current supporters or pay off domestic opposition groups, 
increasing stability while decreasing the probability of irregular turnover. 
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An important secondary finding of Uzonyi et al.’s study is that rivals never provide each 
other with military aid. As a result, the authors analyze the provision of non-military aid in their 
study. Providing nonmilitary aid to an adversary increases stability, decreasing the probability of 
regime change, the associated uncertainty concerning the new regime’s resolve, and the greater 
probability of escalation. Importantly, this is accomplished without increasing the military 
capabilities of the rival state. 54 
After running a battery of logit and OLS models, Uzonyi and Rider find that donor states 
provide nonmilitary aid to their rivals as a result of political instability. They find no difference 
between rival and non-rival states provision of aid in the face of domestic instability in recipient 
states. Both are equally as likely to give non-military aid in conditions of high uncertainty; however, 
rivals do give smaller amounts of aid in these situations because leaders in donor states are restrained 
by the watchful eye of their constituents.55 If you provide more aid to a rival and it is not 
reciprocated, you can lose popularity or office. This last finding is in line with earlier studies of 
foreign aid (Colaresi 2004). The current study fits into this newly emerging camp, however, the 
theoretical expectations for why aid is provided to rival states are not the same. 
Theory 
Do states give foreign aid to rapidly growing adversaries? Studies of the determinants of 
foreign aid’s provision have not considered this question. As a result, I offer a novel theory in this 
respect. I argue that, while foreign aid can be used in attempt to improve economic and political 
stability in recipient states, it can also be used to increase the recipient’s dependence on the donor 
state, increasing the cost recipient states pay when its provision is rescinded or reduced by the 
donor. This is similar to the argument made by Early and Jadoon (2019).  Therefore, foreign aid can 
 
54 This is the motivation for the current study to focus its analysis on non-military aid. 
55 My results concerning the amount of aid provided reinforce this finding. 
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be used as a foreign policy tool that provides donor states with a stick and carrot to entice and 
coerce the recipient state into doing its will. The provision of aid (the carrot) enables the donor state 
to offer inducements to the recipient state that encourage them to act in accordance with the 
preferences of the donor. In the case of shifting power, aid can work to disincentivize the increasing 
state from making demands to alter the status quo that are unacceptable to the more powerful 
donor. Rescinding aid (the stick), or the threat to do so, enables the donor to punish the recipient 
when it acts against these preferences. This is simply another manifestation of negative sanctions, 
and one that falls into the definition of sanctions put forward by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 
(1990).56  
The argument is that enticements can be used to curb or limit the demands made by a 
growing dissatisfied state. It is a classic case of gaining bargaining leverage. The goal is to make the 
growing challenger dependent enough on your provision of aid to increase the cost of any demand 
they may make as a result of their new position in relative power. The more dependent they are on 
your provision of aid, the more costly it is to lose it. The declining state can provide aid with this 
goal in mind. This leads to one of the reasons I look to non-military aid in the empirical analysis. 
Military aid will directly increase the relative power of the growing adversary, directly enhancing its 
ability to come off victorious in battle. Providing the growing adversary with military aid would be 
ill-advised and work counter to the argument just laid out. It is also within the realm of possibility 
that aid can be used to decrease the growing power’s dissatisfaction with the status quo. In 2018, the 
United States provided millions of dollars in aid to Iran, North Korea, and China, none of which 
came from the Department of Defense (not military aid).  
 
56 Both Hufbauer et al., (1990) and Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev (2009) expressly include the recension of foreign aid as a 
manifestation of economic sanctions in their definition. 
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A recent paper by Early and Jadoon (2019) argues along these same lines. The authors argue 
that aid sanctions provide a less costly substitute to commercial sanctions, for the sending state. 
Disrupting aid flows, on the other hand, can be very costly for the target state. The authors further 
argue that greater amounts of aid make sanctions threats more credible and make the sender more 
likely to threaten sanctions on aid. They explain that senders often use the provision of aid with the 
goal of altering the behavior of the recipient state and can limit or take away the aid if the recipient 
does not act accordingly. Because of the costliness of aid sanctions to the target, and the associated 
increase in the sender’s credibility to impose sanctions, the threat of aid sanctions is more likely to 
be successful as the amount of aid being provided increases. They find support for their 
expectations. In addition to Early and Jadoon’s study, Morrow (1999) also argues that greater 
amounts of foreign aid provide the donor with more opportunities to communicate the credibility of 
their willingness to impose sanctions on the recipient state (see also Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2007; Newnham 2008). 
In context of my theory, it follows logically that donors may have the inventive to provide 
aid to a growing adversary, in order to make their treats more credible and making it more likely that 
the recipient state will act in accordance to the will of the donor. In context of shifting power, and 
the associated demands to revise the status quo, greater amounts of foreign aid will make it less 
likely for the growing state to issue costly demands to alter the status quo, simply because of the 
prospect of losing the aid they are receiving. 
The literature on armed conflict and my own study on economic sanctions argue that rapid 
shifts in relative power by a dissatisfied state increase the probability of armed conflict initiation and 
economic sanctions imposition, respectively. However, Uzonyi and Rider’s (2017) theoretical 
expectations and robust empirical findings suggest that conflictual interstate relations, in their case 
state rivalry, can have a positive effect on aid flows between adversaries, due to its stabilizing effect 
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on a rival regime.57 Their argument and findings are counterintuitive, as it seems logical that 
adversarial states would not have incentives to provide each other with aid. The United States 
reversal on their policy of regime change in Syria provides an anecdote that is illustrative of this idea. 
The United States prefers the ouster of Al Assad’s regime but is uncertain whether the regime’s 
replacement would make conditions more or less conducive to United States security and policy 
goals in the region and the around the globe. As a result, the United States incentive to keep Assad 
in power is currently greater than the incentive to replace him. This likely explains why the Obama 
administration reneged on its red line threat to intervene in Syria if evidence of chemical weapons 
use emerged. Seeing no viable alternative, President Obama stuck with the devil he knew and 
refrained from taking steps to further destabilize Assad’s regime. The Trump administration has, 
thus far, followed suit. Are there other conditions that incentivize the provision of foreign aid to 
one’s adversaries? I argue that rapid changes in relative power provide this incentive. 
What would incentivize a donor state to provide aid to a rapidly growing adversary? The 
answer lies partially in the expectations of Neo-Kantianism, which argues that the triad of shared 
IGO membership, economic interdependence, and joint-democracy decreases the likelihood of 
economic coercion between states in the international system (Drury, James, and Peksen 2014). 
Arguing along these lines, Russett (2003) finds evidence that the existence of these three Kantian 
variables decreases armed interstate conflict by up to seventy percent. This is especially true in cases 
of asymmetrical interdependence in which one state is much more dependent on the economic 
relationship than the other and is relatively small in terms of GDP. Larger states have more outside 
options, decreasing the costliness of interrupted economic exchange with an adversary due to 
 
57 This chapter also looks at non-military aid. Rival states do not provide each other with military aid, so the effect of the 
shifting power of the provision of military aid to an adversary will likely not be that insightful. 
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economic or military conflict.58 In context of foreign aid, an important implication is that when 
asymmetrical interdependence is present in a state dyad, a dependent recipient of foreign aid will be 
less likely to challenge the status quo in fear of losing the aid it is receiving from the more powerful 
status quo state that is also the donor. Unlike its more powerful counterparts, a weaker, aid-
dependent state does not have outside sources to which it can turn to replace lost income as a result 
of losing, or experiencing reductions to, its provision of foreign aid. This makes the aid-dependent 
state more vulnerable to the demands of the more powerful donor.  
In line with Russet’s explanation, but contrary to the findings of Drury et al., (2014) 
concerning joint democracy’s pacifying effect on political-economic relations, I argue that foreign 
aid can be used by more powerful donor states to foster greater dependence on the part of a less 
powerful adversarial recipient. As the recipient state becomes more dependent on the provision of 
aid from the donor, any foreign policy decision that will jeopardize its continued provision becomes 
costlier to the recipient. This idea is not new by any means. Hirschman (1980 [1945]) argued that 
more powerful states cultivate asymmetrical trade relationships with less powerful states in order to 
bring the latter’s economy and foreign policies in line with those favorable to the former. I am 
merely applying this argument to the provision of foreign aid, and in the specific context of shifting 
relative power between adversarial states. In this vein, I argue that a rapid shift in relative power, in 
favor of the less powerful recipient state will incentivize the donor to increase its provision of aid 
with this goal in mind. This leads to the first two testable hypotheses concerning the probability that 
the status quo state will provide aid to the growing adversary and the amount of aid it is willing to 
give. 
 
58 One implication of this is that two large states do not often provide each other with aid. In my empirical analysis, I 
find support for this argument. 
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H1a: rapidly shifting relative power in favor of the weaker state in a dyad has a positive effect on the probability of 
foreign aid provision. 
H1b: rapidly shifting relative power in favor of the weaker state in a dyad exerts a positive effect on the amount of 
foreign aid provided by the donor. 
Knowing that greater aid dependence makes it costlier for the recipient to act contrary to the 
donor’s preferences, concerning the status quo distribution of benefits, the recipient state will be less 
likely to issue a demand to revise the status quo that is large enough to incentivize the donor to 
rescind or reduce its provision. The implication being that increased dependence on the foreign aid 
provision of the status quo power makes it less likely that the revisionist will demand an alteration to 
the status quo distribution of benefits that is commensurate with its own newly acquired position in 
the dyadic distribution of power.  
In terms of bargaining, foreign aid increases the costs associated with bargaining failure that 
results when the revisionist issues a demand to alter the status quo that is unacceptably large to the 
status quo power. This simultaneously increases the settlements that the recipient will accept and 
moves the bargaining range closer to the donor’s ideal point, allowing the latter to demand more, in 
the way of maintaining the status quo, after providing aid than in could in the absence of its 
provision. The “more” in this case comes in the form of the status quo state’s demand to maintain 
the status quo distribution of benefits. 
Status quo evaluations. 
A key element of my argument is the degree to which the growing state is dissatisfied with 
dyadic status quo. After all, a growing but satisfied state will not likely be as worrisome to the 
declining status quo power as a dissatisfied adversary that will likely have the incentive to challenge 
the status quo as a result of its improved position in the distribution of dyadic power. This leads to a 
second set of testable hypotheses. 
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H2a: greater status quo dissatisfaction increases the probability of foreign aid provision. 
H2b: greater status quo dissatisfaction increases the amount of aid provided. 
H2c: the relationship between shifting power and the probability of foreign aid is conditional on the degree to which the 
growing power is dissatisfied with the status quo. 
H2d: the relationship between shifting power and the amount of aid provided is conditional on the degree to which the 
growing power is dissatisfied with the status quo.  
Power parity. 
Another key variable of my theory is how close the growing revisionist state is to the status 
quo state in relative power. There are two reasons for power parity’s importance in the question of 
foreign aid. The first reason stems from the mechanisms driving the theory. First, it is unlikely that a 
potential donor will provide foreign aid to a state that is nearly its equivalent in relative power, with 
the goal in mind of fostering asymmetric interdependence. This will be more plausible between a 
preponderant donor and much weaker recipient.  Second, a potential donor, in a dyad consisting of 
states similar in relative power, will be less likely to see the need to provide aid than a one in a dyad 
characterized by power preponderance. A state seeking assistance is more likely to seek it from a 
source that is not in the same desperate economic boat, so to speak. The implication is that shifting 
power’s effect on both the probability of foreign aid and the amount of aid a donor provides is 
conditional on the status quo evaluation of the growing state as well as the degree of power parity 
existent between it and the status quo state. This leads to four more testable hypotheses. 
H3a: power parity decreases the probability of aid provision. 
H3b: power parity decreases the amount of aid provided. 
H3c: the relationship between shifting power and the probability of aid is conditional on the degree to which the 
growing power is dissatisfied with the status quo and the level of power parity existent in the dyad. 
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H3d: the relationship between shifting power and the amount of aid provided is conditional on the degree to which the 
growing power is dissatisfied with the status quo and the level of power parity existent in the dyad. 
Data 
The unit of analysis for this study is directed-dyad-year, spanning the years 1981 to 2001. 
The data is organized so that State A is both the potential aid donor as well as the more powerful 
state in the dyad (also the status quo state), making State B the potential aid recipient and relatively 
less powerful than State A (also known as the revisionist state). There are two dependent variables. 
The first, Aid, measures whether State A provided State B with aid. The second, Aid Amount, is the 
natural log of how much aid State A provided State B when aid was provided. Foreign aid data 
comes from Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Roberts, Findley, and Popwers (2011). The key independent 
variables are the same two that are used for the empirical analysis in the economic sanctions chapter. 
The first, 1-Year Power Shift, measures the one-year change in relative power between the states in 
each dyad. This variable is constructed using Carrol and Kenkel’s (2017) Dispute Outcome 
Expectation Scores and measures the change in relative power over a year’s time. The second key 
independent variable, Dissatisfaction, measures the absolute difference in regime type between the 
states in each dyad. The variable ranges from 0 to 20 with 20 being the most satisfied. This variable 
is constructed using data from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). Finally, 
Relative Power measures how close two states are to power parity and is constructed using DOE 
scores. The remaining control variables for this analysis are those factors know to affect the 
provision of foreign aid. The main effect of interest is the interaction of 1-Year Shift and 
Dissatisfaction. The descriptive statistics are found in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics--Foreign Aid. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
1-Year Shift 119,429 -4.64e-05 0.0195 -0.271 0.254 
Dissatisfaction 119,429 7.965 6.410 0 20 
Relative Power 119,429 0.440 0.0570 0.115 0.5 
Year 119,429 1,992 6.005 1,981 2,001 
DemocracyB 119,429 1.809 7.344 -10 10 
Aid 119,429 0.456 0.498 0 1 
Aid Amount 119,429 0.427 2.426 0 20.76 
RivalryAB 119,429 0.00517 0.0717 0 1 
AssassinationB 119,429 0.0888 0.284 0 1 
RiotB 119,429 .111 .314 0 1 
Civil WarB 119,429 0.0914 0.288 0 1 
Irregular TurnoverB 119,429 0.128 0.335 0 1 
Ln(GDPpc)B 119,429 1.481 0.105 1.254 1.791 
Ln(Population)B 119,429 15.51 1.168 12.83 20.96 
Human RightsB 119,429 5.226 2.213 0 8 
Trade DependenceBA 119,429 0.00386 0.0235 0 2.450 
Trade OpenessB 119,429 0.305 0.457 0 7.518 
Ln(GDPpc)A 119,429 1.465 0.111 1.254 1.828 
Ln(Population)A 119,429 16.90 1.533 12.62 20.96 
ColonyBA 119,429 0.0133 0.115 0 1 
DefenseAB 119,429 0.0747 0.263 0 1 
Ln(distance)AB 119,429 8.052 1.473 0 9.421 
Post-Cold War 119,429 0.658 0.474 0 1 
Aid Year 119,429 2.451 3.865 0 29 
Aid Year2 119,429 20.95 60.11 0 841 
Aid Year3 119,429 260.5 1,178 0 24,389 
      
 
 DemocracyB is the Polity IV score for State B, ranging from fully autocratic, -10, to fully 
democratic, 10. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), and Uzonyi and Rider (2017) provide 
evidence that obtaining policy change in more democratic states is more difficult than doing so in 
more autocratic states. Therefore, a greater degree of democracy in the weaker state should have a 
negative effect on the probability of aid as well as how much aid is given. 
 RivalryAB comes from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), equaling one if states in a dyad were 
rivals and zero otherwise. Rivals should be less likely to provide each other with aid as a result of 
their poor diplomatic relations due to their history of repeated armed conflict. Rivalry is expected to 
decrease the probability of aid being given and to reduce the amount provided.  
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I also include four control variables used by Uzonyi and Rider (2017) that measure internal 
political instability in the potential recipient state. I include these variables as the authors provide 
evidence that they are positively and significantly related to both provision of aid and the amount of 
aid provided. The first three variables are originally from Banks (2015). The fourth, Irregular 
TurnoverB, originally comes from Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009). In addition, I control for 
other factors known to affect the provision of foreign aid.  
 The next four variables come from Uzonyi and Rider’s study. The first is AssassinationsB and 
indicates whether there was an assassination or attempted assassination of a government official or 
politician in State B. It equals one if there was an attempted or successful assassination and zero 
otherwise. It is expected that assassination attempts or the assassination of a government official or 
politician in the weaker state will increase the probability of aid as well as the amount of aid the 
donor provides.  
 Civil WarB indicates whether there was a Civil War in State B. This variable is binary and 
equals one if “Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried out by independent bands of 
citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime” and zero otherwise 
(Uzonyi and Rider 2017, p.282). It is expected that Civil War in the weaker state will be positively 
related to the probability of aid and the amount of aid given. 
 RiotB indicates whether State B experience a riot for each dyad-year, equaling one if this was 
the case and zero otherwise. Uzonyi and Rider provide evidence that riots in potential recipient 
states both increase the probability of aid the amount of aid given. My expectations are the same. 
 Irregular TurnoverB equals one for any dyad-year in which State B experienced irregular leader 
turnover and zero otherwise. There is evidence that the irregular turnover of a political leader 
increases the likelihood of aid and the amount given. It is expected that Irregular TurnoverB is 
positively related to both outcomes. 
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 Ln(GDPpc)B is the natural log of State B’s GDP per capita. Wealthier states are in less need of 
foreign aid than their poorer counterparts, making the provision of aid to the latter more likely. The 
data for this variable comes from the World Bank (2012). It is expected that larger GDP per capita 
in the weaker state will decrease the probability that the more powerful state will provide it with 
foreign aid and will decrease the amount of aid given when provided. 
 Ln(Population)B is the natural log of State B’s population and is also taken from the World 
Bank (2012). States with larger populations are more likely to be in need of foreign aid. It is my 
expectation that larger population in the weaker state increases the probability of aid and the amount 
of aid provided. 
 Human RightsB measures State B’s protection of human rights. States with better human 
rights records are more likely to receive foreign aid. This data comes from the CIRI Physical 
Integrity Rights Protection Scale (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014) and ranges from zero to 
eight, with higher scores indicating a better record on human rights. This variable should be 
positively related to the provision of aid and the amount of aid given. 
 Trade DependenceBA measures the degree to which State B is dependent on State A for trade. 
Trade dependence has been shown to increase the likelihood that the dependent state will receive 
foreign aid. In line with previous studies, this variable is the natural log of the ratio of State B’s trade 
with State A and State B’s GDP per capita.59 The data for this variable comes from the World Bank 
(2012). Trade DependenceBA should be associated with an increase the probability of aid and the 
amount of aid given. 
 Trade OpenessB is the ratio of the natural log of State B’s total trade and its GDP per capita. It 
has been shown that more economically open states are more likely to receive foreign aid. Data for 
 
59 See Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and Uzonyi and Rider (2017). 
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this variable also comes from the World Bank (2012). This variable should be associated with an 
increase in the probability of aid and the amount provided by the donor state. 
Ln(GDPpc)A is the natural log of State A’s GDP per capita. Wealthier states are better able to 
provide aid than poorer states. Higher GPP per capita in the potential donor increases the 
probability of aid’s provision. The data for this variable comes from the World Bank (2012). This 
variable should be positively related to the provision of aid and the amount of aid provided. 
Ln(Population)A is the natural log of State A’s population and is also taken from the World 
Bank (2012). States with larger populations may have more resources to provide aid to other states, 
making the provision of aid more likely. This variable should be positively associated with both of 
the outcomes of interest. 
ColonyBA indicates whether State B was ever a colony of State A. This variable is equal to one 
if State B was ever a colony of State A and zero otherwise. It has been illustrated that past colonial 
relationships increase the probability of foreign aid.  
Defense AllianceAB equals one if State A is in a defense alliance with State B and zero 
otherwise.  Being in an alliance should increase the probability of aid.60 
Ln(Distance)AB is the natural log of the distance between State A and State B. Being in closer 
proximity should increase the probability of aid. 
Post-Cold War is a dummy variable equaling one for all years after 1990 and zero for all years 
prior. It is included to control for the possibility that aid patterns were different during the Cold War 
than they were after. This could be the case because of the shift from a bi-polar to a uni-polar 
international system in which the two dominant powers were no longer vying for global influence 
and the support of third-world. It is expected that this variable will be negatively associated with the 
probability of aid and the amount of aid provided. 
 
60 See Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005). 
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Aid Year, Aid Year2, and Aid Year3, are included in the model to control for temporal 
dependence. They measure the numbers of years since State B received aid from State A. 
After Travis (2010) and Uzonyi and Rider (2017) the Inverse Mills Ratio is included in the OLS 
regressions (Models 4-6) to determine whether the provision of aid is related to the amount of aid 
provided. It is included to correct for selection bias, as the motivation to provide aid is most likely 
also related to the amount of aid provided. The full statistical models also include two interaction 
control terms. These are an interaction between 1-Year Shift and Relative Power and another between 
Relative Power and Dissatisfaction.  
Methods 
 The empirical analysis consists of four logistic regression models that test the probability of 
aid provision and four OLS regression models for the amount of aid given by the donor. As in the 
trade and sanctions analyses, the data is divided based on the degree of power parity existent in the 
dyads. The first subset includes dyads that are at least 80 percent of power parity. The second subset 
includes the dyads that are less than 80 percent of parity. To reiterate, this is the traditional threshold 
used in studies of power transition theory. Sub-setting the data allows me to eliminate the need for 
the trichotomous interaction between shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity. If 
the interaction of shifting power and status quo dissatisfaction is significant in the subset of near-
parity dyads and not in the no-parity subset, this will provide support for the hypotheses that the 
effect of shifting power on the probability of aid and its effect on the amount of aid contributed by 
donor states are conditional on the level of dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity in a state 
dyad. 
Four statistical models are run on each subset of data. The first four models are logistic 
regression models and test the hypotheses concerning the probability that aid is given. The first of 
these models is the base model and does not include any interaction terms. The second logistic 
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regression model is the full model and includes the interaction of a 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction. 
The next four models are OLS and test the hypotheses concerning the amount of aid a donor 
provides. The four models are identically constructed across both subsets of data. As with the 
logistic regression models, the first model is the base model and the second is the full model that 
includes the interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction. Marginal effects are also calculated to 
provide a more intuitive and substantive interpretation of the coefficients reported in the regression 
results. 
Empirical Results 
Table 6 reports the results of all four logistic regression models. The dependent variable is 
the binary indicator Aid. Model 1 tests H1a, H2a, and H3a, reporting the independent effects of 
shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and relative power, as well as well as the effects of other 
control variables that have been shown to affect the probability of the provision of foreign aid. The 
results offer support for all three hypothesized effects. The coefficient for 1-Year Shift is positive and 
significant at the 99 percent level, confirming the expectation of H1a that rapid changes in relative 
power increase the probability that aid will be provided to the increasing state. The coefficient for 
Dissatisfaction is in the expected positive direction and is significant at the 99 percent level as well, 
providing support for H2a. Donors are more likely to give foreign aid to a weaker recipient state as 
dissatisfaction with the status quo increases. Finally, the coefficient for Relative Power is negative and 
significant at the 99 percent level, providing support for H3a. Donors that are nearer to power 
equivalency with the potential recipient state are less likely to provide the latter with foreign aid. 
Model 2 reports the log odds of the full Aid model for the subset consisting of dyads that 
are at least 80 percent of power parity. This model includes the interaction of 1-Year Shift and 
Dissatisfaction. We can immediately see that the the interaction term is significant at the 99 percent 
level, providing tentative support for H2c. The effect of shifting power on the probability of aid 
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provision is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction existent in the dyad. We can also 
see that the interaction term is not significant in the less than 80 percent of parity subset. This 
provides support for H3c. The relationship between shifting power and the probability of aid is 
conditional on the degree of status quo dissatisfaction and the level of power parity existent in the 
dyad. This is the primary effect of interest in the Aid analysis. The interpretation of the constituent 
terms in Model 2 is that when holding Dissatisfaction at its mean value, a one-unit increase in 1-Year 
Shift decreases the probability that aid will be provided. Additionally, when holding 1-Year Shift at its 
mean, a one-unit increase in Dissatisfaction increases the probability that aid will be provided. 
The results for the control variables are mixed. There are a few noteworthy results. First, as 
expected, Ln(GDPpc)b is negative and significant in all four logistic models. DemocracyB is positive and 
significant in all four models as well, contrary to the expected effect. Ln(pop)B is positive and 
significant in all models, as expected. Human RightsB is consistently negative and significant, the 
opposite direction as expected. While puzzling, this result is precisely the effect that Uzonyi and 
Rider (2017) found, which was also contrary to their expectations. It seems that poor a human rights 
record attracts foreign aid donations. The provision of aid is more likely between states in a defense 
pact, as expected. The riot variable was dropped from the analysis as a result of predicting success 
perfectly. There were no observations in which RiotB was not equal to one. This was the case even 
though, out of the nearly 120 thousand observations in the sample, over 100 thousand are equal to 
zero and just over 13 thousand are equal to one. I have no convincing argument for why this is the 
case. The other three controls from Uzonyi and Rider’s (2017) model are positive and significant, as 
expected. The provision of aid was more likely in during the Cold War than after its end. 
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Table 6. Logistic Regression Results—The Provision of Foreign Aid. 
 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES (>=80% parity) (>=80% parity) (<80% parity) (<80% parity) 
     
1-Year Shift 1.563*** -8.199*** 0.670 -11.58 
 (0.388) (2.241) (1.141) (8.382) 
Dissatisfaction 0.00838*** 0.0689*** 0.00697 -0.0151 
 (0.00141) (0.0126) (0.00428) (0.0530) 
Relative Power -2.119*** -0.921*** -1.966** -2.310* 
 (0.240) (0.323) (0.817) (1.213) 
1-Year Shift* 
Dissatisfaction 
. 0.180*** . 0.0778 
 . (0.0598) . (0.184) 
1-Year Shift*Relative 
Power 
. 20.18*** . 26.64 
 . (5.283) . (18.57) 
Relative 
Power*Dissatisfactio
n 
. -0.138*** . 0.0477 
 . (0.0280) . (0.113) 
Ln(gdppc)B -0.808*** -0.829*** -1.487*** -1.476*** 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.379) (0.379) 
DemocracyB 0.0476*** 0.0496*** 0.0532*** 0.0529*** 
 (0.00164) (0.00164) (0.00455) (0.00454) 
Ln(pop)B 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 
 (0.00975) (0.00971) (0.0397) (0.0397) 
Human RightsB -0.185*** -0.186*** -0.226*** -0.226*** 
 (0.00567) (0.00566) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Trade DependenceB 2.010** 2.054** 3.198 3.314 
 (0.935) (0.937) (3.109) (3.103) 
Trade OpenessB -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.430*** -0.430*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0864) (0.0864) 
Ln(gddpc)A 2.811*** 2.809*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.349) (0.349) 
Ln(pop)A 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 (0.00911) (0.00913) (0.0380) (0.0380) 
Colony 0.882*** 0.873*** -0.0187 -0.0147 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.304) (0.307) 
Defense 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.594*** 0.592*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0370) (0.0926) (0.0928) 
Ln(distance) 0.0673*** 0.0678*** 0.0213 0.0211 
 (0.00744) (0.00748) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Post-Cold War -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.129** -0.130** 
 (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0568) (0.0569) 
Rivalry 0.0282 0.00662 -0.0664 -0.0637 
 (0.196) (0.202) (0.333) (0.334) 
Riot . . . . 
 . . . . 
Assassination 4.449*** 4.447*** 3.770*** 3.771*** 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.251) (0.251) 
Civil War 4.171*** 4.170*** 3.891*** 3.881*** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.244) (0.245) 
Irregular Turnover 0.467*** 0.468*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0734) (0.0736) 
Aid Year -0.607*** -0.606*** -0.599*** -0.599*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0362) (0.0362) 
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Aid Year2 0.0649*** 0.0647*** 0.0672*** 0.0673*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00646) (0.00646) 
Aid Year3 -0.00186*** -0.00185*** -0.00210*** -0.00210*** 
 (7.49e-05) (7.49e-05) (0.000269) (0.000269) 
Constant -6.736*** -7.215*** -7.326*** -7.181*** 
 (0.408) (0.418) (0.911) (1.019) 
     
Observations 119,429 119,429 16,854 16,854 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To provide a more intuitive interpretation of the interaction term in Model 2, predicted 
marginal effects are provided in Figure 6. The graph on the left illustrates the marginal effect of 
moving from the minimum value of 1-Year Shift to its maximum value while holding Dissatisfaction 
and all other variables at their means. The most obvious insight from this graph is that as 1-Year Shift 
increases, the probability that foreign aid is provided also increases. Importantly, moving from the 
minimum to maximum value of 1-Year Shift is significant at the 95 percent level. Although 
interesting, I am not particularly interested in the effect of shifting power among averagely 
dissatisfied state dyads. The true theoretical effect of interest is how shifting power affects the 
probability of aid in the most dissatisfied dyads. This ties directly back to the expectation of power 
transition theory that interstate conflict is most likely between states that are near parity and that are 
highly dissatisfied with the status quo. 
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Figure 6. Marginal Effects of 1-Year Shift on the Probability of Aid. 
 
The graph on the right of Figure 6 illustrates the marginal effect of moving from the 
minimum value of 1-Year Shift to its maximum value while holding Dissatisfaction at its maximum 
value (most dissatisfied) and all other variables at their means. Again, it is immediately apparent that 
as 1-Year Shift increases in magnitude the probability of aid also increases. Again, moving from the 
minimum value of 1-Year Shift to the maximum value is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
By comparing the two graphs in Figure 6, we can see that the marginal effect of this move is also 
significantly larger in the most dissatisfied state dyads then it is in those that are merely averagely 
dissatisfied. In the most dissatisfied dyads, a shift equal to the maximum value of 1-Year Shift is 
associated with approximately a 63 percent probability that aid will be provided to the weaker but 
increasing state. In averagely dissatisfied dyads this probability is approximately 53 percent. This 
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represents a statistically significant 16 percent decrease in the probability that aid will be given to the 
weaker but growing state. 
We now turn our attention to the analysis of the amount of aid donors provide to their 
relatively weaker counterparts. Table 7 reports the OLS regression results for the Aid Amount 
analysis. As with the Aid analysis, the first two models in Table 7 were performed on the near-parity 
subset, while the second two were performed on the subset consisting of dyads that are less than 80 
percent of parity. The key independent variables and control variables are identical to those included 
in the Aid analysis.  
Model 5 reports the coefficients for the baseline model, which omits all three interaction 
terms. We can see that 1-Year Shift is significant at the 95 percent level but is negative, contrary to 
the expectations of H1b. Likewise, Dissatisfaction is in the opposite direction hypothesized and fails 
to reach significance. Relative Power is in the expected direction but is not significant. These last 
two results are contrary to H2b and H3b, respectively.  
Model 6 reports the coefficients for the full model, including all control variables. From this 
model we can see that the interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is negative and significant at 
the 99 percent level, providing tentative support for H2d. The effect of shifting power on the 
amount of aid provided by a donor state is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction in a 
state dyad. When holding Dissatisfaction at its mean, a one-unit change in 1-Year Shift is associated 
with a 0.5 percent decline in the amount of aid being provided by the more powerful donor state. 
While this seems to contradict H2d, this is an incorrect conclusion at which to arrive based on the 
reported coefficients. The sample mean of Dissatisfaction is 8, which qualifies as a relatively satisfied 
dyad. Recall that the variable ranges from zero to twenty with twenty being the most dissatisfied and 
zero being the most satisfied. It is not surprising, then, that a 1-Year Shift has a negative effect when 
Dissatisfaction is held at its mean. To truly test whether the relationship between shifting power and 
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status quo dissatisfaction is as hypothesized, we must rely on an analysis of marginal effects. Before 
moving to the substantive results, however, it must also be pointed out that the results in Table 7 
provide support for H3d.  This is the main effect of interest in the Aid Amount analysis. Comparing 
models 6 and 8, we can see that the interaction of 1-Year Shift and Dissatisfaction is significant in the 
greater than or equal to 80 percent of parity subset but not in the less than 80 percent of parity 
subset. This confirms the expectation that the relationship between shifting power and the amount 
of aid a donor provides is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction and the degree of 
power parity existent in the dyad. Were the interaction term to be significant in Model 8, this 
hypothesis would be rejected.  
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Table 7. OLS Regression Results—Aid Amount. 
 5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES (>=80% parity) (>=80% parity) (<80% parity) (<80% parity) 
     
1-Year Shift -0.511** 13.14*** 0.686 8.068 
 (0.243) (1.487) (1.070) (8.071) 
Dissatisfaction -0.000301 -0.0322*** -0.00841*** 0.00823 
 (0.000868) (0.00721) (0.00220) (0.0595) 
Relative Power -0.0412 -0.725*** -8.974*** -8.732*** 
 (0.178) (0.229) (1.086) (1.458) 
1-Year Shift* 
Dissatisfaction 
. -0.114*** . -0.0433 
 . (0.0384) . (0.199) 
1-Year Shift*Relative 
Power 
. -30.85*** . -16.19 
 . (3.296) . (17.81) 
Relative 
Power*Dissatisfactio
n 
. 0.0721*** . -0.0358 
 . (0.0156) . (0.125) 
Ln(gdppc)B -1.465*** -1.443*** 0.204 0.204 
 (0.0869) (0.0854) (0.213) (0.213) 
DemocracyB -8.16e-05 -0.00137 -0.00609** -0.00595** 
 (0.00115) (0.00127) (0.00265) (0.00291) 
Ln(pop)B -0.0408*** -0.0395*** 0.302*** 0.302*** 
 (0.00547) (0.00545) (0.0353) (0.0312) 
Human RightsB 0.00670 0.00805 -0.0915*** -0.0913*** 
 (0.00462) (0.00503) (0.0118) (0.0113) 
Trade DependenceB 2.325*** 2.275*** 5.971*** 5.936*** 
 (0.799) (0.658) (1.949) (2.105) 
Trade OpenessB 0.0156 0.0176 -0.247*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0219) (0.0409) (0.0427) 
Ln(gddpc)A 3.627*** 3.606*** 3.648*** 3.644*** 
 (0.0736) (0.0608) (0.208) (0.162) 
Ln(pop)A 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.0302 0.0295 
 (0.00534) (0.00510) (0.0234) (0.0207) 
Colony 1.474*** 1.474*** -0.219 -0.221 
 (0.169) (0.109) (0.287) (0.288) 
Defense -0.0694*** -0.0711*** 0.381*** 0.383*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0218) (0.0735) (0.0693) 
Ln(distance) 0.0298*** 0.0290*** 0.0489*** 0.0490*** 
 (0.00304) (0.00305) (0.00869) (0.00806) 
Post-Cold War 0.457*** 0.458*** 0.519*** 0.520*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00915) (0.0290) (0.0282) 
Rivalry -0.396*** -0.377*** 0.134 0.130 
 (0.0396) (0.0410) (0.260) (0.230) 
Riot -0.0298 -0.0305 0.0624 0.0631 
 (0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0611) (0.0602) 
Assassination -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.0844 -0.0849 
 (0.0295) (0.0343) (0.0928) (0.0813) 
Civil War -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.203*** -0.201*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0287) (0.0783) (0.0775) 
Irregular Turnover -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.133*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0164) (0.0489) (0.0507) 
IMRaid -0.168*** -0.175*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 
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 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0206) (0.0207) 
Constant -5.555*** -5.220*** -6.848*** -6.944*** 
 (0.241) (0.234) (0.732) (0.983) 
     
Observations 119,429 119,429 16,835 16,835 
R-squared 0.074 0.075 0.108 0.108 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The task now turns to providing a more intuitive interpretation of the interaction effect 
found in Model 6. Figure 7 reports the marginal effects of a change in 1-Year Shift from its minimum 
to maximum values while holding Dissatisfaction at its mean and maximum values. Immediately 
apparent form both graphs is that the effect of 1-Year Shift is in the opposite direction as expected. 
Therefore, while H2d and H3d are supported in that the relationship between shifting power and 
the amount of aid a donor gives is conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction and the 
degree of parity in a state dyad, the effect of rapidly shifting power is in the opposite direction than 
expected. Instead of increasing the amount of aid a donor gives, more rapid increases in relative 
power, on the part of the weaker recipient, decrease the amount of aid the donor provides. It is 
interesting that aid is more likely to be provided in these dyadic conditions, but the amount given 
declines as the magnitude of the shift and the level of status quo dissatisfaction increase. This can be 
seen by the steepness of the slope of the line in the graph on the right versus the graph on the left. 
This finding implies that donors provide aid in hopes of deterring costly demands by the 
encroaching state to alter the status quo but give less to those that are more dissatisfied and 
encroaching at a more rapid pace, when provided. It is clear that the marginal effect of 1-Year Shift 
and the associated decline in aid is significant at the 95 percent level in both graphs. The decline in 
the graph on the right approximates to a 215 percent decline in the amount of aid provided to a 
weaker recipient. 
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Figure 7. Marginal Effects of 1-Year Shift on the Amount of Foreign Aid Provided. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, it was hypothesized that rapid shifts in relative state power, in favor of the 
weaker state in a dyad, increases the probability that the more powerful dyadic counterpart will 
provide the former with foreign aid. Additionally, it was hypothesized that this relationship is 
conditional on the level of status quo dissatisfaction and the degree of power parity between the 
dyad. The same conditions were also hypothesized to increase the amount of aid that the more 
powerful donor provides. The underlying argument is that the more powerful but declining state will 
use non-military foreign aid in an attempt to make the prospect of losing it too costly for the 
encroaching, weaker power. If successful, the high cost associated with the forfeiture or partial 
redaction of the aid being received will reduce the likelihood that the recipient will make demands to 
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alter the status quo distribution of benefits that are costly enough to cause the donor to stop 
providing said aid. 
 The empirical results provide support for the expectations concerning the probability that 
aid will be provided but are counter to the expectations concerning the amount of aid the donor 
gives. In a the most dissatisfied dyads that are at least 80 percent of power parity, a maximum one-
year increase in relative power by the weaker state increases the probability of aid by 15 percent, 
from a .53 to a .63 probability. Importantly, this increase in probability is significant at the 95 
percent level. On the other hand, these same conditions reduce the amount of aid the donor 
provides to a weaker recipient by approximately 215 percent. 
 The findings, while not completely in line with my theoretical expectations, are nonetheless 
enlightening. I have shown that shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, and power parity are 
important factors to consider when analyzing foreign aid. Even with the battery of known 
determinants of aid, the interaction of these three variables significantly affects the likelihood that a 
state will receive aid and how much they will receive. These findings provide additional insight into 
how states use economic coercion to manipulate the behavior of their counterparts in the 
international system. According to empirical results, we can expect the United States to decrease its 
provision of aid to China and other rapidly growing, dissatisfied states in the future and begin 
providing aid to those not already receiving it. Overall, it is apparent that foreign aid is, indeed, used 
as a tool of coercive foreign policy that concerns over the dyadic status quo affect the way it is used. 
Additionally, the results in this chapter further bolster the claim that power transition theory need 
not simply be a theory of war. It can, at the least, be applied to economic conflict.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation set out to examine whether, and how, shifting power distributions, status 
quo evaluations, and power parity work together to affect the use of economic foreign policy. The 
interaction of these variables has long been argued to be positively correlated with the outbreak of 
major-power war but has never been considered in context of other more common foreign policy 
responses. Relying on the logic of foreign policy substitution, I have argued that it is reasonable to 
expect that when the combination of these factors does not lead to war that it may lead other, less 
costly, manifestations of foreign policy. Of specific interest to this dissertation are those policy tools 
that fall under the economic category—namely, economic sanctions, bilateral trade, and foreign aid. 
Employing the logic of bargaining theory, I explained how each policy tool possesses its own 
bargaining range, identical in function to the bargaining range of war, proffered by Fearon (1995). 
When either the demand of the growing revisionist state to alter the status quo, or the demand of 
the status quo state to maintain it, falls outside of the agreements that the either state prefers to 
enacting one or more of these policies, the incentive to do is present. I argued that this can lead to 
the imposition of economic sanctions, reductions in bilateral trade, and to the provision of foreign 
aid.   
 The empirical results offer partial support for my theoretical expectations. As expected, the 
effect of shifting power on the probability of economic sanctions imposition, the probability of 
foreign aid provision, and bilateral trade flows is conditional on the degree of status quo 
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dissatisfaction in a state dyad. Among dyads that are near power parity, rapid shifts in favor of a 
dissatisfied, weaker state in the dyad significantly increase the probability of sanctions imposition 
and of foreign aid provision, and significantly decrease bilateral trade. Contrary to expectations, 
these same dyadic conditions decrease the amount of foreign aid a donor provides.  
These findings provide support for the argument that the conditions that lead to major-
power war also lead states to enact coercive economic foreign policies. The result for the amount of 
foreign aid donors provide is the only outcome for which the conditional effects of status quo 
dissatisfaction, power parity, and shifting relative power did not behave as expected. However, the 
effect was statistically significant but in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized.  
The empirical results vindicate the argument of foreign policy substation that similar stimuli 
can lead to different policy outcomes at different times, the word “similar” being an important and 
applicable caveat. This is certainly illustrated by each of the empirical chapters of this study. 
Relatedly, also receiving validation, is the argument that the key tenets of power transition theory 
can be applied to foreign policy options that fall short of war. The application of power transition’s 
key variables to economic foreign policy is supported by the empirical results. I would argue that 
these variables, and their interaction, deserve attention in any analysis that is concerned with the 
security implications of changing power distributions in the international system, whether said 
analysis is concerned with military, economic, or diplomatic foreign policy. Additionally, any study 
of armed conflict would be better served by identifying possible substitutes to military action and 
incorporate these into the empirical analysis. 
 Going forward, the underlying theory needs fine-tuning—this is obvious. It is understood 
that there are plenty of holes to be poked in this study. However, this is a first attempt at 
formulating a new theory of foreign policy, so there is naturally much room for improvement. In 
this respect, the scope conditions need to be refined. While it is not expected that the theory only 
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applies to the dyadic configurations put forward by power transition theory, restricting the scope to 
these conditions provide a good starting point for further refinement. One problem with this 
approach, however, is that these dyadic configurations are rare—thus, not being ideal for 
quantitative analysis. For example, in power transition theory’s purest form, there are only a handful 
of applicable dyads over the last 500 years (Kegley and Raymond 1994). Lemke’s (2000) regional 
approach may be a better, more quantitative-friendly, alternative. However, even in light of some 
obvious room for improvement, the foundational theoretical framework laid out in this dissertation 
provides a solid base from which to build a fruitful research agenda.  
Limitations and Future Research 
One of the limitations of each empirical chapter are the relative sample sizes in each subset 
of data. The subsets that include dyads that are at least 80 percent of power parity are much larger 
than those consisting of dyads that are less than 80 percent. Although none of the samples is small 
in the absolute context, the latter are much smaller relative to the former. For example, in the 
bilateral trade analysis, the near-parity subset contains over 21 thousand observations while the less 
than parity contains just over 8 thousand. The relative disparity in sample sizes may have some 
impact on significance levels of the variables in each subset’s respective empirical models. This is 
undoubtedly a direct result of the scope conditions. After removing the restrictions that the dyads 
under consideration must consist of at least one major-power or be contiguous, the sample size for 
the near-parity subset increases to include over 91 thousand observations, while the less than parity 
sample increases to over 89 thousand observations. Perhaps the significance levels would increase if 
the sample size on the latter subset was closer in size with the former. This pattern of asymmetric 
sample sizes is true for all three empirical chapters.  
Another limitation concerning sample size has to do with the possibility of type I errors, or 
false-positives. This is always a consideration when dealing with inferential statistics and a large 
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sample size. The analysis of foreign aid includes the largest sample out of the three empirical 
chapters of this dissertation. The reason for its relatively large size compared to the other analyses is 
its directed dyad-year structure. There are nearly 120 thousand observations in models 1 and 2 of 
Table 6. When the sample contains this many observations, it may be the case that insignificant 
effects provide more insight than those that successfully achieve the traditional accepted level of 
statistical significance. In Model 2 of Table 6, the only statistically insignificant effect is the 
coefficient for state rivalry. The insignificant result likely indicates that power parity has a greater 
effect on the provision of non-military aid than rivalry, as the coefficient for rivalry is statistically 
significant in in models 3 and 4, which consist of dyads that are less than 80 percent of power parity. 
In the near-parity subset, the effect of power equivalence washes out the effect of rivalry. This is an 
interesting insight gleaned from an insignificant result. 
 Another limitation of this dissertation is theoretically based. Specifically, how to best define 
the scope conditions. While I believe the dyadic hierarchy and relevant dyad explanations I offer in 
the study are valid, there is always room for improvement. As the study is based in the logic of 
power transition theory, perhaps redefining the scope conditions to those proffered directly by 
studies under its purview would be an appropriate alteration. Power transition theory is concerned 
with major power war at the system and regional level. In this study, I have not followed suite. The 
decision not to do so was not made without careful consideration, however. I strongly believe the 
logic of power transition theory applies to more than the dual realm of the international system and 
regional hierarchies. In fact, if logic justifies the theory’s application to the regional level, I see no 
valid reason for why the same logic not to justify its application to the dyadic level. Hierarchical 
relationships exist at all three levels of analysis. That said, it may be the case that my theory would 
possess greater validity if I were to adjust the scope conditions to be in line with those already 
established by prior studies. 
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 Another possible limitation, or possible flaw, of this study is that the theory attempts to 
apply a theory of major-power war to a theory of economic coercion, specifically, and foreign policy 
generally. I understand why this approach may be critiqued as a classic case of comparing apples to 
bananas. My response to this critique is that this has been an attempt to explain certain determinants 
of interstate behavior by drawing on existing theories of International Relations. Perhaps the 
counter response would be that this study should draw on different existing theories. This may, 
indeed, be a valid critique. At this time, however, I do am not able to identify what these other 
theories might be.  
 I view the limitations above to be the most probable. There are others, to be sure, but these 
present the largest challenge. That said, where there exists challenges there also exists opportunities 
for growth and progress. Each of these limitations provides an avenue for that growth and progress. 
Out of these, I believe the one that is most promising is the alteration of the scope conditions. In 
future research, the scope conditions could be altered to consist of both system and regional 
hierarchies. Relatedly, an analysis of how the three hierarchical structures interact to affect the 
foreign policy decisions of states provides an interesting avenue for future research. For example, 
how does the composition of the international hierarchy affect the composition of its regional 
counterparts? How does the composition of regional hierarchies affect the foreign policy decisions 
of dyadic hierarchies? Both of these are interesting questions that are worth pursuing. Another 
obvious avenue for future research would be to study how shifting power, status quo dissatisfaction, 
and power parity affect the use of armed conflict. This has been done at the regional and system 
levels but has not been applied to state dyads in the way economic foreign policy was in this study. 
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Table 8. Rare Events Logistic Regression Results for Economic Sanctions 
Imposition with Extended Power Shift Variables and Interactions—Near Parity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity >=80% parity >=80% parity 
     
Dissatisfaction 0.0815*** 0.0924*** 0.0536 -0.0388 
 (0.0223) (0.0298) (0.0475) (0.0366) 
Relative Power -0.268*** -0.310*** -0.349** -0.143 
 (0.0640) (0.0873) (0.172) (0.108) 
Ln(trade) -0.0134 -0.0166 -0.0456 -0.120*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0305) (0.0426) (0.0294) 
Allies 0.704** 0.808** 1.289** 1.687* 
 (0.358) (0.405) (0.635) (1.008) 
Ln(distance) 0.100 0.0203 -0.0610 0.187 
 (0.124) (0.106) (0.138) (0.136) 
US 2.765*** 3.329*** 4.482** 1.332 
 (0.501) (0.626) (1.780) (1.235) 
Year -0.0170 -0.201** -0.0313 0.287*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0938) (0.197) (0.0860) 
Sanction Year 0.346 0.927 16.94 9.117*** 
 (0.435) (0.625) (18.85) (1.510) 
5-Year Shift 5.160 . . . 
 (5.826) . . . 
10-Year Shift . 5.906 . . 
 . (4.874) . . 
15-Year Shift . . 9.855* . 
 . . (5.272) . 
20-Year Shift . . . 4.946 
 . . . (8.002) 
5-Year Shift*Dissat. -0.147 . . . 
 (0.435) . . . 
10-Year Shift*Dissat. . -0.0604 . . 
 . (0.377) . . 
15-Year Shift*Dissat. . . 0.163 . 
 . . (0.359) . 
20-Year Shift*Dissat. . . . -0.295 
 . . . (0.684) 
Constant 26.53 393.5** 19.60 -585.7*** 
 (74.91) (187.1) (408.6) (170.6) 
     
Observations 10,977 6,953 3,505 1,619 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9. Rare Events Logistic Regression Results for Economic 
Sanctions Imposition with Extended Power Shift Variables and 
Interactions—No Parity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES >80% parity >80% parity >80% parity 
    
Dissatisfaction 0.0907 -0.0473 0.305*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0682) (0.0878) 
Relative Power -0.144 0.205 1.493*** 
 (0.267) (0.229) (0.132) 
Ln(Trade) -0.268*** -0.166*** 0.541*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0399) (0.0735) 
Allies -1.510 -0.726 3.815*** 
 (1.950) (2.172) (1.016) 
Ln(distance) -0.174 -0.0491 2.742*** 
 (0.125) (0.110) (0.189) 
US 6.027** 3.408 -1.348 
 (2.353) (2.386) (2.814) 
Year 151.4*** 114.3*** -323.4*** 
 (0.0124) (0.00995) (0.0110) 
Sanction Year -9.442 17.84 1.470 
 (0) (0) (0) 
5-Year Shift 16.65** . . 
 (7.945) . . 
5-Year Shift*Dissat. -3.721*** . . 
 (0.674) . . 
10-Year Shift . 5.009 . 
 . (3.061) . 
10-Year Shift*Dissat. . 0.372 . 
 . (0.479) . 
15-Year Shift . . 17.26*** 
 . . (5.293) 
15-Year Shift*Dissat. . . 6.526*** 
 . . (0.203) 
20-Year Shift . . . 
 . . . 
20-Year Shift*Dissat. . . . 
 . . . 
Constant -299,475 -227,155 650,545 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    
Observations 3,876 2,380 1,217 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Fixed Effects OLS Regression Results for Logged Bilateral Trade with 
Longer Durations of Shifting Power—Near Parity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity >=80% parity >=80% parity 
     
Ln(Distance) -0.00329 -0.00936 -0.00464 -0.00701 
 (0.0111) (0.00572) (0.00564) (0.00565) 
Ln(GDP)a 0.0174 -0.0102 0.00189 0.00261 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0190) 
Ln(GDP)b 0.0218 0.0272 0.0204 0.0227 
 (0.0215) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0209) 
Ln(pop)a 5.944*** 5.821*** 5.520*** 5.707*** 
 (0.610) (0.581) (0.590) (0.597) 
Ln(pop)b 6.752*** 5.923*** 6.513*** 6.601*** 
 (0.386) (0.382) (0.394) (0.393) 
Major Power A -3.638*** -3.809*** -2.808*** -2.275*** 
 (0.553) (0.553) (0.542) (0.545) 
Major Power B 0.439 -0.00896 0.155 0.253 
 (0.822) (0.720) (0.728) (0.804) 
Relative Power -6.826** -9.811*** -7.628** -6.749** 
 (3.096) (2.978) (3.072) (3.062) 
Dissatisfaction 0.0168 0.0129 0.0113 0.0115 
 (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0141) 
1-Year Shift -7.543*** . . . 
 (1.732) . . . 
1-Year Shift*Dissat. -0.510*** . . . 
 (0.149) . . . 
5-Year Shift . 6.199** . . 
 . (2.745) . . 
5-Year Shift*Dissat. . 0.250 . . 
 . (0.264) . . 
15-Year Shift . . -3.544* . 
 . . (2.112) . 
15-Year Shift* Dissat. . . -0.503** . 
 . . (0.226) . 
20-Year Shift . . . -6.427*** 
 . . . (2.033) 
20-Year Shift* Dissat. . . . -0.697*** 
 . . . (0.219) 
Constant -121.1*** -112.6*** -114.6*** -117.2*** 
 (4.977) (4.850) (4.939) (4.993) 
     
Observations 91,797 99,478 99,793 100,639 
R-squared 0.132 0.128 0.134 0.137 
Number of dyadcode 4,223 4,255 4,278 4,272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Fixed Effects OLS Regression Results for Logged Bilateral Trade with 
Longer Durations of Shifting Power—No Parity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >80% parity >80% parity) >80% parity >80% parity 
     
Ln(Distance) -0.0191 -0.00108 0.00747 0.00127 
 (0.0148) (0.00973) (0.00958) (0.0104) 
Ln(GDP)a 0.0343** 0.0356** 0.0224 0.0255 
 (0.0165) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
Ln(GDP)b -0.0264* -0.0337** -0.0270* -0.0291* 
 (0.0159) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0154) 
Ln(pop)a 6.170*** 6.151*** 6.414*** 6.145*** 
 (0.503) (0.480) (0.485) (0.486) 
Ln(pop)b 6.893*** 6.518*** 6.507*** 6.751*** 
 (0.459) (0.444) (0.449) (0.452) 
Major Power A -3.333*** -3.156*** -3.154*** -3.105*** 
 (0.635) (0.703) (0.721) (0.734) 
Major Power B -1.897** -1.907** -2.032*** -2.095*** 
 (0.788) (0.750) (0.783) (0.787) 
Relative Power -0.350 0.106 -0.0728 0.171 
 (0.431) (0.411) (0.413) (0.408) 
Dissatisfaction -0.0210 -0.0321** -0.0294** -0.0310** 
 (0.0152) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
1-Year Shift -8.065** . . . 
 (3.515) . . . 
1-Year Shift* Dissat. 0.191 . . . 
 (0.254) . . . 
5-Year Shift . -11.97* . . 
 . (7.244) . . 
5-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. 1.457** . . 
 . (0.644) . . 
15-Year Shift . . -6.769 . 
 . . (7.271) . 
15-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. . 0.538 . 
 . . (0.585) . 
20-Year Shift . . . -6.853 
 . . . (6.855) 
20-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. . . 0.486 
 . . . (0.527) 
Constant -124.6*** -120.1*** -122.7*** -122.2*** 
 (3.340) (3.255) (3.219) (3.229) 
     
Observations 88,131 98,860 99,120 99,430 
R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.146 0.146 
Number of 
dyadcode 
6,055 6,363 6,466 6,424 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12. Logistic Regression Results for The Provision of Foreign Aid and 5-Year 
Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
5-Year Shift -2.771*** -0.255 -11.97*** 33.72 
 (0.938) (4.735) (3.422) (26.52) 
Dissatisfaction 0.0191*** 0.0650*** 0.00430 -0.00921 
 (0.00402) (0.0208) (0.00455) (0.0530) 
Relative Power -0.708 0.282 -1.925** -2.160* 
 (0.437) (0.611) (0.809) (1.211) 
5-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. 0.281* . 0.326 
 . (0.146) . (0.457) 
5-Year Shift* 
Relative Power 
. -12.53 . -117.0* 
 . (12.46) . (64.97) 
Relative Power * 
Dissat. 
. -0.110** . 0.0290 
 . (0.0479) . (0.113) 
Rivalry 0.370 0.369 -0.167 -0.147 
 (0.397) (0.401) (0.363) (0.363) 
Assassination 3.773*** 3.779*** 3.798*** 3.805*** 
 (0.242) (0.243) (0.266) (0.267) 
Civil War 4.055*** 4.055*** 3.938*** 3.940*** 
 (0.251) (0.251) (0.260) (0.260) 
Irregular Turnover 0.480*** 0.475*** 0.542*** 0.539*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0542) (0.0767) (0.0769) 
Ln(gdppc)B -2.134*** -2.160*** -1.764*** -1.755*** 
 (0.290) (0.292) (0.399) (0.399) 
PolityB 0.0481*** 0.0497*** 0.0540*** 0.0537*** 
 (0.00417) (0.00420) (0.00480) (0.00478) 
Ln(pop)B 0.0533* 0.0520* 0.220*** 0.223*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0411) (0.0411) 
physint2 -0.197*** -0.199*** -0.219*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0169) (0.0170) 
Trade DependenceB 1.567 1.617 3.812 3.893 
 (1.115) (1.114) (3.001) (2.994) 
Trade OpenessB -0.249*** -0.252*** -0.424*** -0.422*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0889) (0.0889) 
Ln(gdppc)A 7.729*** 7.748*** 4.032*** 4.040*** 
 (0.338) (0.339) (0.363) (0.364) 
Ln(pop)A 0.362*** 0.361*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0394) (0.0394) 
Colony 0.911*** 0.901*** -0.00546 -0.0302 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.303) (0.304) 
Defense 0.411*** 0.415*** 0.555*** 0.556*** 
 (0.0984) (0.0973) (0.0961) (0.0964) 
Ln(distance) 0.0313* 0.0309* 0.0174 0.0169 
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 (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0160) (0.0161) 
Post-Cold War 0.118*** 0.117*** -0.126** -0.122** 
 (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0590) (0.0590) 
Aid Year -0.726*** -0.725*** -0.618*** -0.618*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0388) (0.0389) 
Aid Year2 0.0803*** 0.0802*** 0.0703*** 0.0703*** 
 (0.00439) (0.00439) (0.00697) (0.00698) 
Aid Year3 -0.00235*** -0.00234*** -0.00222*** -0.00222*** 
 (0.000173) (0.000172) (0.000293) (0.000293) 
Constant -14.54*** -14.90*** -7.431*** -7.370*** 
 (1.027) (1.033) (0.947) (1.056) 
     
Observations 28,475 28,475 15,558 15,558 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13. Logistic Regression Results for The Provision of Foreign Aid and 10-Year 
Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
10-Year Shift -2.550*** 2.084 -2.150 -25.57 
 (0.957) (4.580) (3.182) (23.99) 
Dissatisfaction 0.0198*** 0.0669*** 0.00631 -0.0267 
 (0.00402) (0.0207) (0.00454) (0.0519) 
Relative Power -0.668 0.338 -1.965** -2.541** 
 (0.434) (0.608) (0.798) (1.170) 
10-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. -0.0220 . -0.354 
 . (0.155) . (0.430) 
10-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. -12.73 . 62.73 
 . (11.95) . (57.59) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. -0.113** . 0.0712 
 . (0.0476) . (0.111) 
Rivalry 0.347 0.343 -0.210 -0.231 
 (0.412) (0.415) (0.330) (0.329) 
Assassination 3.597*** 3.599*** 3.624*** 3.622*** 
 (0.233) (0.234) (0.253) (0.253) 
Civil War 3.865*** 3.864*** 3.737*** 3.734*** 
 (0.241) (0.241) (0.244) (0.244) 
Irregular Turnover 0.445*** 0.441*** 0.512*** 0.514*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0764) (0.0764) 
Ln(gdppc)B -2.220*** -2.251*** -1.680*** -1.665*** 
 (0.290) (0.291) (0.397) (0.397) 
PolityB 0.0477*** 0.0492*** 0.0546*** 0.0542*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00424) (0.00482) (0.00481) 
Ln(pop)B 0.0508* 0.0498 0.227*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0418) (0.0418) 
physint2 -0.196*** -0.197*** -0.222*** -0.223*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0167) (0.0167) 
Trade DependenceB 1.667 1.729 3.055 3.015 
 (1.149) (1.156) (3.117) (3.160) 
Trade OpenessB -0.249*** -0.248*** -0.414*** -0.418*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0857) (0.0858) 
Ln(gdppc)A 7.683*** 7.695*** 3.943*** 3.936*** 
 (0.335) (0.336) (0.364) (0.364) 
Ln(pop)A 0.350*** 0.348*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0321) (0.0397) (0.0398) 
Colony 0.916*** 0.914*** -0.00575 0.00871 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.305) (0.315) 
Defense 0.440*** 0.443*** 0.544*** 0.542*** 
 (0.0982) (0.0973) (0.0970) (0.0972) 
Ln(distance) 0.0267 0.0270 0.0124 0.0120 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Post-Cold War 0.117*** 0.111*** -0.117** -0.118** 
 (0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0589) (0.0589) 
Aid Year -0.709*** -0.707*** -0.616*** -0.615*** 
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 (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0395) (0.0395) 
Aid Year2 0.0783*** 0.0780*** 0.0713*** 0.0712*** 
 (0.00439) (0.00439) (0.00726) (0.00726) 
Aid Year3 -0.00229*** -0.00228*** -0.00229*** -0.00229*** 
 (0.000172) (0.000172) (0.000311) (0.000311) 
Constant -14.08*** -14.42*** -7.270*** -7.013*** 
 (1.019) (1.023) (0.959) (1.056) 
     
Observations 28,189 28,189 15,482 15,482 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14. Logistic Regression Results for The Provision of Foreign Aid and 15-Year 
Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
15-Year Shift -1.898** 3.658 -2.762 4.612 
 (0.928) (5.031) (2.916) (23.08) 
Dissatisfaction 0.0196*** 0.0648*** 0.00725 -0.0160 
 (0.00408) (0.0208) (0.00454) (0.0513) 
Relative Power -0.653 0.350 -1.893** -2.339** 
 (0.430) (0.606) (0.787) (1.174) 
15-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. 0.0997 . -0.209 
 . (0.143) . (0.401) 
15-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. -17.18 . -14.25 
 . (12.91) . (54.08) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. -0.108** . 0.0502 
 . (0.0478) . (0.109) 
Rivalry 0.354 0.337 -0.225 -0.221 
 (0.417) (0.424) (0.353) (0.352) 
Assassination 3.700*** 3.703*** 3.705*** 3.705*** 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.252) (0.252) 
Civil War 3.996*** 3.995*** 3.781*** 3.780*** 
 (0.244) (0.244) (0.246) (0.246) 
Irregular Turnover 0.480*** 0.476*** 0.516*** 0.516*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0767) (0.0767) 
Ln(gdppc)B -2.015*** -2.036*** -1.540*** -1.527*** 
 (0.287) (0.288) (0.394) (0.394) 
PolityB 0.0459*** 0.0473*** 0.0527*** 0.0524*** 
 (0.00424) (0.00426) (0.00483) (0.00482) 
Ln(pop)B 0.0699** 0.0672** 0.233*** 0.233*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0411) (0.0411) 
physint2 -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.220*** -0.221*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
Trade DependenceB 1.393 1.468 2.626 2.617 
 (1.046) (1.054) (3.582) (3.612) 
Trade OpenessB -0.244*** -0.246*** -0.444*** -0.444*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0875) (0.0874) 
Ln(gdppc)A 8.085*** 8.105*** 3.889*** 3.888*** 
 (0.333) (0.333) (0.364) (0.364) 
Ln(pop)A 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0314) (0.0395) (0.0395) 
Colony 0.868*** 0.860*** -0.00728 -0.0119 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.317) (0.321) 
Defense 0.422*** 0.423*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 
 (0.0993) (0.0981) (0.0954) (0.0955) 
Ln(distance) 0.0299* 0.0288 0.0131 0.0130 
 (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Post-Cold War 0.141*** 0.141*** -0.110* -0.111* 
 (0.0400) (0.0398) (0.0594) (0.0594) 
Aid Year -0.713*** -0.711*** -0.606*** -0.606*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0387) (0.0387) 
Aid Year2 0.0779*** 0.0777*** 0.0690*** 0.0689*** 
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 (0.00439) (0.00438) (0.00703) (0.00704) 
Aid Year3 -0.00225*** -0.00224*** -0.00218*** -0.00218*** 
 (0.000173) (0.000172) (0.000297) (0.000298) 
Constant -15.78*** -16.14*** -7.569*** -7.378*** 
 (1.011) (1.016) (0.946) (1.047) 
     
Observations 28,711 28,711 15,651 15,651 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15. Logistic Regression Results for The Provision of Foreign Aid and 20-Year 
Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
20-Year Shift -0.605 -1.988 -1.462 0.687 
 (0.900) (4.361) (2.767) (21.82) 
Dissatisfaction 0.0185*** 0.0564*** 0.00683 -0.0201 
 (0.00407) (0.0208) (0.00462) (0.0520) 
Relative Power -0.487 0.327 -2.016** -2.558** 
 (0.437) (0.610) (0.796) (1.203) 
20-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. 0.198 . -0.372 
 . (0.139) . (0.386) 
20-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. 0.573 . 0.853 
 . (11.33) . (50.58) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. -0.0904* . 0.0589 
 . (0.0479) . (0.111) 
Rivalry 0.462 0.464 -0.0222 -0.0201 
 (0.416) (0.419) (0.374) (0.373) 
Assassination 3.583*** 3.585*** 3.699*** 3.699*** 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.257) (0.257) 
Civil War 3.940*** 3.942*** 3.875*** 3.875*** 
 (0.244) (0.244) (0.254) (0.254) 
Irregular Turnover 0.500*** 0.497*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0540) (0.0772) (0.0771) 
Ln(gdppc)B -2.048*** -2.058*** -1.555*** -1.537*** 
 (0.287) (0.288) (0.400) (0.400) 
PolityB 0.0461*** 0.0473*** 0.0520*** 0.0515*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00423) (0.00489) (0.00489) 
Ln(pop)B 0.0527* 0.0503* 0.248*** 0.248*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0414) (0.0414) 
physint2 -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.218*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
Trade DependenceB 1.144 1.197 3.380 3.307 
 (0.967) (0.970) (3.269) (3.342) 
Trade OpenessB -0.248*** -0.252*** -0.468*** -0.470*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0490) (0.0936) (0.0935) 
Ln(gdppc)A 7.985*** 8.002*** 3.813*** 3.808*** 
 (0.342) (0.342) (0.366) (0.367) 
Ln(pop)A 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0396) (0.0396) 
Colony 0.876*** 0.857*** -0.00396 -0.000273 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.314) (0.322) 
Defense 0.409*** 0.415*** 0.606*** 0.606*** 
 (0.0983) (0.0969) (0.0982) (0.0983) 
Ln(distance) 0.0249 0.0241 0.0135 0.0135 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
Post-Cold War 0.121*** 0.124*** -0.0934 -0.0946 
 (0.0395) (0.0393) (0.0595) (0.0595) 
Aid Year -0.738*** -0.737*** -0.595*** -0.594*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0382) (0.0383) 
Aid Year2 0.0815*** 0.0813*** 0.0662*** 0.0661*** 
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 (0.00434) (0.00434) (0.00687) (0.00687) 
Aid Year3 -0.00237*** -0.00236*** -0.00205*** -0.00204*** 
 (0.000170) (0.000170) (0.000287) (0.000287) 
Constant -15.46*** -15.76*** -7.505*** -7.277*** 
 (1.025) (1.032) (0.953) (1.062) 
     
Observations 28,381 28,381 15,467 15,467 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16. OLS Regression Results for The Logged Amount of Foreign Aid and 5-
Year Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
5-Year Shift 6.607*** -15.32*** 6.416 -15.84 
 (1.689) (4.209) (5.827) (31.69) 
Dissatisfaction -0.00177 -0.0177 -0.00367* 0.0496 
 (0.00172) (0.0125) (0.00213) (0.0373) 
Relative Power 0.638** 0.245 -2.548*** -1.592* 
 (0.302) (0.399) (0.597) (0.860) 
5-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. 0.492* . -0.155 
 . (0.262) . (0.918) 
5-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. 51.11*** . 56.01 
 . (12.16) . (79.38) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. 0.0375 . -0.115 
 . (0.0287) . (0.0798) 
Rivalry -0.0566 -0.0519 0.0101 -0.00167 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.0750) (0.0748) 
Assassination 0.0579 0.0550 0.0118 0.0135 
 (0.0877) (0.101) (0.0643) (0.0593) 
Civil War -0.0613 -0.0613 -0.0752 -0.0733 
 (0.0777) (0.0736) (0.0809) (0.0671) 
RiotB -0.112** -0.109** 0.0239 0.0253 
 (0.0503) (0.0552) (0.0491) (0.0500) 
Irregular Turnover -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.118*** -0.115** 
 (0.0443) (0.0534) (0.0360) (0.0470) 
Ln(gdppc)B -1.378*** -1.354*** -0.637*** -0.647*** 
 (0.195) (0.172) (0.229) (0.231) 
PolityB 0.00130 0.000925 -0.00316 -0.00252 
 (0.00203) (0.00207) (0.00234) (0.00267) 
Ln(pop)B -0.0168 -0.0166 0.0727*** 0.0718*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0203) (0.0271) (0.0277) 
physint2 -0.0245** -0.0242** -0.0241** -0.0240** 
 (0.00996) (0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0110) 
Trade DependenceB 1.519 1.455 2.040* 1.966* 
 (1.341) (1.347) (1.043) (1.115) 
Trade OpenessB -0.0168 -0.0187 -0.0434 -0.0428 
 (0.0695) (0.0580) (0.0586) (0.0521) 
Ln(gdppc)A 4.186*** 4.169*** 2.270*** 2.280*** 
 (0.206) (0.225) (0.205) (0.216) 
Ln(pop)A 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.0574*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0193) (0.0172) (0.0200) 
Colony 0.599*** 0.593*** -0.160 -0.148 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.135) (0.151) 
Defense 0.0440 0.0391 0.0858 0.0911* 
 (0.0732) (0.0625) (0.0527) (0.0533) 
Ln(distance) 0.0234*** 0.0225*** 0.0110* 0.0120** 
 (0.00790) (0.00651) (0.00647) (0.00597) 
Post-Cold War 0.529*** 0.533*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0262) (0.0311) (0.0330) 
IMRaid5 -0.0535*** -0.0557*** 0.0309 0.0322* 
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 (0.0187) (0.0168) (0.0192) (0.0177) 
Constant -6.965*** -6.765*** -3.322*** -3.772*** 
 (0.509) (0.500) (0.593) (0.577) 
     
Observations 28,475 28,475 15,537 15,537 
R-squared 0.530 0.530 0.533 0.533 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17. OLS Regression Results for The Logged Amount of Foreign Aid and 10-
Year Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
10-Year Shift -4.289*** -5.863* -5.297 -61.01** 
 (1.323) (3.466) (5.511) (29.91) 
Dissatisfaction -0.000915 -0.00118 -0.00251 0.0703 
 (0.00174) (0.0119) (0.00190) (0.0450) 
Relative Power 0.610** 0.593 -2.458*** -0.998 
 (0.304) (0.381) (0.634) (0.885) 
10-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. -0.0543 . -0.254 
 . (0.273) . (0.699) 
10-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. 5.365 . 135.8* 
 . (9.189) . (77.04) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. 0.000668 . -0.157* 
 . (0.0284) . (0.0947) 
Rivalry -0.116 -0.112 -0.0268 -0.0811 
 (0.111) (0.123) (0.0688) (0.0715) 
Assassination 0.0965 0.0964 0.00492 0.00749 
 (0.0885) (0.0847) (0.0744) (0.0668) 
Civil War -0.168** -0.169** -0.0770 -0.0751 
 (0.0673) (0.0788) (0.0747) (0.0521) 
RiotB -0.122** -0.123** 0.0263 0.0304 
 (0.0510) (0.0554) (0.0494) (0.0517) 
Irregular Turnover -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.127*** -0.121*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0421) (0.0380) (0.0360) 
Ln(gdppc)B -1.460*** -1.460*** -0.590*** -0.607*** 
 (0.214) (0.239) (0.226) (0.191) 
PolityB 0.00418 0.00415** -0.00370 -0.00276 
 (0.00262) (0.00204) (0.00265) (0.00244) 
Ln(pop)B -0.00104 -0.000414 0.0748*** 0.0730*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0258) (0.0239) (0.0256) 
physint2 -0.0240** -0.0239* -0.0220* -0.0224** 
 (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0121) (0.0103) 
Trade DependenceB 1.635 1.627 2.239** 2.082 
 (1.295) (1.481) (1.093) (1.270) 
Trade OpenessB 0.0109 0.0118 -0.0317 -0.0326 
 (0.0851) (0.0584) (0.0537) (0.0448) 
Ln(gdppc)A 4.450*** 4.443*** 2.174*** 2.193*** 
 (0.267) (0.225) (0.199) (0.230) 
Ln(pop)A 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.0552*** 0.0589*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0183) (0.0167) (0.0181) 
Colony 0.660*** 0.662*** -0.135 -0.101 
 (0.120) (0.107) (0.134) (0.150) 
Defense 0.0269 0.0281 0.0821 0.0860* 
 (0.0738) (0.0618) (0.0597) (0.0491) 
Ln(distance) 0.0185** 0.0188** 0.00987 0.0107* 
 (0.00781) (0.00813) (0.00659) (0.00598) 
Post-Cold War 0.494*** 0.493*** 0.248*** 0.246*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0274) (0.0269) (0.0333) 
IMRaid10 -0.0427** -0.0430* 0.0234 0.0274* 
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 (0.0212) (0.0226) (0.0187) (0.0148) 
Constant -7.766*** -7.747*** -3.285*** -4.011*** 
 (0.670) (0.517) (0.486) (0.617) 
     
Observations 28,189 28,189 15,451 15,451 
R-squared 0.528 0.528 0.547 0.547 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18. OLS Regression Results for The Logged Amount of Foreign Aid and 15-
Year Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
15-Year Shift -6.591*** -2.630 -1.460 -100.2*** 
 (1.029) (3.510) (4.673) (32.91) 
Dissatisfaction -0.00155 -0.00901 -0.00318 0.0604 
 (0.00164) (0.0149) (0.00229) (0.0469) 
Relative Power 0.650* 0.493 -2.374*** -1.194 
 (0.362) (0.440) (0.513) (0.853) 
15-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. -0.192 . -0.0680 
 . (0.206) . (0.601) 
15-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. -7.821 . 234.8*** 
 . (8.378) . (75.55) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. 0.0174 . -0.137 
 . (0.0349) . (0.0992) 
Rivalry -0.161 -0.152 -0.0180 -0.0555 
 (0.105) (0.121) (0.0746) (0.0739) 
Assassination 0.0786 0.0759 0.0182 0.0194 
 (0.0925) (0.0950) (0.0599) (0.0742) 
Civil War -0.0625 -0.0645 -0.0878 -0.0852 
 (0.0909) (0.0776) (0.0673) (0.0655) 
RiotB -0.132** -0.132** 0.0340 0.0398 
 (0.0573) (0.0528) (0.0495) (0.0478) 
Irregular Turnover -0.165*** -0.163*** -0.121*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0491) (0.0382) (0.0335) 
Ln(gdppc)B -1.507*** -1.512*** -0.696*** -0.707*** 
 (0.243) (0.211) (0.192) (0.199) 
PolityB 0.00585** 0.00562** -0.00333 -0.00274 
 (0.00252) (0.00236) (0.00221) (0.00246) 
Ln(pop)B 0.000658 0.00198 0.0680*** 0.0658** 
 (0.0251) (0.0207) (0.0221) (0.0258) 
physint2 -0.0256** -0.0258** -0.0231*** -0.0229** 
 (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.00867) (0.0111) 
Trade DependenceB 1.853 1.836 2.241* 2.085 
 (1.335) (1.287) (1.221) (1.478) 
Trade OpenessB -0.00102 0.00189 -0.0352 -0.0346 
 (0.0745) (0.0576) (0.0536) (0.0616) 
Ln(gdppc)A 4.877*** 4.870*** 2.346*** 2.335*** 
 (0.273) (0.287) (0.191) (0.192) 
Ln(pop)A 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.0663*** 0.0708*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0172) 
Colony 0.676*** 0.687*** -0.149 -0.108 
 (0.116) (0.123) (0.118) (0.134) 
Defense 0.00331 8.87e-05 0.0865 0.0801 
 (0.0645) (0.0531) (0.0543) (0.0608) 
Ln(distance) 0.0114 0.0121* 0.00952* 0.00998 
 (0.00755) (0.00668) (0.00569) (0.00640) 
Post-Cold War 0.516*** 0.511*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0275) (0.0268) (0.0293) 
IMRaid15 -0.0325* -0.0330 0.0284* 0.0320 
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 (0.0190) (0.0226) (0.0147) (0.0211) 
Constant -8.599*** -8.528*** -3.498*** -4.064*** 
 (0.600) (0.727) (0.464) (0.602) 
     
Observations 28,711 28,711 15,632 15,632 
R-squared 0.520 0.521 0.532 0.533 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19. OLS Regression Results for The Logged Amount of Foreign Aid and 20-
Year Shifts in Relative Power—For Near Parity and No Parity Dyads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES >=80% parity >=80% parity <80% parity <80% parity 
     
20-Year Shift -1.362 -17.52*** 0.898 -101.0*** 
 (0.832) (3.509) (3.965) (25.97) 
Dissatisfaction -0.00163 -0.0133 -0.00302 0.0638 
 (0.00155) (0.0159) (0.00193) (0.0426) 
Relative Power 0.607** 0.176 -2.494*** -1.550* 
 (0.297) (0.427) (0.551) (0.854) 
20-Year Shift* 
Dissat. 
. 0.309*** . -0.0561 
 . (0.118) . (0.407) 
20-Year 
Shift*Relative 
Power 
. 39.77*** . 242.2*** 
 . (8.290) . (64.09) 
Relative Power* 
Dissat. 
. 0.0281 . -0.143 
 . (0.0363) . (0.0906) 
Rivalry -0.131 -0.127 -0.0294 -0.0762 
 (0.103) (0.137) (0.0760) (0.0787) 
Assassination 0.0876 0.0908 0.0146 0.0159 
 (0.0994) (0.0940) (0.0599) (0.0691) 
Civil War -0.0402 -0.0359 -0.0712 -0.0682 
 (0.0680) (0.0792) (0.0655) (0.0778) 
RiotB -0.121** -0.120** 0.0428 0.0479 
 (0.0549) (0.0530) (0.0475) (0.0486) 
Irregular Turnover -0.176*** -0.181*** -0.122*** -0.117** 
 (0.0460) (0.0522) (0.0428) (0.0558) 
Ln(gdppc)B -1.432*** -1.415*** -0.608** -0.627*** 
 (0.197) (0.227) (0.248) (0.223) 
PolityB 0.00326 0.00291 -0.00365 -0.00287 
 (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00289) (0.00250) 
Ln(pop)B -0.00673 -0.00663 0.0716** 0.0691** 
 (0.0223) (0.0214) (0.0320) (0.0299) 
physint2 -0.0205* -0.0201 -0.0229** -0.0230** 
 (0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0102) (0.0110) 
Trade DependenceB 1.600 1.587 2.477 2.064 
 (1.509) (1.579) (2.194) (1.935) 
Trade OpenessB 0.00186 -0.00395 -0.0357 -0.0313 
 (0.0663) (0.0637) (0.0491) (0.0543) 
Ln(gdppc)A 4.573*** 4.563*** 2.291*** 2.260*** 
 (0.232) (0.239) (0.251) (0.227) 
Ln(pop)A 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.0611*** 0.0640*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0204) 
Colony 0.652*** 0.610*** -0.153 -0.0682 
 (0.106) (0.119) (0.160) (0.137) 
Defense 0.00926 0.0276 0.0889 0.0807 
 (0.0739) (0.0838) (0.0635) (0.0631) 
Ln(distance) 0.0168** 0.0177** 0.0103 0.0107 
 (0.00702) (0.00715) (0.00862) (0.00751) 
Post-Cold War 0.520*** 0.526*** 0.268*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0228) (0.0317) (0.0290) 
IMRaid20 -0.0540*** -0.0530*** 0.0293 0.0343* 
 169 
 (0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0188) (0.0192) 
Constant -7.854*** -7.646*** -3.481*** -3.867*** 
 (0.682) (0.590) (0.591) (0.636) 
     
Observations 28,381 28,381 15,451 15,451 
R-squared 0.521 0.522 0.532 0.534 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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